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Abstract
The Internet of Things (abbreviated: “IoT”) is acknowledged as one of the most
important disruptive technologies with more than 16 billion devices forecasted to
interact autonomously by 2020. The idea is simple, devices will help to measure
the status of physical objects. The devices, containing sensors and actuators, are
so small that they can be integrated or attached to any object in order to measure
that object and possibly change its status accordingly. A process or work flow is
then able to interact with those devices and to control the objects physically. The
result is the collection of massive data in an ubiquitous form. This data can be
analysed to gain new insights, a benefit propagated by the “Big Data” and “Smart
Data” paradigms.
While governments, cities and industries are heavily involved in the Internet
of Things, society’s privacy awareness and the concerns over data protection in
IoT increase steadily. The scale of the collection, processing and dissemination of
possibly private information in the Internet of Things has long begun to raise privacy
concerns. The problem is a fundamental one, it is the massive data collection
that benefits the investment on IoT, while it contradicts the interest on data
minimization coming from privacy advocates. And the challenges go even further,
while privacy is an actively researched topic with a mature variety of privacy
preserving mechanisms, legal studies and surveillance studies in specific contexts,
investigations of how to apply this concepts in the constrained environment of IoT
have merely begun.
Thus the objective of this thesis is threefold and tackles several topics, looking
at them in a differentiated way and later bringing them together for one of the
first, (more) complete pictures of privacy in IoT.
The first starting point is the throughout study of stakeholders, impact areas and
proposals on an architectural reference model for IoT. At the time of this writing,
IoT was adversed heavily by several companies, products and even governments,
creating a blurred picture of what IoT really is. This thesis surveys stakeholders,
scenarios, architecture paradigms and definitions to find a working definition for
IoT which adequately describes the intersection between all of the aforementioned
topics. In a further step, the definition is applied exemplary on two scenarios to
identify the common building blocks of those scenarios and of IoT in general. The
building blocks are then verified against a similar approach by the IoT-A and Rerum
projects and unified to an IoT domain model. This approach purposefully uses
notions and paradigms provided in related scientific work and European projects
in order to benefit from existing efforts and to achieve a common understanding.
In this thesis, the observation of so called cyber-physical properties of IoT leads to
the conclusion that IoT proposals miss a core concept of physical interaction in the
“real world”. Accordingly, this thesis takes a detour to jurisdiction and identifies
ownership and possession as a main concept of “human-to-object” relationships.
The analysis of IoT building blocks ends with an enhanced IoT domain model.
The next step breaks down “privacy by design”. Notably hereby is that privacy
by design has been well integrated in to the new European General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR). This regulation heavily affects IoT and thus serves as the
main source of privacy requirements. Gürses et al.’s privacy paradigm (privacy as
confidentiality, privacy as control and privacy as practice) is used for the breakdown,
preceded by a survey of relevant privacy proposals, where relevancy was measured
upon previously identified IoT impact areas and stakeholders. Independently from
IoT, this thesis shows that privacy engineering is a task that still needs to be well
understood. A privacy development lifecycle was therefore sketched as a first step
in this direction.
Existing privacy technologies are part of the survey. Current research is summed
up to show that while many schemes exist, few are adequate for actual application
in IoT due to their high energy or computational consumption and high implemen-
tation costs (most notably caused by the implementation of special arithmetics).
In an effort to give a first direction on possible new privacy enhancing technologies
for IoT, new technical schemes are presented, formally verified and evaluated. The
proposals comprise schemes, among others, on relaxed integrity protection, privacy
friendly authentication and authorization as well as geo-location privacy. The
schemes are presented to industry partners with positive results. This technologies
have thus been published in academia and as intellectual property items.
This thesis concludes by bringing privacy and IoT together. The final result
is a privacy enhanced IoT domain model accompanied by a set of assumptions
regarding stakeholders, economic impacts, economical and technical constraints as
well as formally verified and evaluated proof of concept technologies for privacy in
IoT.
There is justifiable interest in IoT as it helps to tackle many future challenges
found in several impact areas. At the same time, IoT impacts the stakeholders
that participate in those areas, creating the need for unification of IoT and privacy.
This thesis shows that technical and economical constraints do not impede such a
process, although the process has merely begun.
iv
CONTENTS i
Contents
List of Figures v
List of Tables viii
List of Algorithms viii
List of Acronyms x
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2 Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3 Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2 Framing the Internet of Things 12
2.1 Commercial Relevance and Impact Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2 Differences in Data Generation between Web and IoT Systems . . 17
2.3 Methodology of Identification of Building Blocks for IoT . . . . . 18
2.3.1 Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.3.2 Building Blocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.4 Architecture Reference and Domain Model for IoT . . . . . . . . . 27
2.4.1 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.4.2 IoT-A Architectural Reference Model . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.4.3 Domain Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.4.3.1 Rerum Domain Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.5 Further Architectural Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.5.1 Federation, Collaboration, Cooperation and Composition . 39
2.5.2 Communication Schemes in IoT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.5.3 Ownership and Social IoT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.5.3.1 Ownership Representation in IoT . . . . . . . . . 48
2.5.3.2 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.5.3.3 A User-centric Implementation for Ownership . . 50
2.5.3.4 Proposal on the Establishment of Ownership . . . 51
Data Protection for the Internet of Things Santiago Reinhard Suppan, 2017
CONTENTS ii
2.5.3.5 Ownership in the Rerum Domain Model . . . . . 57
2.5.4 Implementation of the Rerum Domain Model . . . . . . . 59
2.6 Technologies for IoT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.6.1 Economical Value and Size Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.6.2 Classification of IoT Devices and Networks . . . . . . . . . 64
2.6.3 IoT Protocol Layer Stack - IETF LLN . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.6.4 IoT Protocol Layer Stack - IETF LLN + HIP . . . . . . . 66
3 Privacy in the Internet of Things 70
3.1 Stakeholders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.2 Privacy Engineering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.2.1 Privacy Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.2.1.1 The European Data Protection Rules . . . . . . . 75
3.2.1.2 European Data Protection Rules - Review 2012 . 77
3.2.1.3 Privacy by Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.2.1.4 PRIPARE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.3 A Privacy Development Lifecycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.3.1 Education of System Developers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.3.2 Phase 1 - Purpose Definition and Data Minimization . . . 86
3.3.3 Phase 2 - Threats and Risks Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.3.4 Phase 3 - Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.3.5 Phase 4 - Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.3.6 Phase 5 - Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
3.3.7 Phase 6 - Release of System and Education of Stakeholders 92
3.3.8 Phase 7 - Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.3.9 Challenges of Privacy Engineering in IoT . . . . . . . . . . 94
3.3.9.1 Best Practices for Privacy Engineering . . . . . . 94
3.3.9.2 Cognitive and Structural Problems . . . . . . . . 95
4 Privacy Enhancing Technologies for the Internet of Things 101
4.1 Categorization of Privacy Enhancing Technologies . . . . . . . . . 102
4.2 Privacy Enhancing Technologies Supporting Practice and Control 103
4.2.1 Privacy Dashboard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.2.1.1 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.2.1.2 Rerum Dashboard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
4.2.1.3 Integration in the Rerum Domain Model . . . . . 108
4.2.2 Consent Manager . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
4.2.2.1 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
4.2.2.2 Integration in the Rerum Domain Model . . . . . 116
Data Protection for the Internet of Things Santiago Reinhard Suppan, 2017
CONTENTS iii
4.2.3 Privacy Friendly Access Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
4.2.3.1 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
4.2.3.2 Other Authentication Protocols . . . . . . . . . . 130
4.2.4 Sticky Policies for Data in Transit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
4.2.4.1 Integration in the Rerum Domain Model . . . . . 133
4.2.5 Privacy Enhancing Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
4.2.5.1 Efficient Privacy Friendly Authorization . . . . . 136
4.3 Privacy Enhancing Technologies supporting Confidentiality . . . . 152
4.3.1 Position Hiding in Floating Traffic Observation . . . . . . 152
4.3.1.1 Floating Car Observation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
4.3.1.2 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
4.3.1.3 Description of the Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
4.3.1.4 Generation of Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
4.3.1.5 Stop at Geodic/Civic Area defined by Policy . . . 158
4.3.1.6 Automatic Stop at Side-Roads by Default . . . . 160
4.3.1.7 Example of User Opt-Out with two Active Vectors 160
4.3.1.8 Avoiding Correlation between Vectors . . . . . . 161
4.3.1.9 Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
4.3.1.10 Summary and Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
4.3.2 Pseudonyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
4.3.2.1 Related work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
4.3.2.2 Existing Fundamentals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
4.3.2.3 Virtually Unlimited Generation of Values . . . . 167
4.3.2.4 Choosing Adequate Pseudonyms . . . . . . . . . 169
4.3.2.5 Definition of Path and Jump . . . . . . . . . . . 170
4.3.2.6 Optimization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
4.3.2.7 Changing Pseudonyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
4.3.2.8 Pseudonym Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
4.3.2.9 Summary and Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
4.3.3 Malleable Message Authentication Codes . . . . . . . . . . 175
4.3.3.1 Introduction to Homomorphism . . . . . . . . . . 176
4.3.3.2 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
4.3.3.3 Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
4.3.3.4 MallMAC Scheme - Fundamentals . . . . . . . . 182
4.3.3.5 The MallMAC Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
4.3.3.6 Variations of the Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
4.3.3.7 Protocol Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
4.3.3.8 Summary and Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
4.3.4 Group Message Authentication Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
Data Protection for the Internet of Things Santiago Reinhard Suppan, 2017
CONTENTS iv
4.3.4.1 Introduction to Group Signatures . . . . . . . . . 195
4.3.4.2 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
4.3.4.3 Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
4.3.4.4 The GroupMACs Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
4.3.4.5 Considerations and Optimization of Group MACs 207
4.3.4.6 Protocol Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
4.3.4.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
5 A Privacy Enhanced IoT Domain Model 210
5.1 Rerum Pre-Final Domain Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
5.1.1 Trust and Privacy in IoT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
5.2 The Final RERUM Domain Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
5.3 A Privacy Enhanced IoT Domain Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
5.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
6 Conclusion 219
6.1 Outlook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
Appendices 224
A Assumptions on the Virtual Representation of Users 225
B Protocol Design and Verification 227
B.1 Design of Efficient Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
B.2 On the Verification of Security Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228
B.2.1 The Scyther Formal Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
B.3 Verification of the MallMACs Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
B.4 Verification of the GroupMACs Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
Bibliography 242
Data Protection for the Internet of Things Santiago Reinhard Suppan, 2017
LIST OF FIGURES v
List of Figures
1.1 Methodology overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1 Generation of data in [a] web based systems and [b] IoT . . . . . 18
2.2 From a definition and building blocks to a common architectural
reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.3 A Smart Home Scenario (left) and a Fitness Tracker Scenario (right) 23
2.4 The same building blocks could be identified in both scenarios . . 25
2.5 From scenarios (top) to architectures (bottom left) to building
blocks and an architectural reference model (bottom right) . . . . 26
2.6 The IoT-A: internet of things domain model . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.7 Rerum first phase ARM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.8 Contributions for Privacy Enhancing Technologies in Rerum . . . 38
2.9 Cloud based communication scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.10 Gateway based communication scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.11 Intranet based communication scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.12 Distributed communication scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.13 Ownership scenario - setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.14 Ownership scenario with enabling technologies . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.15 Ownership and digital shadow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.16 Ownership protocol example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.17 Integration of ownership in the Rerum domain model . . . . . . . 58
2.18 Rerum middleware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.19 Comparison of the TCP/IP stack (left) and the IETF IoT LLN
stack (right) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.20 IP based communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.21 HIP based (bottom) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.1 Draft for the Rerum dashboard [SWC+15] . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
4.2 Interaction of Privacy Dashboard and Consent Manager . . . . . . 109
4.3 Interaction of Privacy Dashboard and Anonymising and Pseudonymis-
ing Manager . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
Data Protection for the Internet of Things Santiago Reinhard Suppan, 2017
LIST OF FIGURES vi
4.4 Interaction of Privacy Dashboard and Activator / Deactivator of
Data Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
4.5 Sequence of the acquisition of user consent . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
4.6 Rerum Consent Manager: Example for consent request in the UC-I2
trial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
4.7 The access control modules (outlined) of the Rerum architecture . 120
4.8 A simple Sticky Policy mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
4.9 Exemplification of XACML by mapping a real life example . . . . 123
4.10 Integration of XACML components in the Rerum middleware . . 125
4.11 Sequence for the access of protected data in Rerum through XACML126
4.12 Sequence of the OAuth 2.0 protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
4.13 Sequence of the DCAF protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
4.14 Sticky Policies in the Rerum domain model . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
4.15 Pseudonym-based authorization tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
4.16 Energy profile comparison of different cryptographic functions [Che15]149
4.17 Geo-location data in traffic measurement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
4.18 Time controlled vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
4.19 Stop at geodic/civic area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
4.20 Stop at side roads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
4.21 Hash-Tree with an initial input x . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
4.22 Selection of adequate outputs as pseudonyms . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
4.23 Example of a pseudonym agreement for data retrieval . . . . . . . 173
4.24 Example of re-constructing a pseudonym by a device owner . . . . 174
4.25 Possible secrets and paths for Signer, Sanitizer and Verifier . . . . 186
4.26 The MallMAC Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
4.27 Proposed variation for sanitization knowledge by using different
secrets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
4.28 Variation of the distribution of secrets for better revocation . . . . 193
4.29 Variation of the distribution of secrets for better revocation . . . . 195
4.30 Example of existing hash trees in the scheme with two Signers . . 202
4.31 Example of a verification table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
4.32 Simplified sequence diagram for the proposed scheme . . . . . . . 204
4.33 Verification of two messages in two different time slices . . . . . . 206
5.1 Rerum domain model - six new extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
5.2 Rerum final domain model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
5.3 A Privacy Enhanced Domain Model for IoT . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
B.1 Scyther - Basic formal model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
B.2 Scyther - Protocol execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
Data Protection for the Internet of Things Santiago Reinhard Suppan, 2017
LIST OF FIGURES vii
B.3 Scyther - Matched typing and bounds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
B.4 Verification of the MallMACs protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
B.5 Verification of the GroupMACs protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
Data Protection for the Internet of Things Santiago Reinhard Suppan, 2017
LIST OF TABLES viii
List of Tables
2.1 Comparison of size in relation to costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2.2 IETF classification of constrained devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.1 Comparison of energy and computational profiles of AA schemes . 150
4.2 Evaluation of AA schemes for constrained devices in lossy networks 151
4.3 Generation of multiple vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
4.4 Multiple active vectors before entering an opt-out area . . . . . . 161
4.5 Averaged vector sent at entrance of an opt-out area . . . . . . . . 161
4.6 Group MACs: Initial distribution of secrets . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
Data Protection for the Internet of Things Santiago Reinhard Suppan, 2017
LIST OF ALGORITHMS ix
List of Algorithms
1 Construction of functions G, g1, g2, g3, g4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
2 Construction of main data structure used by the function G . . . 145
3 Example generation of a value for G . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
4 Traversing the PAT data structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
5 Initial creation of St . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
6 Creation of Ct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
7 Generation of HMAC values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
8 Creating pseudonym data structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
9 Generation of keys in a Group Signature Scheme. . . . . . . . . . 196
10 Distribution of keys in a Group Signature Scheme . . . . . . . . . 196
11 Adding new members in a Group Signature Scheme . . . . . . . . 196
12 Revoking members in a Group Signature Scheme . . . . . . . . . 197
13 Sign a message in a Group Signature Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
14 Verify a message in a Group Signature Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . 197
15 Re-link (or “opening”) a Signature in a Group Signature Scheme . 198
16 Actions of Signer 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
17 Actions of Verifier 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
Data Protection for the Internet of Things Santiago Reinhard Suppan, 2017
LIST OF ALGORITHMS x
List of Acronyms
IoT Internet of Things . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
ICT Information and Communications Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
IERC European Research Cluster on the Internet of Things. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21
IoT-A Internet of Things Archtiecture Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
PET Privacy Enhancing Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
PETs Privacy Enhancing Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
OSN Online Social Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
PbD Privacy by Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
PDLC Privacy Development Lifecycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
DFDs Data Flow Diagrams. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .87
FAQ Frequently Asked Questions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .92
EMS Energy Management System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
CoAP Constrained Application Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
6lowPAN IPv6 over Low power Wireless Personal Area Network . . . . . . . . . . . 28
OSI model Open Systems Interconnection model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
ARM Architectural Reference Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
WSN Wireless Sensor Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
PE Physical Entity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
VE Virtual Entity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
AE Augmented Entity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
VRD Virtual Rerum Device . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
GVO Generic Virtual Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
WWW World Wide Web. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
LLN Low Power and Lossy Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Data Protection for the Internet of Things Santiago Reinhard Suppan, 2017
LIST OF ALGORITHMS xi
ROLL Routing Over Low power and Lossy networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .65
HIP Host-Identity Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
ID Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
IESG Internet Engineering Steering Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
DTLS Datagram Transport Layer Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
NFC Near Field Communication. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21
RFID Radio-Frequency Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
GDPR General Data Protection Regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development . . . . . . . . . . . 82
UCC Uniform Commercial Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
SDLC Security Development Lifecycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
GVO General Virtual Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
FOI Feature Of Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
SPT Rerum Security, Privacy and Trust Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
HC Health Care . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
XACML Extensible Access Control Markup Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
PEP Policy Enforcement Point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
PDP Policy Decision Point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
RMW Rerum Middleware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
PAP Policy Administration Point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
OAuth Open Authorization standard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
SAM Server Authentication and Authorization Manager . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
CAM Client Authentication Manager . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
RO Resource Owner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
AS Authentication Server. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .127
AG Access Grant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
C Client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
S Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
RS Resource Server. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .127
ST Server Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
Data Protection for the Internet of Things Santiago Reinhard Suppan, 2017
LIST OF ALGORITHMS xii
CT Client Token. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .138
AT Authorization Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
DCAF Delegated CoAP Authentication and Authorization Framework . . . . 128
TTP Trusted Third Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
AM Authentication Manager . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
DTLS Datagram Transport Layer Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
SAML Security Assertion Markup Language. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .121
PAT Pseudonym-based Authorization Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
PRG Pseudo-Random Generator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
ACE Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments IETF
Working Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
AA Authorization and Authentication. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .148
ECQV Elliptic Curve Qu-Vanstone Implicit Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
TA Trusted Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
3DES Triple-Data Encryption Standard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
AES Advance Encryption Standard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algroithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
CA Certificate Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .131
VANETs Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
BASt German Federal Highway Research Institute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
GGM Goldreich, Goldwasser and Micali . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
MAC Message Authentication Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
HMAC Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
SSS Sanitizable Signature Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
MallMACs Malleable Message Authentication Codes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .177
RSU Road-Side Unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
GroupMACs Group Message Authentication Codes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .200
Data Protection for the Internet of Things Santiago Reinhard Suppan, 2017
Necessity is blind until it
becomes conscious. — Freedom
is the consciousness of necessity.
Karl Marx
Chapter 1
Introduction
The Internet of Things (IoT) is expected to bring massive changes upon society
and economy over the next 10 to 15 years [SGFW10]. The IERC [VFG+11]
describes IoT as: “a dynamic global network infrastructure [...] where physical
and virtual “things” have identities, physical attributes, and virtual personalities
and use intelligent interfaces, and are seamlessly integrated into the information
network.”
This global network of “things” is growing steadily with more than 16 billion
devices forecasted to interact by 2020, see [VF10]. Devices will be able to gather
data from different objects in different contexts in a higher quality and quantity
than ever before. The data will then be processed by service providers worldwide
through cloud services and mobile programs (or “apps”) which are estimated to
reach more than 253 billion in 2017, see [Sta15]. In order to understand why data
is an asset of such a great value, it has to be understood how economical value can
be generated from it. Kenneth Cukier, editor of “The Economist” and previous
editor of “Wall Street Journal Asia” expresses it as follows (see [Cuk14]): “Well,
think about it. You have more information. You can do things that you couldn’t
do before. [...] The general idea is that instead of instructing a computer what do,
we are going to simply throw data at the problem and tell the computer to figure it
out for itself. [...] And this idea of machine learning is going everywhere.”
The idea described by Kenneth Cukier is reflected in the Big and Smart Data
boom. Data is stored in the cloud, linked to other data (form other sensors or
other systems) and the “enriched” data can reveal structures that give new insights
1
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and allow new business opportunities. This new structures correspond to purposes
not identified in the first place which fundamentally contradicts European (and
U.S. American) data protection regulations, which have at their core user consent
and data processing that is bound to a purpose, see [Sol12].
A common understanding within IT companies is that parties collecting the
data (which are normally not the person to whom the data refers to), are free
to decide what they want to do with it. This point of view has been brought to
public focus recently by automobile companies which discussed whom the data
in connected cars belong to. The argument was that companies which produced
single car components (e.g., breaks, relays, bus systems) created and claimed
the data, while car manufacturers claimed the data because those components
were used in the car itself1. The discussion left the driver out completely, whose
behaviour is measured by the car sensors. This contradicts another fundamental
privacy principle: it is neither the “data generator” nor the “data controller”, the
entities that should determine how the data can be used and by whom. The entity
responsible for those decisions is solely the driver or “data subject” 2.
These misconceptions and challenges for data protection in IoT have long
begun to raise privacy concerns in the research community (for instance, see
[May09a] [Web10a] [AIM10a] [MS10]). Also, the European Commission has
expressed concern regarding the challenges of data protection in the Internet of
Things, see [TEGIE13], as well as Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners,
see [KM14].
But Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners also underline in [KM14]
that IoT and data analysis are useful for society. For example, health care has
benefited significantly from exchanging sensitive health records from patients,
see [WPJ+05]. With the data from patients in different contexts, further health
care support can be developed, for example in the case of assisted living. “Public
data mining” in cities can support efficient waste management, reduction of costs
1For a snapshot of the discussion, see [DeB15].
2The terms data subject, data controller and data generator are specific terms to describe
whom the data belongs to, who generated it and who processes, stores or maintains it. They are
commonly used in privacy, e.g. in the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).
For the sake of simplicity, this thesis will use the terms user as synonym for data subject and
service provider as a general collective term for data generator and controller.
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related to traffic and logistics as well as a raise in comfort quality regarding air
and noise pollution.
The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party states that society’s acceptance
and the benefits promised to cities and industries regarding the potential of
the Internet of Things will heavily depend on the perception of data protection
provided by IoT. The following quotation is taken from [EU 14]:
“Organisations which place privacy and data protection at the forefront of product
development will be well placed to ensure that their goods and services respect the
principles of privacy by design and are equipped with the privacy friendly defaults
expected by EU citizens.”
Privacy in the IoT context is not only a matter of “avoiding data” as data
collection and analysis is beneficial. The problem with this idea is that companies
may not know how to benefit from data, thus collecting large amounts until they
understand how to use it. As the purpose is unknown by the time of collection,
data subjects may not be informed properly or they are drawn into consenting to
processing policies that they do not understand for the immediate benefit of a
service or even for the lack of alternatives3.
Hoarding data may be risky, as shown in the Cost of Data Breach Study,
see [LLC15]. The study shows that a single lost or stolen record may cause an
average damage of $154. Data breaches ranged in 2015 from 22000 to more than
100000 lost records per incident, equalling an economic damage from $338000 to
$15 million. This does not include “mega breaches” which, according to the study,
disclose a minimum of 10 million records, causing a damage of 1.3$ billion or more.
The costs per breach include direct and indirect costs. Direct costs incur engaging
forensic experts, hotline support and providing discounts to recompense the
user. Indirect costs are extrapolated calculations of customer loss and diminished
customer acquisition.
But in some cases the consequences for companies may not be as big as
for the users and therefore the motivation to avoid unnecessary collection or to
adequately protect private data may be low. For example, the data breach of
Sony’s Playstation Network in 2014 was estimated to cost more than $100 million,
3As the introductory quote says, “Necessity is blind.”
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see [Cor14]. In their following quarter financial report, Sony stated that they could
reduce the costs to $15 million, see [Son15]. Additionally, Sony was able to use the
attention from the breach to push their publicity, flagging the attack as an attempt
to stop the release of a controversial movie produced by Sony, thus gaining more
subscribers as Sony released the movie in their entertainment network exclusively,
see [Dea15]. In summary, Sony could shift the attention from the privacy breach
to attract users to their network and compensate their losses (or even gain benefit
from it due to savings in advertisement), while the lost data records, providing
information about millions of user credit cards, passwords and payment details of
Sony employees remain in the hands of the attackers, see [Mus11].
A serious consequence that may come along data breaches or surveillance of
individuals is the so called chilling effect, see [Sol07]. The chilling effect describes
the fear of individuals of being judged by their actions and decisions. In order to
avoid such effects and increase user acceptance, IoT system operators will have to
be transparent to users, for example, by showing that their systems are not used
for extensive tracking. In cases of a data breach where information that can be
used to judge individuals is lost, the consequences are unpredictable.
In order to push companies to protect user data, high sanctions as well as
regulations have been demanded that do not allow loopholes. These exist in current
directives, as they are too high-level to decide whether protection is adequate
or not, see e.g. [Web09]. Accordingly, there is need for technology to protect
personal data in different scenarios. For example, if no efficient Privacy Enhancing
Technology (PET) is available for IoT devices due to their constraints, only a
best effort protection can be demanded from companies, even if it is inadequate.
There are several other challenges faced by all the stakeholders of IoT sucha s
Internet of Things developers, data protection authorities and individuals, as
stated in [KM14]. For example, the data gathered in public spaces relates to many
different individual data subjects, and it will not be easy to ask them for consent
or inform them about the purpose of collection. The transparency of the data
provenance and integrity is difficult to guarantee in a scenario where subjects are
continuously being monitored and tracked by a large number of devices. And
even if technical solutions exist, constrained devices used in IoT make the use of
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security and privacy mechanisms difficult to implement, configure and use. This
challenges and their interdependencies will be analysed during the course of this
thesis.
1.1 Motivation
This thesis provides an understanding of the fundamental conflicts of privacy and
IoT, which were briefly introduced in the Chapter 1. This is done by reconciling
existing work and serving new insights as a starting point to privacy in IoT by
showing which problems and challenges are the most imminent.
Although this thesis follows many technical proposals and explores how these
technical methods can be applied upholding the constraints imposed by IoT devices,
it does not focus on the specification of the “right Bits” for single technologies.
Developed protocols are means to understand why a specific technology makes
sense in the IoT context.
The first main challenge that this thesis wants to address is to identify the
building blocks of the Internet of Things. The existence of many road-maps,
definitions, whitepapers and architectures exist which make it difficult to define
what IoT actually is and how it is different from known systems like web systems
or sensor networks. It has to be understood upon which blocks the IoT will be
built on and which technologies will be used to bring an IoT system to life, for
example how proposals like [GBMP13], [RNL11] and [BBF+13] help to create a
common IoT architecture and how technologies like [Har12], [SHBF12], [Mul07]
and [GNC+01] may enable IoT but potentially limit data protection.
Protecting the privacy of system participants as well as casual users and non-
involved subjects in a future IoT is the second main challenge in privacy research.
The problem is the ubiquitousness and pervasiveness of sensors that measure
the status and context of environments. This will affect individuals regardless of
them being a user of the system or not. Data collection in IoT differs therefore
from other systems that are considered to be potentially intrusive, such as Online
Social Networks (OSNs). Online Social Network (OSN) generally trade privacy for
commodity and require active user interaction to consume the user’s data. Data
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protection in IoT has therefore many aspects that need to be analysed and other
research fields may need to be incorporated as well for possible answers, examplse
being jurisprudence4 and health care. Additionally, the constrained environment
of IoT does not allow to use existing Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs),
thus new PETs or adaptations have to be developed.
The last main challenge is enabling privacy preserving services in IoT. This
may be possible, if data protection can be deeply routed into an IoT system such
that privacy and value of data can be balanced. But there is no consensus on how
privacy can be engineered into a system, let alone into a network of systems such
as IoT. Many taxonomies, principles and approaches exist for building privacy
into a system.
Derived from the identified challenges above, this thesis will analyse following
questions:
Identifying the building blocks of IoT
(a) Which are the existing efforts and proposals to support a future IoT?
(b) Which are the main building blocks that IoT needs?
(c) Which building blocks are specially relevant for privacy in IoT and which
building blocks have to be further defined to allow "privacy by design"?
Data protection in IoT
(a) What requirements do European Data Protection Regulations impose on practi-
cal IoT, particularly the new proposals of [C+12b]?
(b) Which existing privacy taxonomy can be applied to IoT?
(c) Which existing privacy enhancing technologies are relevant for IoT?
(d) How can existing privacy enhancing technologies be adapted or applied in
concrete IoT scenarios?
Privacy by Design in IoT
(a) What does "Privacy by Design" mean in the context of IoT?
(b) How can identified privacy enhancing technologies enable privacy by design?
4Jurisprudence is the “the study, knowledge, or science of law”, see [Cor16].
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(c) How does the resulting privacy friendly IoT architecture reflect privacy by
design?
1.2 Approach
This thesis follows the design science research methodology from Peffers et al.
[PTRC07], based on the original proposal by Hevner et al. [HMPR04]. The
proposed methodology by Peffers et al. comprises of six activities:
Problem identification and motivation. Problem identification was intro-
duced in Section 1.1 and is further elaborated on related work discussed per
Chapter.
Definition of the objectives for a solution. Objectives or research questions
are defined in Section 1.1. Additional objectives are derived from the Rerum
project, which this thesis accompanies. The objectives will be referenced
through the thesis for clarity.
Design and development. Peffers et al. refer to the creation of artifacts such as
“constructs, models, methods, instantiations or new properties of technical,
social, and/or informational resources” to answer research questions. As
data protection in IoT covers a wide variety of problems, this thesis will
provide many different artifacts, such as an extended architectural reference
model in Section 2.3.1, protocols to show the viability of PETs in constrained
environments in Section 4.2 as well as a privacy development lifecycle in
Section 3.3 as a proposed consensus on privacy engineering.
Demonstration. The variety of aritfacts will be demonstrated in use cases that
are based on the Rerum project. Hevner et al. underline that artifacts should
target “unsolved and important business problem[s]”, therefore artifacts of
this thesis were published in the industry context as collaborative patents
and other intellectual property instruments with Siemens AG. References to
those publications are cited in the respective Chapter.
Evaluation. Artifacts were evaluated through formal verification, publications
and also in laboratory experiments. The evaluation form will be described
per artifact in its respective Chapter.
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Communication. Artifacts in this thesis were communicated to project and
industry partners as well as standardization bodies. Details will be described
per Chapter.
Figure 1.1 displays the relationship between the research method, related
work and results of this thesis. The individual relations between related work,
methodology and resulting contributions are explained in the respective Chapters.
For problem identification and motivation, this thesis will use, adapt and
extend the use cases of Rerum, see [RER14a].
Figure 1.1: Methodology overview
The main contributions of this thesis are:
• Survey of traditional web systems and their evolution to the Internet of
Things. As a clear cut definition is inexpedient, this survey focuses on
structures and problems from the traditional internet that are carried over
to the Internet of Things. The survey is firstly published in this thesis.
• Survey of privacy in traditional web systems, cognitive and structural prob-
lems and how they carry over to the Internet of Things. Solutions are
presented in form of related work and own proposals like a privacy de-
velopment life-cycle, architectural concepts and knowledge transfer from
other scientific fields, namely jurisprudence and medicine, and the technical
artifacts listed below. The survey is firstly published in this thesis.
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• Consent management is one of the structural problems of traditional data
protection. This artifact describes a technical and conceptual solution to
the scaling problem of consent. The problem derivation and definition is
only found in this thesis. The architectural artifact was developed for this
thesis, presented and published within the Rerum project.
• Policies in IoT are a fundamental technology to support consent manage-
ment. This technical artifact was developed for this thesis and was published
as an intellectual property item5 by Siemens AG in 2014, see [SC15]. The
artifact was thereafter introduced to and published by the Rerum project.
• Privacy friendly authentication and authorization are other fundamental
technologies needed for data protection. The technologies analysed were
based on the requirements of the Rerum project’s use cases. The resulting
artifacts comprise PETs for Malleable Authentication Codes, Group Message
Authentication Codes and Privacy Friendly Authentication Tokens. The
Malleable MACs and Group MACs have been adopted by Siemens AG as
intellectual property items6. Privacy enhanced tokens have been published as
an Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) draft and are further developed
by Siemens AG independently, see [CSP15].
• Ownership and Possession are fundamental elements of German law. Own-
ership and possession are useful for data protection to be able to differentiate
the privacy policies that apply in case a physical object that senses data is
used by a new subject. This artifact adopts the definition of German law
and transfers it to data protection. This artifact has, to the best knowledge
of the author, no related work and is firstly introduced in this thesis.
• Pseudonym management is used to generate and agree (for a limited time)
to use pseudonyms between different parties in IoT. This technical artifact
was developed for this thesis and was published as an intellectual property7
item by Siemens AG in 2014.
• Rerum Privacy Components. This artifact describes the components of the
5Under the official patent file reference number 102015202769.4.
6Under the official patent file reference numbers DE 102015205111 A1 and 102015211932.7,
respectively. Authors are Santiago Suppan and Jorge Cuéllar, filing by Siemens AG.
7Under official patent file reference number DE 102015203543 A1. Authors are Santiago
Suppan and Jorge Cuéllar, filing by Siemens AG.
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Rerum architecture that have been developed in the course of this thesis and
in cooperation with the Rerum project. The components comprise methods
for intervenability (temporary revocation of consent), transparency (privacy
dashboard) and use case specific archtiecture (floating car observation for
Rerum use case UC-O1.)
• Geo-location Privacy Technology for Floating Car Observation. This artifact
explains why related work on location privacy is too heavy and how a light
weight geo-location Privacy Enhancing Technology (PET) for floating car
observation could look like.
• A Privacy Development Lifecycle. This artifact suggests a privacy develop-
ment lifecycle and shows how it can be combined with a security development
lifecycle for synergies. This artifact has been submitted in 2015 and is going
to appear 2016 in [SC16].
• A Privacy Enhanced IoT Domain Model. This artifact summarizes all
previous artifacts in an IoT domain model. The domain model sets all
privacy and IoT building blocks into relation and is a key contribution of
this thesis.
Every artifact is accompanied by a literature review to further understand
the problem, underline motivation and draw conclusions. The literature reviews
follow Webster and Watson’s approach, as seen in [WW02].
1.3 Outline
The outline of this thesis is as follows:
In Chapter 2 an introduction to IoT is given. The Chapter begins with a
literature review to understand the motivation behind IoT, its economical value and
the most promising building blocks for future IoT research. The Chapter outlines
technical standards and architecture proposals, compares them to traditional
Information and Communications Technology (ICT) systems and reconciles the
building blocks of IoT systems. The building blocks will be used to develop privacy
enhancing technologies in Chapter 4.
In Chapter 3 privacy in the Internet of Things is discussed. Fundamental
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conflicts of privacy and IoT are recapitulated, several privacy principles, privacy
taxonomies and privacy frameworks are discussed and unified in a proposal for
a Privacy Development Lifecycle (PDLC). The Privacy Development Lifecycle
(PDLC) is used to identify the needed steps of privacy engineering and to analyse
the challenges in engineering privacy in IoT systems.
Privacy Enhancing Technologies are a fundamental part of privacy engineering.
PETs are fairly well developed, e.g., PETs that hold integrity conditions in
anonymous environments and to allow observability in public networks. In the
Internet of Things many of the current PETs are either too inefficient, economically
unsustainable or have not been researched thoroughly. Chapter 4 elaborates on
the PETs that are needed in IoT, based on scenario descriptions of the Rerum
project and the lessons learned of the PDLC proposal. This Chapter also presents
a proof of concept of several artifacts, such as model based integration of policies,
achieving malleability properties of message authentication codes, a lightweight,
privacy preserving authorization protocol based on symmetric cryptography and
a message authentication code scheme that resembles the properties of group
signatures.
Chapter 5 resumes the presented concepts and technologies, building blocks
and domain model proposals in a privacy enhanced IoT domain model.
Chapter 6 concludes this thesis and gives an outlook towards open challenges
and future work for data protection in IoT.
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Chapter 2
Framing the Internet of Things
There is an undeniable hype surrounding the Internet of Things. Companies with
a consulting focus like McKinsey, Accenture and Gartner state that IoT is the most
important technology trend of the next years, see [Com15b,DBNA14,JKW15].
But also companies with a technical focus like, Google1, Microsoft2, Siemens3
and others4 show that IoT promises competitive advantage. One problem is, that
public relations and marketing strategies have developed many definitions using
terms like “web of things”, “web of systems” and “web of everything” as synonyms.
It is therefore that a lot of confusion exists on what the Internet of Things actually
is and how it differentiates itself from traditional IT systems which have been
simply called “IoT” or “smart” to follow the trend.
In this Chapter different definitions of IoT will be discussed to adopt a working
definition for the rest of this thesis. As IoT is still a fairly recent topic, related
efforts of standardization bodies will be emphasized to make sure that the adopted
definition is long-lived. The remainder of this Chapter is outlined as follows:
Section 2.1 captures the current status of IoT in society and economy. Section 2.2
compares traditional ICT systems and IoT systems and underlines similarities
and differences. Section 2.3 elaborates a methodology to find building blocks for
IoT, Section 2.3.1 particularly discusses the different visions and definitions of
1Google wants to provide “the” operating system for the IoT, see [Wee16].
2Microsoft wants to unify IoT devices with their Windows 10 operating system, see [Mic16].
3Siemens manufactures a wide range of products and services for several application fields
including smart cities, industries and mobility. Additionally, Siemens wants to provide services
for their products to cover the whole IoT lifecycle, see for example the explanation in [Weg15].
4See e.g. [IBM16, Int16,Ama16a].
Data Protection for the Internet of Things Santiago Reinhard Suppan, 2017
2. FRAMING THE INTERNET OF THINGS 13
IoT. The Section concludes with the definition that is going to be used for the
rest of this thesis. Section 2.4 introduces the IoT-A and Rerum architectural
reference model and identifies the most important building blocks form the adopted
definition. Section 2.4.2 defines the IoT terminology that will be used in the
following Chapters, including definitions of a common domain model and an
architectural reference. Section 2.5 describes additional architectural concepts and
communication types in IoT. This concepts come into play in the design decisions
for PETs in Chapter 4. Section 2.6 reviews the proposed technologies to support
the identified building blocks and architecture. This Section concludes with a set
of “enabling technologies of IoT” which will be used in Chapter 4 to show how
these technologies favour and limit PETs.
2.1 Commercial Relevance and Impact Areas
The term “Internet of Things” is said to be coined by Kevin Ashton in 1999,
see [Ash09], when he linked the idea of RFID tags with the problem of a huge
amount of heterogeneous goods of Proctor and Gamble, in order to analyse and
optimise the company’s supply chain. The Internet of Things was born as a
business solution and it has been adopted as such, as is reflected in the opinions
of governments world wide, for example:
The Council of the European Union mentions the importance of IoT in March
2008 in [EU14], where it recognizes the Internet of Things as “poised to develop
and to give rise to important possibilities” and at the same time it acknowledges
that IoT “represents risks in terms of the protection of individual privacy”.
The United States National Intelligence Council acknowledged its disruptive
importance in 2008 [Cou08], stating that IoT may “contribute invaluably to
economic development and military capability”.
The Chinese government has first stated their interest in IoT in 2009, see
[SGFW10], with reported investments of $1.6 billion in 2014 and an estimated
market value of $ 163 billion by 20205.
One of the most significant technologies for IoT, as discussed in the following
5Figures reported by the GSMA, see [GSM15].
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Chapter, is RFID. The RFID market is estimated to amount $13.2 billion world-
wide6. Other building technologies in IoT, which may differ from application field
to application field, may amount similar market values with time, making the
economical significance of IoT many times larger.
There are several social areas that IoT will have impact on. Miorandi et al.
identify six market sectors in [MSPC12] which are Smart Homes & Buildings,
Smart Cities, Environmental monitoring, Health-care and Smart Busi-
ness. Gubbi et al. additionally determine in [GBMP13] Utility and Mobile,
which will be integrated in to the Smart Cities application field in the following
overview.
Smart Homes and Buildings are envisioned as a tool against pollution and
gas emissions from cities. The United Nations report on global warming of 2007
revealed that 70% to 80% of the CO2 emissions are produced in cities. Smart
homes and buildings can help to reduce the CO2 footprint by decentralizing energy
management and allowing on-site production of energy and the optimization of
energy consumption. The role of IoT here is to manage sensors that constantly
overview energy consumption and process the feedback of decentralized energy
production. Additionally, IoT helps to align energy optimization strategies with
user policies. Smart homes and buildings will also host many “smart appliances”
which will interact dynamically to provide commodity services for users such as
automatic temperature regulation, order of comestibles if their amount falls below
user defined thresholds, safety checks for door and window locks as well as for
critical appliances e.g., stove-tops, ovens, water pipes, etc.
Smart City is a term that unifies several application areas within a city.
Cities will be facing major challenges, as they are where up to 70% of the world’s
population is estimated to concentrate, see [Uni14]. One problem that comes with
this fact is the energy provision for the urban population. Traditional electrical
grids are built to transmit energy in one direction, usually provided by energy
producers. As the grid needs to hold a steady electric frequency, high energy
demand or low energy demand causes destabilisations that can lead to black outs.
With urban population increasing, the current grid structure will not be able
6Figures by idtechex, see [DH15].
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to cope with the volatility of demand. To handle the raising urban population,
a decentralized approach may be helpful. For this, the role of consumers and
producers has to merge, allowing households to produce, consume and sell their
own energy. Many energy producers will then be spread throughout the cities
forming “micro-grids” that balance their own demand and supply. A micro-grid
can give or take energy from other micro-grids in case of over- or under-production.
This is the so called “self-monitoring” and “self-healing” properties of the future
energy grid, also called “smart grid”. IoT will support many of the components of
the future smart grid, providing a platform for millions of sensors and actuators in
homes, electrical nodes and electrical markets which evaluate demand and supply
to establish energy prices. Gubbi et al. [GBMP13] point out that utility companies
will profit from a network of sensors in remote energy meters (or“smart meters”)
and water pumps which can provide a real time profile of energy transmission and
water networks in order to ensure high quality supply.
Traffic congestions and high pollution rates are other typical problems of
cities with high population. The solution is refereed to as “smart transportation”:
vehicles in a city contribute information (this is called floating car observation)
to a service provider, for example the municipality of a city, in order to gather
the traffic volume. The service providers then estimate possible congestions in
different routes and suggest the fastest detour to the contributing vehicles. The
suggested routes also help to distribute the traffic over several routes to avoid
congestions. Smart transportation can also include continuous traffic members
such as public transportation vehicles or garbage collectors. This type of traffic
participants circulate a city based on service requests. Until now, public transport
and garbage collectors needed to pass every stop and collection point in a route.
In the future, buses and garbage collectors are going to dynamically chose their
route to avoid empty bus stops and collection points. The dynamic routes are
then enriched by traffic estimation information of the service providers. IoT will
again help to provide the platform for all different types of traffic participants,
to connect various sensors for floating car observation and to combine different
services for a holistic traffic analysis. Gubbi et al. [GBMP13] also list freight
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carriers as beneficiaries of smart transportation with intelligent routes based on
traffic estimation and dynamic service provision.
Environmental monitoring and comfort quality analysis are similar in
their application. The European Union has defined exposure limits for several
pollutants such as O3 (ozone) and CO27 to reduce health risks. IoT can be used to
identify other emissions and pollution factors that could have detrimental effects
on citizens’ health by setting up sensor clusters all over a city which measure
different type of factors like temperature, windfall, rain, humidity, river height and
others. This application field is called environmental monitoring, which can also
be used to react to other scenarios: sensors and actuators may help to recognize
an emergency situation and assess the threat level to individuals located in the
area.
Exposure limits are generally established to minimize possible health risks.
However, environment-related quantities can also be adapted/changed to create
individual comfort zones. This kind of services are called comfort quality services.
Sensors and actuators are used to analyse the close environment of individuals
(temperature, humidity, etc.) and to change that environment (when possible)
according to the wishes of the users.
A particular application of comfort quality is Health Care. A personal body
network and sensor clusters in the proximity of patients can provide a detailed
health status to health service providers. The combination of several measurements
can help to identify emergency situations, trigger an adequate reaction and even
react preventively before the patient reaches an alarming condition. Sensors
and actuators can also support elders in their everyday activities (so called
assisted living) and health aware citizens to track their activities, such as recognize
unhealthy behaviour and optimizing their nutrition.
As stated in the previous Section, the term Internet of Things was born of
the idea of using sensors to optimize business processes. Smart Business is
a collective term for application fields that relate to business and industry, for
example inventory management in smart and chaotic warehouses, just-in-time
strategies and supply chain management, individual customer care, theft protection
7For other different variables, see [Eur08].
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and intelligent industries8 which can be set-up and administrated on short terms,
as IoT technology identifies resources, creates relations between them, creates
ordering processes for missing resources or retrieves plans to create them on-site
(e.g. with 3D printers).
These fields are just a subset of all possible applications of IoT. Although
diverse, they all observe users activities either directly or indirectly. In the next
Section, a brief overview of related projects and standardization activities is
given, which relate to privacy protection in the application fields presented in this
Section.
2.2 Differences in Data Generation betweenWeb
and IoT Systems
Web based systems and IoT systems have several things in common: they are
distributed by nature, their participants share and process a vast amount of data
and their technologies constantly adapt to new constraints and environments. IoT
has specific characteristics like resource constrained devices and lossy networks,
which will be detailed in Section 2.6.2. One of the main differences however, is
how data is introduced into each system as shown in Figure 2.1.
Data generation in web based systems ([a] in Figure 2.1) is actively driven
by system users. Users either participate in the systems and actively upload and
input data or the system generates data according to the users activities. Users
interact hereby on clients that have high resources regarding computational power,
energy and connectivity. In particular, clients are able to connect to wide area
networks such as the World Wide Web (WWW).
8Advertised as “Industry 4.0” in Germany, see [Bun14].
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Figure 2.1: Generation of data in [a] web based systems and [b] IoT
Privacy pervasive applications in web based systems operate on the data that
has been generated by the users themselves or has been generated according to
user activities. IoT based systems extend the structure of web based systems by
adding devices around web based clients. The devices do not necessarily interact
with the user, they are provided with simple interfaces and communicate in local
intranets.
Data generation in IoT follows many automatisms where devices are pro-
grammed or follow policies to automatically collect data. These devices use
sensors to measure their status and the status of their surroundings. IoT devices
tend to change their location and form new intranets dynamically. Consequently,
they sense the status of anything that occasionally happens in the devices’ envi-
ronments.
In regards to privacy, this is the most critical difference, as sensitive data of
non-users maybe collected and introduced to the system without their knowledge.
2.3 Methodology of Identification of Building
Blocks for IoT
In this Section the overall methodology to identify building blocks for the Internet
of Things will be described. Specifically, a “domain model” is required which
conceptually unifies and relates different building blocks.
Carrying out the methodology is a non-trivial task that takes considerable
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effort, therefore this thesis will use and extend the results of the projects IoT-A,
see Section 2.4.2, and Rerum, see Section 2.4.3.1. The methodology explained in
the upcoming Sections follows the approach of IoT-A and Rerum, although it is
presented in a simplified and exemplary manner. Additionally, this Section will
look into related work and will propose a working definition for the Internet of
Things, see Section 2.3.1, that will be used for the rest of this thesis.
The methodology starts with a definition. In general semantics a “definition”
can be of two types: intensional and extensional, see [Lyo77]. Intensional defini-
tions describe the essence of a term, while extensional definitions describe element
per element how a term is composed. Figure 2.2 displays the methodology.
Figure 2.2: From a definition and building blocks to a common architectural
reference
There are many definitions for the Internet of Things which vary depending
on the definition’s respective point of view. Their nature is intensional, as the
Internet of Things has no consensus and cannot be defined extensionally. That
means, that a definition can merely frame the Internet of Things, differentiating
it from traditional ICT systems and other related technologies (RFID, sensor
networks, the world wide web, etc.).
With an intensional definition, applications and scenarios can be identified
as scenarios using IoT technologies. These scenarios can be analysed in order to
identify common elements. These elements can again be put into an abstract
relation and classified as: (1) scenario and technically specific elements or (2)
conceptual elements. Conceptual elements that are non-technical and do not
change over considerable time are called building blocks. These building blocks
and their relations can be summed up in an architectural model, which can be
used to develop conceptual extensions for example to support data protection.
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2.3.1 Definition
In this Section, a definition is searched that answers the following question:
What building blocks do impact areas described in Section 2.1 have
in common?
The question is based on the following idea:
IoT is the underlying technology used to solve the challenges of several application
fields. These application fields and use cases have similar problems, which can be
conceptual, technical, architectural, etc. Similar problems are solved by similar
solutions. This solutions can be abstracted to building blocks. Identifying common
building blocks for the application fields is beneficial and can help to maintain
interoperability, to build system roadmaps, product life cycles and to benchmark
systems, see [BBF+13]. Once these building blocks are understood, they can be
analysed from a privacy point of view, used to derive privacy requirements and
enhanced to meet those requirements.
Definition 1 - Miorandi et al. define IoT in [MSPC12] “from a conceptual
standpoint [...] IoT builds on three pillars, related to the ability of smart objects to
be identifiable (anything identifies itself), to communicate (anything communicates)
and to interact (anything interacts). [These objects] either among themselves,
[build] networks of interconnected objects, or with end-users or other entities in
the network.” Miorandi et al. underline the properties of so called “smart objects”
which are physical entities that are able to be identified, to interact with their
environment and to communicate with other entities in a wide network.
Definition 2 - Gubbi et al. define IoT in [GBMP13] from an information
oriented (Gubbi et al. call it user-oriented) perspective: “interconnection of
sensing and actuating devices providing the ability to share information across
platforms through a unified framework, developing a common operating picture
for enabling innovative applications. This is achieved by seamless large scale
sensing, data analytics and information representation [...]” Gubbi et al. do not
elaborate on devices or the technology underlying the network to “allow long-
lasting applications to be developed and deployed using the available state-of-the-art
protocols at any given point in time.”
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Definition 3 - Atzori et al. do not give a definition in [AIM10a], they see the
Internet of Things as an intersection of different paradigms, namely:
• the internet-oriented paradigm that describes protocols, networks, virtual-
ization through middleware, etc.
• the things oriented paradigm that looks at the technology close to physi-
cal entities, such as Near Field Communication (NFC), Radio-Frequency
Identification (RFID), sensors, actuators, etc.
• and the semantic oriented paradigm that helps to create knowledge from
information through data analysis.
In summary, Atzori et al. see IoT as a way of using existing paradigms. As a
result, the building blocks for IoT will emerge per use case and per application
field.
Definition 4 - A possible definition, given by the European Research Cluster
on the Internet of Things (IERC) in [VFG+11], was presented in the introduction
of this thesis. The IERC states that IoT “could be defined” as a “dynamic global
network infrastructure [...] where physical and virtual “things” have identities,
physical attributes, and virtual personalities and use intelligent interfaces, and are
seamlessly integrated into the information network.” The IERC envisions physical
objects with respective virtual representations that share some attributes. Virtual
entities might also be of a more complex character such that they are able to have
own identities and interact individually with other entities in a global network.
The four definitions can be summarized to obtain a broader, more complete
definition of IoT. This definition will be used as the working, intensional definition
of this thesis. The definition reads as follows:
Start of Definition 5. The Internet of Things is a large network that unifies
several entities. The majority of these entities are virtual representations (also
called virtual entities) of physical entities. Physical entities are measured and
changed by small hardware, usually called smart objects. A smart object is either
hardware (e.g., sensors and actuators) that measures and acts on a physical entity
combined with the respective software, or, the composition of the physical entity
that is measured and acted on and the respective hardware/software in such a
way that they are visually inseparable.
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Smart objects can be unequivocally identified, communicate what they sense
and they react to to other network participants, taking their environment into
account and possibly changing on it.
Virtual representations take the data from smart objects. A virtual repre-
sentation may take data from one or many smart objects. Complex virtual
representations may have complex logics, called personalities.
The data that is offered by smart objects to virtual representations is analysed
and converted to different data formats depending on their context9. Smart objects,
virtual representations, data exchange elements, etc. are called building blocks.
Building blocks are conceptual elements and are based on different technologies,
which may change over time. The change depends on different factors, inter alia
the respective state-of-the-art, market position of technology drivers, patents,
intellectual property and others. End of Definition 5.
At this point it is noted that only partial consensus could be found with Atzori
et al. intersection of specifically things/internet/semantics as many other research
and application fields may influence IoT as shown in later Chapters of this thesis.
Also, some technologies are developed specifically for IoT, therefore not fitting in
the intersection paradigm.
In the next subsection, the answer to the question asked at the beginning of
this Section will be sketched by looking at two use cases and applying Definition
5 to them. In this process, the building blocks of IoT will be pointed out, set into
relation and introduced to an architectural model.
2.3.2 Building Blocks
In the last Section several possible definitions of IoT were presented and a holistic
definition for the Internet of Things was proposed. This Section takes a look at
building blocks. Building blocks of a system are conceptual, non-technical elements
that are not expected to change over the next decades or longer [BBF+13, p. 114].
By looking at two simple use cases and trying to identify their building blocks
9For example a user’s location data can be transmitted as raw data for user navigation or it
needs to be transformed to create a routable road network. Both scenarios may take place when
a user is driving his car and the data is measured the same way (by a GPS device), but the
data format changes depending on what the user wants (the context of use), as seen in [CK09].
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with help of Section’s 2.3.1 Definition 5, this Section will try to identify building
blocks that answer the question:
What do building blocks that impact areas in IoT have in common?
Figure 2.3: A Smart Home Scenario (left) and a Fitness Tracker Scenario (right)
Figure 2.3 displays two typical scenarios in IoT10. The left image shows a
smart home. Users that live in smart homes are able to use information technology
to control appliances and to adapt their energy consumption (smart homes will
be able to produce, store and sell energy) via graphical interfaces such as smart
phones or so called energy management systems.
The second image shows one of many scenarios for body area networks and
wearable devices. Wearable devices are accesoires that help to measure physical
attributes of its possessor. A user can connect one or several accessoires to his
smart phone (or other devices with a graphical interface) and analyse his own body
data to derive his physical status and change his behaviour accordingly. In the
image, a jogger who monitors his heart rate with a fitness tracker is depicted. The
user can then adapt his speed to train different energy systems (e.g. phosphagen,
aerobic, anaerobic).
Definition 5 will now be mapped to each of the scenarios to identify common
building blocks. Definition 5 names five characteristics of IoT: physical entities,
their virtual representation, devices that measure or act on physical entities, basic
functionalities of the devices and the network structure that interconnects all of
these entities.
Smart Home Scenario
Physical entities. The smart home has several physical entities and appliances
like heating systems, light bulbs, windows, doors, etc.
10Images where acquired under Flickr CC© creative commons license.
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Virtual representations or virtual entities. According to Definition 5, all of
the smart home’s physical entities have a virtual representation. These
could be software artefacts that are instantiated in the user’s smart phone
or energy management system.
Devices. According to Definition 5, virtual entities have attributes in order to
resemble the status of the physical entity. In this scenario, devices are
embedded into the smart appliances.
Functionality of the different Entities. According to Definition 5, entities
are identifiable, are able to communicate and to respond to messages from
other entities. All of those tasks are carried out by the entity’s respective
device(s).
Network. Devices and the smart phone or the Energy Management System
(EMS) are connected over a home area network. In case third party services
are used to analyse the energy consumption, the smart phone or EMS serve
as a gateway to the internet.
Fitness Tracker Scenario
Physical entities. In this scenario the user is the physical entity.
Virtual representations or virtual entities. The virtual entity represents
the user, with one attribute for his heart rate. This could be a software
artefact that is instantiated in the user’s smart phone.
Devices. According to Definition 5, virtual entities have attributes in order to
resemble the status of the physical entity. In this scenario, the fitness tracker
and the smart phone are two devices that are able to measure the user’s
attributes.
Functionality of the different Entities. According to Definition 5, entities
are identifiable, are able to communicate and to respond to messages from
other entities. The fitness tracker measures the user’s heart rate and provides
this data to the user (on his smart phone). The device which monitors the
physical entity (i.e. the user) is represented by the fitness tracker while the
smart phone holds the virtual entity as a representation of the user.
Network. The fitness tracker is connected to the smart phone, building a small
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body area network. In case third party services are used to analyse the
user’s heart rate, the smart phone serves as a gateway to the internet.
Figure 2.4: The same building blocks could be identified in both scenarios
Figure 2.4 visualizes the identified building blocks per scenario. It is also visible
that all building blocks have some kind of relationship to each other: Sensing,
actuating and identification elements are in physical proximity. They are either
devices themselves or a part of a device that is attached or somehow related to a
physical entity. Devices are connected to a gateway, be it the user’s smart phone
or the energy management system, creating a local IoT intranet with a gateway
to the WWW. The smart phone (or the EMS) hosts the virtual representations of
the physical entities and acts as a middleware that creates interfaces for graphical
applications. After this analysis, the question at the beginning of this Section can
be answered with: the impact areas described in Section 2.1 have at least the five
building blocks of Definition 5 in common.
“At least” underlines that components, their functionalities, resources and
services can be put into relation in more exactitude. The result could be an
architectural reference model that abstracts the individual building blocks and the
architectures from scenarios into general building blocks to facilitate development,
standardization and comparability of IoT systems.
Figure 2.5 shows the methodology. This methodology has been described
in [Mul08,BBF+13]. The bottom up approach (from use cases to a theoretical
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Figure 2.5: From scenarios (top) to architectures (bottom left) to building blocks
and an architectural reference model (bottom right)
model) is applied in Internet of Things Archtiecture Project (IoT-A)11 because
there are many IoT systems in use already.
11IOT-A, project full title: The Internet-of-Things Architecture, was a FP7 project founded
by the European Commission under the grant agreement no.: 257521. http://www.iot-a.eu, last
visited August 17, 2017.
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An architectural model has to analyse many use cases at once and verify the
universal applicability among them. This effort has been done by IoT-A and is
therefore out of scope of this thesis.
At the time of this writing, there is no standardized architectural reference
model with assigned building blocks for IoT, therefore it cannot be guaranteed
that a particular proposal will be long-lived. Nevertheless, the IERC project
IoT-A has developed an Architectural Reference Model (ARM) that surpasses the
scope of many related projects and that methodologically builds and summarizes
its results. How the IoT-A ARM differs from other proposals and how it is build
will be thematized in the following Section.
2.4 Architecture Reference and Domain Model
for IoT
The IoT-A ARM is a very complete and expedient proposal for a common un-
derstanding of IoT in terms of identifying building blocks and relationships in a
non-technical manner. Before going into details, general work related to architec-
ture proposals in IoT will be discussed. The discussion will exclude projects that
are based on the IoT-ARM such as iCORE, BUTLER, IoT@Work and OPENIoT
as they are all based on the same ARM. Rerum, which provides privacy and
security extensions to the IoT-ARM, is discussed in Section 2.4.3.1.
2.4.1 Related Work
Gubbi et al. present an "internet" centric IoT architecture which focuses on
processes and services more than the "things" centric view of IoT. The exclusion
of the "things" centric view raises many questions when mapping the architecture
to scenarios as done in this Section. Gubbi et al. give hints on the technology that
could be important for smart objects and "things", but it is not explained how these
technologies interplay or are related to the other elements of the architecture. For
example, RFID is named as an important element of IoT, but it is not explained
by whom and for what reason RFID data is processed. Following Definition 5
from Section 2.3.1, it could be assumed that a virtual representation will use that
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information, but this is an assumption that lies outside of the architecture. Gubbi
et al. reference IoT-A as an "European Union [project] that [has] been addressing
the challenges particularly from a wireless sensor network perspective". In the
research of IoT-A done for this thesis, this cannot be confirmed. IoT-A’s proposal
does not focus on particular Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) related topics like
topologies or routing paths, it rather covers a wide spectrum from sensors to
business processes, maintaining a non-technical perspective.
Khan et al. [KKZK12] propose a layer based stack, which conceptually charac-
terizes the communication in machine-to-machine environments. It is based on
the Open Systems Interconnection model (OSI model), but changes many of the
layers in the OSI model. Vidal et al. also propose in [VMZS+13] to change the
Open Systems Interconnection model (OSI model) in favour of the host-identity
protocol (see [MNJH08]). Although both proposals tackle different problems in
IoT, it is uncertain if any proposal that radically changes the OSI model will be
accepted and applied by manufacturers, vendors and service providers. It seems
therefore that standardization in the IETF for IoT does only consider proposals
within the OSI model, such as the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)
and IPv6 over Low power Wireless Personal Area Network (6lowPAN), as seen
in [ICT+13].
Yashiro et al. propose in [YKKS13] an architecture that allows an extension
of the CoAP protocol with the uID architecture (see [KS10] for details on the
uID architecture). The proposal details technical aspects on the identification of
entities in the IoT network and how they can be embedded in applications, but it
does not look into relationships or building blocks in general.
There are other proposals that seek to establish an architecture for fast time-
to-market services and products. Such an architecture can be found in [FRE15],
which discusses several protocols and technologies that are provided by the author’s
products.
The ISO/IEC JTC 1/WG 10Working Group on Internet of Things is developing
a reference architecture “to describe the characteristics and aspect of IoT systems,
to define the IoT domains, to describe the reference model of IoT systems and to
describe interoperability of IoT entities”, see [San15]. The working group has been
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established in 2014 and is still actively developing their proposal for the ISO/IEC
30141 standard. The working group has been in contact with several IERC groups
including the Rerum consortium12. There is a high probability that the resulting
standard will be compatible with the IoT-A ARM and that the concepts and
technologies developed for the Rerum project and for this thesis can be applied to
the ISO ARM as well.
2.4.2 IoT-A Architectural Reference Model
The following subsection describes the general concepts of the IoT-A ARM. The
subsection relies on the description of the IoT-A book, see [BBF+13], if not cited
otherwise.
Mueller describes in [Mul08] an architectural reference model as “captur[ing]
the essence of the architecture of a collection of systems”. Similar to the example
methodology of Section 2.3.1, the building blocks of several (existing) systems are
analysed and put into relation.
IoT-A classifies the building blocks of IoT within several architectural views.
Views are “representation[s] of one or more structural aspects of an architecture
that illustrates how the architecture addresses one or more concerns held by one
or more of its stakeholders”, see [RW12]. Views are composed of viewpoints.
Viewpoints are described in [MEH01] as “establish[ing] the languages or notations
used to create a view, the conventions for interpreting it, and any associated
analytic techniques that might be used with the view”.
IoT-A proposes the following architectural views for IoT:
Physical Entity View refers to the physical entities in IoT which may be any
physical object that is relevant from a user or application perspective. This
can be any physical object including humans and animals.
Deployment View is derived from the physical entity view. For example, the
Physical Entity View might indicate that entities are fragile and need to be
attached to devices all at once.
12See https://ict-rerum.eu/765-2/ for a snapshot of the collaboration. Website was last visited
on August 17, 2017.
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Operational View describes which tasks and actions are required for operating
the system.
IoT Context View depends on the physical entity view, it describes the relation-
ships, dependencies and interactions between the system and its environment.
IoT-A further defines four main activities for the generation of an architecture
from the IoT-A ARM, which relate to the points described above. The activities
are:
• Create a Physical Entity View. Similar to example of Section 2.3.1, a system
is planned by identifying physical objects, their relationships with sensors,
actuators and other devices, and the interactions between each other and
between components outside the system.
• Create an IoT Context view. This action prepares the elicitation of require-
ments by further analysing the systems relationships with its environment.
IoT-A provides an IoT Domain Model which gives an ontological and se-
mantic overview of the possible relationships.
• Elicit Requirements (functional, non-functional).
• Derive other views (deployment and operational).
The last two actions depend on the outcome of the first two actions, which
depend themselves on the IoT Domain Model. The domain model is introduced
in [BBF+13, p. 114] as a “precondition” for working with the IoT-ARM as it
introduces the concepts like Devices, IoT Services, Virtual Entities (VE), and
their relations. The domain model is comparable to Figure 2.5 where the depicted
architectural reference model contains the blocks “tags, sensors, actuators”, etc.
The IoT-A domain model defines fundamental building blocks, sets them in
relation and serves as a starting point for the creation of the ARM, architectures
and IoT systems. The building blocks of the IoT Domain Model are not bound
to particular technologies and are not expected to change “over the next decades
or longer”, see [BBF+13, p. 114].
In the next Section, the IoT Domain Model will be explained followed by the
extension of the domain for security and privacy building blocks in Section 2.4.3.1.
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2.4.3 Domain Model
The IoT Domain Model provides a common definition and taxonomy of the
IoT domain. The complete IoT-A taxonomy for the Internet of Things is given
in [BBF+13, Section 6.7]. The domain model consists of several sub-models, namely
the IoT Information Model, the IoT Functional Model, the IoT Communication
Model and the IoT Trust, Security & Privacy Model.
The IoT Information Model defines the structure of information in an IoT
system without giving details on its exact representation. The IoT Functional
Model identifies functionality groups that manage the information of the Infor-
mation Model. The Communication Model describes concepts for handling the
complexity of communication in IoT, while the Trust, Security and Privacy Model
introduces typical functionalities and interdependencies for trust, security and
privacy.
IoT-A provides a graphical representation of the domain model using the UML
language.
Figure 2.6 shows the diagram. The diagram sets several blocks into relation.
Each block has a colour, yellow depicts animate objects (humans, animals, plants
and so on), blue is considered hardware, green is considered software and white is
not clearly classifiable (e.g. a scenario specific, non-statical combination). The
diagram evolves around the physical entity. A physical entity may be an animate
object, but also any kind of physical (“touchable”) object. Physical objects maybe
atomic or composed of many physical objects, such as the subcomponents in a
car. As seen in the examples of Section 2.3.1, physical objects are measured and
acted on. Therefore, one or many devices are attached on physical entities either
physically or in its physical proximity. A device, as a physical (“touchable”) object,
is itself a physical entity and could be measured, e.g., for maintenance. Devices
may have different duties but three basic functionalities can be observed for IoT
(see Definition 5 in Section 2.3.1): identify, measure and act on entities. These
functionalities are carried out by devices (tags, sensors and actuators) which can
be individual devices, or, one device may carry out all functions. A particular
relationship may exist, where a sensing device is also measuring the identification
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Figure 2.6: The IoT-A: internet of things domain model
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device. In general, these functionalities are not mandatory, therefore their relation
to the physical entity is zero to many.
In Definition 5, the idea of virtual representation of physical objects was
already introduced. This idea is also found in the domain model with the relation
of physical to virtual entities. The relationship is denoted with [one to many] to
[one], as there may not be a Virtual Entity (VE) without a Physical Entity (PE)
that the VE is representing. Also, a physical entity may have several virtual
representations that are either atomic or complex, but a VE is always related to
a single PE. The existing relation of PE and VE generates a conceptual entity
called Augmented Entity (AE). The AE is the composition of a PE and a VE. If
one of the elements is removed, the AE is destroyed.
Each VE has an Identifier (ID) that identifies it unequivocally. A VE can
be either passive or active. Active VEs are of the type Active Digital Artefacts
(ADA) such as software applications (Services are also ADAs, see below). Passive
types are Passive Digital Artefacts can be static software objects such as database
entries.
The VE can be imagined as a software object that is initiated with the
attributes of its physical counterpart. For example, if a window closes, the VE of
that window has to change one of its attributes to ‘closed’.
In the domain model, the VE does not directly consume sensed information
from a sensor. The reason is practical: a sensor is likely to have proprietary
protocols and interfaces. Therefore an abstraction of the data interface has
to be found. IoT-A proposes to call those abstraction resources. Accordingly,
every device hosts two types of resources, a network resource that takes care
of communication functionality (receiving and sending messages) and an on-
device (data) resource, that handles the interfaces of providing and receiving (and
understanding) data.
A VE is associated to zero or many resources and is accessed through services.
Services (or agents) are software clients that provide interfaces to resources and VE.
In the case of resources, services offer interfaces to retrieve or provide information.
In the case of VEs, the service’s interfaces allow to change a VE (“close window”)
and to trigger a device reaction accordingly (“actuator closes window”).
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Users are animate objects or some kind of a Digital Artefact (e.g., a Service or
an application) that interact with Physical Entities. In the case of direct physical
interactions (e.g. opening or closing a window), the VE has to adapt its attributes.
The same interaction can only happen virtually, if the PE can be acted on by an
actuator. It is then the responsibility of the Services to check if such an interaction
is possible.
The domain model will serve as the fundamental building block for the rest
of this thesis. It will be extended throughout this thesis and discussed in Sec-
tions 2.4.3.1.
Considerations The domain model suggests that VEs do not need to be as-
sociated to any service or resource. An example given in [BBF+13] is a passive
VE in form of a database entry. But if the VE is not associated with any service
or resource, it is not able to represent the physical entity adequately. If the PE
changes, there is no other way of changing the VE than updating the database.
The database has to be an active digital artefact that needs a service to be
updated. How and when the service updates the database is uncertain, as there
is no resource (and device) to trigger the alert. With improper representation,
the composition of the Augmented Entity cannot be sustained and the PE does
consequently not participate in the system.
If a human user was to update the database (assuming interaction also means
monitoring), he has to invoke a service to update the database. The database
would then contain the VE that is changed by the service. In this case, the VE had
to be explicitly contained in the database, which is not a requirement following
the zero to one, zero to zero self-relationship of Virtual Entities in the domain
model.
Therefore, the assumption will be made that Passive Virtual Entities which
are neither associated to devices nor services, are always contained by an Active
Virtual Entity with both associations. This assumption13 will be included in the
final domain model of this thesis in Section 2.5.3.5.
13This aspect is newly introduced in this thesis. The BUTLER project has introduced an
additional building block called Context that is related to VEs, but it does not address this
aspect directly. The final domain model of this thesis will consider the work from BUTLER,
but the outcome is a proposal firstly published in this thesis
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2.4.3.1 Rerum Domain Model
In this Section, the first phase Rerum domain model, see [RER15], is introduced.
In the first phase, functional and non-functional requirements of Rerum use cases
have been introduced to extend the IoT-A domain model.
Rerum First Phase Domain Model. Rerum has based its domain model on
the proposals of the IoT-A and BUTLER projects. Figure 2.7 is taken directly
from deliverable D2.3 [RER14b] and presents the first phase domain model. In
comparison to the IoT-A domain model, see Figure 2.6, the Rerum domain model
adds six new elements:
Context. The notion has been adapted from the BUTLER project. In short,
context is an additional attribute of a Virtual Entity, that describes the
context of the Physical Entity. Contextual information can be very different:
e.g., from personal information like position to information about the state
of an entity, like temperature and light level.
Context has a zero to many relationship with Resources, as contextual
information maybe measured from none or many Devices that are or are
not related to the Physical Entity the Context is describing. Context is
exposed by its Virtual Entity, as it can be described as an additional property
that the VE carries. Context is accessed by a Service (thus zero to many
relationship), as is any other attribute of the VE.
Users and Applications. Rerum assumes that Software invokes Services, thus
replacing the Active Digital Artefact with Applications. Rerum also assumes
that a Human User either interacts physically with an Entity or uses an
Application to invoke Services and interact with an Entity’s virtual represen-
tation. The associations are zero to many in both cases (user to application
and application to service). A self-association is depicted for Services to
allow one Service to invoke another. This can be useful in case of federations,
collaborations, compositions, etc.
Virtual (Rerum) Device. The Virtual Rerum Device (VRD)14 is the virtual
representation of a Device. The VRD behaves like the VE of the IoT-A
14Rerum branded this entity with the Rerum label as the project is developing devices itself.
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domain model: it can be self-contained (a VRD can contain zero to many
other VRD’s and accordingly be associated to none or one VRD head in
case of a composition). A Device is assigned to a PE, therefore the VRD is
assigned to a VE as well. The associations are zero to many.
Generic Virtual Objects. Rerum sees VRDs and VEs as similar objects that
represent different entities. Rerum therefore makes an abstraction of both
and defines an objects called the Generic Virtual Object (GVO).
Administrator. Rerum defines an Administrator as a human user with the
highest privileges in the domain model. He administrates the software that
contains virtual representations, is responsible for associating virtual entities
with their physical counterparts, registering new devices and keeping the
firmware of devices up-to-date.
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Figure 2.7: Rerum first phase ARM
In the second phase, privacy, security and trust technologies were developed.
As these technologies are used in the whole architecture, a further extension is
needed, which leads to the final Rerum domain model. Several of the privacy
enhancing technologies that were developed for this thesis are among those that
influenced the domain model. Figure 2.8 gives an overview.
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Figure 2.8: Contributions for Privacy Enhancing Technologies in Rerum
The depicted technologies are presented in detail in Chapter 4.
This thesis builds upon the first phase and the final domain model to propose
a privacy enhanced domain model15 in Chapter 5.
2.5 Further Architectural Concepts
Rerum defines additional layers to complement the domain model. The domain
model defines which elements and relations a system has while the layers describe
how they interact. In total, four layers are defined:
On-device layer. This layer describes the software, hardware components of
devices and also handles how technologies can be embedded into devices.
Communication layer. This layer describes how active entities of the domain
interact with one another. The communications scheme is significant for
the analysis of threads and risks as well as for the selection of protection
mechanisms.
Middleware layer. This layer manages the virtualization of entities, e.g., creat-
ing a virtual entity from a physical entity and associating nearby devices
to that virtual entity. Other tasks are the registration of new devices, the
15The concepts that are additionally presented in this thesis could not be integrated in the
Rerum project due to the timely finalization of the domain model. In any case, the Rerum
domain model can bee seen as a living proposal that is meant to be used, adapted and extended.
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orchestration of service- and discovery requests, how services and resources
are provided as well as the association of different entities according to
Rerum’s IoT domain model.
Application layer. This layer is an abstraction layer that specifies the protocols
and interfaces that interact with all the underlying layers. For example, the
business process modelling language is used is this layer. Rerum has defined
this layer as out of scope.
Rerum’s exclusion of the application layer has also an effect on the layout
and scope of this thesis, as architectural work and the verification on trials were
not available. The application layer deals with the user interaction and user
experience which is a central part of privacy as control. Therefore some details
and suggestions are given in Chapter 4.
In the following subsections, the communication layer is further discussed as its
functionality is significant for the data flow of an IoT system and for the privacy
analysis of that system. The rest of the layers will not be further discussed here
as the application layer has been left out of scope. Rerum’s on-device layer as well
as the middleware layer have already been discussed extensively, see [RER15].
2.5.1 Federation, Collaboration, Cooperation and Com-
position
In IoT entities interact heavily. Virtual entities communicate, interact and group
with other entities to provide services of higher complexity. In this Section16,
group interactions will be discussed. Grouping is a certain behaviour of entities
to share or delegate logic to one or among several entities. Rerum describes one
form of grouping as forming a federation.
Rerum defines in [RER15] federations as follows17: “a grouping of virtual
devices is called a “federation” if they cooperate to offer a composed Service
for monitoring or controlling a PE. Furthermore, the VRD federation can be
considered as a service composition between the Services of the VRDs for access-
ing/changing the attributes of a VE.”
16This Section is firstly published in this thesis.
17For legibility, the Rerum terminology has been adapted to the terminology of Section 2.4.2.
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The definition uses several terms for the interaction of entities when they
“group”: “federation”, “cooperation” and “composition”. This terms can again
be differentiated based on how entities associate to one another, if resources of
entities are shared or not between other entities and how a common goal, for
example the provision of a mutual service, is reached.
In this Section four forms of “grouping” will be reviewed and set into an IoT
context, namely federation, collaboration, cooperation and composition.
Federation. Serrano et al. define in [SMH+10] federations for future internet
systems as: “any governance environment in which two or more autonomous
administrative domains must interoperate for their mutual advantage and where
they must establish business, trust and technical agreements to make that happen.”
This definition can be applied to IoT terms in the following way:
a federation is a relationship in which entities interact to achieve a mutual goal,
e.g., the provision of a complex service where entities are able to operate on
their own (“autonomous”) and have several associations to other entities and
contexts (“administrative domains”). Agreements have to be established to reach
the federation’s goal, e.g., an agreement on which service the federated entities
guarantee. Also technical agreements, e.g. modes of operation, such as how data
object types that are used between entities are to be handled, protocols (such as
TCP or UDP), interfaces (APIs which describe parameters and function calls),
encryption modes and the definition of policies and trust relationships. Trust
is essential for federations as one entity has to trust a second entity to behave
as expected18. In federations, participating entities will not gain access to the
resources of other federation entities. Rather, entities manage their resources on
their own and they offer individual services.
Serrano et al. define a federation as a governance. Rerum assumes that there
is one entity that leads the governance and at the same time offers the service
which is also responsible for the logic necessary to orchestrate the federation.
In this thesis, the leading entity will be called a federation head, the remaining
participants will be called federation peers.
18The notion and the mechanisms of trust will be further explained in Section 4
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Collaboration. The term collaboration in ICT is not used as a mechanism
but rather as a form of “working together” between researchers and system
designers to drive innovation or education, see for example [McC04, HW04].
Therefore, a closer look is taken at social sciences, which looks deeper into the
interaction in collaboration. The definition of Mattessich et al. in [MM92] is
adopted, which describes collaboration as a: “mutually beneficial and well-defined
relationship entered into by two or more organisations to achieve common goals.
The relationship includes a commitment to: a definition of mutual relationships
and goals; a jointly developed structure and shared responsibility; mutual authority
and accountability for success; and sharing of resources and rewards. [...] The
individuals who represent collaborating organisations are referred to as partners
or members.” Compared to a federation, entities in a collaboration share their
resources, they equally define goals, business, trust and technical agreements. A
collaboration has no head, it is led in a mutual way by all members. Entities in a
collaboration may exclude the provision of services outside of the collaboration,
as shared resources may be used and blocked by fellow collaborators.
Cooperation. Cooperation has not been sufficiently discussed in the field of IoT
or ICT. For example, Schaffers et al. discuss in [SKP+11] “cooperated federations”,
but do not give any information on what a cooperation nor what a federation
means. Another example can be found in [RPP11], Rohokale et al. present
a model for cooperative IoT, but assume that the reader is savvy of wireless
cooperation networks and is able to transfer his knowledge to IoT. Sirinivasan
et al. refer to game theory to explain cooperative behaviour in their work on
cooperation in wireless networks, see [SNCR03].
Game theory will also be used here to find a suitable definition for cooperation.
Game theory is a mathematical model to describe social behaviour, specially
cooperative and conflictive aspects thereof, and is thus well fitted for explaining
the term cooperation.
Dugatkin et al. define in their work on game theory and animal behaviour,
see [DR98], a cooperation as: “an outcome that - despite potential costs to
individuals - is “good” (measured by some appropriate fitness measure) for the
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members of a group of two or more individuals and whose achievement requires
some sort of collective action. [...] [To] cooperate can mean either to achieve that
cooperation (something manifests at group level) or to behave cooperatively - that
is, to behave in a manner making cooperation possible (something the individual
does), despite the fact that the cooperation will not actually be realized unless other
group members have also behaved cooperatively.” Furthermore, they describe three
paths to achieve cooperation: by reciprocity (i.e. acting in a way that benefits
others), by forming a group and through by-product mutualism (an action that
first and foremost benefits the actor, but also benefits others as a by-product).
This definition can again be described in IoT terms as follows: entities in a
cooperation have a common “outcome” or goal, e.g., the result of some sort of
service provision. The goal is mutually defined and benefits all of the cooperating
entities. To reach their goal, entities behave in one of the three formulated ways
(reciprocal, group oriented, creating by-products). For example, a group of entities
in an IoT space would cooperate and act reciprocal, if they chose every action
in a way that it benefits a part of the group. In comparison, a group oriented
behaviour means that some of the cooperating entities form an explicit group and
that their actions do not affect the other entities in the space directly. Lastly, the
entities may offer individual services, but they chose to act in such a way that a
by-product benefits some of the space’s participants.
Entities in a cooperation may share their resources. They are likely to be
able to offer individual services anytime. A cooperation has no single point of
leadership and may be terminated as soon as the outcome is reached.
Composition. Composition relationships are known in software engineering
as part of the unified modelling language. The UML version 1.3 specification,
see [RHCF05], describes compositions as:“a form of aggregation with strong
ownership and coincident lifetime of part with the whole. The multiplicity of the
aggregate end may not exceed one (it is unshared).” Entities entering a composition
are created for the composition only and are destroyed when the composition’s
lifetime ends. Composition entities share their resources and are not allowed to
share or use them outside of the composition. The notion of ownership suggests
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that one entity in the composition has more responsibility than the others. It
carries the logic to orchestrate the compositions activities, manages the shared
resources, defines the composition’s goals and handles service, trust and technical
agreements. Clarke describes in [Cla02] additional agreements and actions that
need to be made when entities enter a composition relationship. These are adapted
to IoT terms:
Specify how entities should be integrated. Define how different entities can
be integrated and which integration method is preferred. Methods could be
for example migration, replacement or wrapping.
Identify and specify overlaps. Entities might have similar APIs, assignments
to devices and other entities, services and resources. These overlaps have to
be identified.
Specify how conflicts in corresponding elements are reconciled. If con-
flicts appear, define how they can be resolved. For example for an API, the
API of entity may take precedence over another, or neither is preferred and
a new API is created.
2.5.2 Communication Schemes in IoT
Section 2.4 introduced the methodology to obtain an IoT domain model which
comprises IoT entities and their relationships. Section 2.5.1 described how entities
can group and share common logic. Communication schemes describe how entities
communicate. Depending on the scenario, entities might use technology to share
messages to entities nearby, they might forward messages through gateways as
they lack resources to connect to the WWW, or they might be powerful enough to
communicate to entities nearby and to send messages over the WWW to service
providers. In this Section four different communication schemes will be presented:
cloud based, gateway based, intranet based and distributed communication scheme.
Cloud based communication scheme. Figure 2.9 exemplifies the scheme
with two virtual entities, a user device with a graphical interface and two service
providers. This scheme does not foresee entities talking to each other. Entities
send data to few central service providers over the WWW. These service providers
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are typically called cloud services. Cloud services are no entities in the IoT domain,
as they do not represent neither a physical entity nor a device. In modern cloud
Figure 2.9: Cloud based communication scheme
based communication schemes, cloud services may be defined more loosely and
can be part of IoT entities. Also, entities might talk to each other before sending
the common data to the cloud service.
Gateway based communication scheme. In IoT, constrained devices may
be used to retrieve data and to provide them to the respective virtual entities.
Constraints may be in computational power, in battery capacity and in network
range. Additionally, constrained devices might be changing their location and they
might be unavailable for a long period of time. In order for a cloud based scheme
to work with constrained devices, at least one unconstrained entity is needed
which can expand the limited network range. Rerum has determined this entity
as a gateway, see [RER15]. Figure 2.10 depicts the scheme with the same setup
as above. Gateways are predominately being used in sensor networks. Ishaq et al.
refer in [ICT+13] to two main forms of gateways: translators of web protocols into
proprietary device network protocols for real-time access of data and databases
that store data from the device networks without allowing any interaction with
the sensors.
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Figure 2.10: Gateway based communication scheme
Intranet based communication scheme. The intranet based communication
scheme extends the gateway based scheme by creating a physical proximity view. It
allows all nearby entities and devices, also constrained ones, to exchange messages.
The physical proximity is also called a smart space, see for example [NSFB15,
KBG13]. Figure 2.11 again exemplifies the scheme. In this scenario every entity
Figure 2.11: Intranet based communication scheme
in the physical proximity is connected, building an intranet. A user can access the
data of the VEs with his computer by sending a request directly to the entities.
Distributed communication scheme. The distributed scheme interconnects
everything and is the closest to IoT, see definition of Section 2.3.1. As seen in
Figure 2.12, every entity, device and service can freely connect to one another
without any restriction. The accessibility of every entity to the WWW shows
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that all entities in this scheme are either unconstrained or so well organized that
messages can be routed through nearby entities until they reach WWW gateways.
Figure 2.12: Distributed communication scheme
Although the distributed communication scheme is the closest to the definition
of IoT, the intranet based scheme seems to be the most adequate to be used in
current IoT systems, due to the restrictions of many IoT devices. Ishaq et al. note
in [ICT+13] that gateways are common in sensor networks, as they have been used
by proprietary vendors to allow a controlled connection between the sensor and
actuator networks and the WWW. Gateways have been used predominantly as
middlewares, translating web protocols into proprietary sensor protocols. Roman
et al. survey in [RZL13] communication and logical schemes and note that the
“intranet of things” is the result of the interconnection of current, isolated ICT
systems. One example for this is found in smart cities, where smart buildings,
smart homes, water supply and energy supply management systems of an entire
city are connected to each other, forming a municipality network (the city intranet).
Rerum uses a variant of the intranet based communication scheme for several
different smart city scenarios as well. Rerum utilizes the gateway as a trusted
component which carries some of the Rerum middleware logic. This logic takes
care of various tasks like device discovery, device registration, entity management
and service publishing. The interested reader is referred to [RER15, Section 4.2.1].
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2.5.3 Ownership and Social IoT
Definition 5 in Section 2.3.1 describes the interaction between different smart
objects by exchanging data, reacting to other smart objects and their environment.
Atzori et al. elaborate on the interaction of smart objects and human users
in [AIM14]. Atzori et al. envision a network of objects with social behaviour.
This idea matches the description of “personalities” in definition 5, where objects
establish trust relationships and act accordingly in the network. Human users
are able to interact physically and impose rules on their smart objects at the
same time. The relationship between a smart object and the human user is not
specified, as e.g. in [AIM14], but it is a deciding factor in the idea of social IoT
as relationships between objects may be influenced by trust relationships between
human users. Best to the author’s knowledge, there is no existing research19 that
discusses the idea of the digital representation of real-life ownership relationships.
An ownership model digitally represents a real life “thing”-to-user relationship
in a differentiated, simplified and pragmatic way, where a stakeholder can be a
human being, a machine or a virtual entity. Differentiated means, that the model
serves an explicit purpose in the Internet of Things domain. It differentiates itself
from other mechanisms such as authentication20. The property of simplicity takes
away complexity from the model, which can be found in its real world counterpart,
but is not needed for the model’s purpose. One example is the physical contact
with a device. Physical possession is important for ownership purposes, but the
model does not profit from real physical contact (e.g., a person holding a smart
phone in his hands versus just being near the device). Naively said, it is enough
to assume that communication in a near field equals physical possession. Finally,
the concept of pragmatism describes the generality of the model. The model is
not uniquely related to one real word example. It generalizes properties (e.g., an
ownership model is always based on a subject owner and an object thing and
allows heterogeneous applicability among similar relationships.
Three crucial concepts define ownership: absolute ownership, physical pos-
session and rights of use. They are found in cross research domains such as
19Such as in the discussed conceptual works of [MSPC12,AIM10a,GKN+11,MS08,WBC+09].
20Ownership and authentication share similar concepts and technologies, but they serve
different and particular purposes, respectively. Further details are discussed below.
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jurisprudence and economics, where they constitute the evidence of ownership,
i.e., which party has certain rights and duties over a property, how protection of
ownership is defined and how ownership can be represented and enforced towards
other parties. Ownership models also represent machine to machine and virtual
ownership relationships, which are not common in real life scenarios.
2.5.3.1 Ownership Representation in IoT
In real life, ownership is deeply rooted in society, although not actively enforced.
In the Internet of Things, where objects are interconnected and communication
is digital and transparent, different ownership enforcement mechanisms are needed.
Policies in particular will enforce the rights of use (who is allowed to use a certain
“thing” in a certain way?) and to persevere privacy aspects (the owner of a smart
object authenticates a subject and authorizes him to use the object and, at the
same time, all identities may remain unknown). The owner of an IoT object will
decide over the following fundamental attributes:
• The number of identities and pseudonyms.
• The mapping of identities and pseudonyms.
• In case users conflict in the interaction with an IoT object, the owner is the
deciding party.
• Closely related to dissolving conflicts, the owner defines a set of fundamental
policies that decide over the access permissions to the smart object.
In contrast, the physical possessor of a smart object may, if the fundamental set
of policies allow it, overrule some of the owner’s attributes:
• The possessor may change the number of identities and pseudonyms in order
to hide his interactions (also towards the owner).
• The possessor may be the only person to map new identities and pseudonyms
to objects.
• In case users conflict in the interaction with an IoT object, the possessor
may be the deciding party. But ultimately the owner holds the final decision,
as he holds legal rights over the object.
• The possessor may override some of the owner’s policies, if they are related
to the protection of the possessor’s personal data.
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The ownership relation helps to ease the usability of access control. An object
may have standard policies set by the owner, but needs to change its policy set
in case a person different from the owner is allowed to interact with it. The
case of changing from owner to physical possessor is a part of smart object’s
self-awareness capabilities that benefit the ownership concept as described in the
following Section.
2.5.3.2 Related Work
IoT objects are envisioned to be supportive in relation to system architecture,
design and development, integrated management, business models and human
involvement on their own, and to integrate themselves in any context they are
carried into [SU05]. This again is only possible, if objects are capable of being self-
aware, i.e., to understand in which context they are in and how they are supposed
to behave. Kortuem et al. define in [KKFS10] three types of self-awareness
for smart objects: activity-awareness, policy-awareness and process-awareness.
In [SU05] and [SS11] awareness is further enhanced with the concepts of context-
awareness and self-description semantics.
Activity-aware smart objects are aware of event and activity streams. This objects
can react according to their state, to which functionality they are providing, and
how they are being used. Typical events are picking up, turning on or operating
the object. One example could be a container filled with a chemical reagent. If
the container exceeds a certain temperature or pressure, it will disable its opening
mechanism.
Policy-aware smart objects understand to what extent their functionality or state
comply with predefined policies. In a smart home this could mean that an oven
should not turn itself off when heating, even if energy prices are high.
Process-aware smart objects understand the organizational workflow they are
part of. They can relate the physical occurrences to their workflow and react
accordingly.
Context-aware smart objects share the properties of policy-aware smart objects.
They can initiate and form ad-hoc workflows based on semantic description of
their surroundings. Several unknown smart objects group together and agree on a
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workflow and grouping scheme to achieve a certain result [ZGW05]. Ownership
can be regarded as an addition to the awareness property as well. An object can
identify who it belongs to and who it is interacting with, enforce access control
and draw conclusions in order to build trust relationships.
2.5.3.3 A User-centric Implementation for Ownership
For a clear ownership definition, the German civil code will be used. As existing
research shows [Qui11], historical reasons and steady development in real property,
personal property and the differentiation between “Law” and “Equity” have made
it difficult to find a clear definition in English Law21.
Ownership, as defined in the German civil code §903 Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch,
“is the right to use a thing and to exclude others from any interaction”. Notably,
using this definition, several key concepts from IoT-A and Rerum become visible:
the “thing” which corresponds to a Physical Entity in IoT and several forms of
“interaction”. The article further defines a positive content and a negative content,
which an owner can define regarding his property. The positive content describes
which kind of interaction is allowed and the negative content describes which
kind of exclusions exist for a “thing”. According to German Law, ownership is an
absolute right over a thing, as it can be represented and enforced erga omnes, i.e.,
towards all parties.
This definition, even if unknown to many, is ubiquitously present in everyday
life. The physical interaction with a thing is coined by the ownership relation of
it. If the thing is the property of a person A, a person B will (normally) avoid
certain actions with it, if not avoid an interaction at all.
There are of course several kinds of ownership: sole ownership, simple joint
ownership and partial joint ownership. All of them describe different relationships
of a physical entity to one or many owners. But all of them have in common, that
positive and negative content can not be enforced physically any time, anywhere.
This is different in the context of IoT.
In order to move towards a complete ownership model, following steps are
necessary. First, the ownership relation of things and users must be defined.
21English Law means hereby the jurisdiction and legal system of England and Wales. Other
jurisdictions, such as those from member states of the Common Law, are not considered.
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Second, adequate technologies have to be identified. Here the Rerum architecture
and the scheme of connected intranet of things22 are considered.
2.5.3.4 Proposal on the Establishment of Ownership
The following proposal follows a conceptual as well as a technical description of
a possible ownership establishment process and gives readers a more concrete
use case on how ownership could be used. The Section makes use of an example
to guide through the establishment phases. Subsequently, ownership will be
integrated in the IoT domian model in the next Section.
The Setup. A user is surrounded by two smart objects. The smart objects
could be two wearable devices, such as a fitness tracker and a smart watch. The
user additionally has a smart phone23. Figure 2.13 demonstrates the setup and
denotes some possible examples of adequate enabling technologies.
As described in the connected intranet of things scheme, the two physical
entities are not able to connect to the world wide web, therefore they are neither
searchable nor identifiable over a wider network.
22As discussed in Section 2.5.2, this model describes a network similar to a private area
network, were smart objects build an intranet. In this intranet only a few objects are able to
connect to a wider network, e.g., the world wide web.
23Note: all of the objects are physical entities including its respective devices in a way that is
visually inseparable.
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Figure 2.13: Ownership scenario - setup
To reach the WWW, they are dependant of a computationally more capable
member of the intranet, which in this example is the user’s smart phone. The smart
phone will be therefore called “master” - resembling the master-slave terminology
in Bluetooth communication24. The user, the smart phone and the two objects
can communicate over different protocols and interfaces as follows:
• Person to Smart Phone. This is realised through the user interface of the
smart phone. The ownership relation is more complex. The smart phone
can be regarded as the virtual representation of the user25. The smart
phone has to make sure that the owner is the one in physical possession. It
is therefore favourable to authenticate the user with two factors that can
be related to him. This is done by exploring the different authentication
mechanisms (with a combination of "what you are", "what you have" and
"what you know" attributes of the user). For example, RFID tags can be
combined with PIN based authentication. The user wears an RFID tag
somewhere on his body26. Per NFC, the smart phone can check on its
24The interested reader is referred to the Bluetooth specification in [B+01].
25This assumption has been made based on an interview made with telecommunication experts,
see annex A. The reason is that a user’s smart phone contains sufficient information to represent
almost any attribute of the user, therefore it is adequate to hold the user’s virtual entity.
26Passive UHF RFID tags can reach a 10 meter radius with a low energy consumption
profile for the reader, if the amount of tags is low (this is the case for personal area networks),
see [Dob12]. This makes the assumption reasonable.
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booting and periodically thereafter, if the person can authenticate himself
as its owner. The user has to register himself and his tag in the first boot
process following the phone’s “off-the-shelf” delivery or after a factory reset.
The interested reader is referred to [FDW04] for more information on secure
RFID authentication.
• Smart Phone to Objects. The smart phone has a special relation to the
two objects as it is the intranet’s master. At the same time, it is an object
itself. Thus two connections are defined. Tag [2] in Figure 2.13 is an out of
bound, i.e., a special communication protocol between the master and the
intranet’s slaves. This could be Bluetooth, for example. Before other objects
are allowed to interact with each other inside the intranet, the out-of-band
channel has to be established and master/slave relations have to be defined.
Tag [3] is the communication protocol that is used between every object in
the intranet. This could be, for example, a communication based on the
Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA), the Host-
Identity Protocol (further discussed in Section 2.6.4) and a combination of
other currently known network and authentication standards (e.g., mobileIP,
Ipsec and Teredo).
• The communication of the rest of "things" with each other is based on the
communication type of [3] as seen above.
Technologies. Figure 2.1427 shows a further refinement of the scenario. Here, a
special technology is chosen for every communication relation. The authentication
relation from smart phone to owner, marked with [1], is realised with a RFID-tag
recognized by the Near-Field-Communication capability of the smart phone and
a PIN. The master-slave communication in [2] is realized by Bluetooth. This
communication is specifically for master-to-slave messages, which can contain
different commands, configuration or status requests. The communication of
object to object is exemplified in [3] by the Host-Identity Protocol (HIP)28. This
communication is used for exchanging operational data, e.g., for application related
27Figure 2.14 displays the Sony Smart Tag; Source: www.sony.com.
28Note: Host-Identity Protocol (HIP) protocol is still actively researched for the IoT domain,
see Section 2.6.4 for details.
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messages. Note that [2] and [3] are chosen to be out-of-bound in order to have
dedicated communication channels.
Figure 2.14: Ownership scenario with enabling technologies
The HIP can be used to establish an identity based communication inside the
intranet. That means, the objects do not address each other by IP-addresses, but
by identities. In a simplified form, identities are signatures over a random value,
they can be verified and can be accounted to their master, where the master might
serve as a certificate authority. The routing of messages is done via IP-address, the
mapping of identities to IP-addressed is carried by the protocol. The Figure 2.14
displays an exemplary identification of the objects by the identities SO1 and SO2,
which are verifiable via certificates of the form X.509. IP-addresses are obtained
according to the master’s subnet, with the master being the standard gateway to
the intranet.
Protocol. Figure 2.15 further showcases the protocol. One of the two smart
objects changes its physical possession from one person to another. In the previous
Section it was mentioned that it is not expedient to verify if a human user is
physically touching an object, but that it is enough to know if an object leaves the
domain of authority of one user and reaches the domain of another. This domains
are coined here as Digital Shadows. The term digital shadow has been used in
the context of identity management before by Sarma et al., see [SG09]. In Sarma
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et al.’s definition, the digital shadow is the area of influence of a user’s virtual
identity on one or more (web- or application-)services. This definition is extended
here to the context of IoT, where the identity of the user influences one or more
IoT objects. The mechanisms of influence are similar to those described by Sarma
et al. (e.g., access control rules) with the addition of ownership mechanisms.
In Figure 2.15, object SO2 has obtained his identity from master1. Master1
is the virtual representation of person1, which the object now can be referred to.
As described above, the identity is a verifiable cryptographic value and it is not
computationally feasible to spoof or manipulate it.
In the example SO2 leaves person1’s digital shadow and looses its connection
to person1’s intranet (specifically to master1). As soon as it enters person2’s
digital shadow, it’s identity is verified by master2.
Figure 2.15: Ownership and digital shadow
During the identification process, master1 is identified as the previous owner,
as the identity of SO2 if verifiable through public information of master129. Note
29A possible mechanism that can be used here for the lookup is a public key infrastructure.
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that master2 and SO2 use the same protocols [2] and [3] that SO2 used to
communicate with master1.
Figure 2.16: Ownership protocol example
Figure 2.16 shows a more refined version of the protocol. The identities are
based on Group Signatures, where an object proves his identity by authenticating
himself with a signature. The signature is publicly verifiable and proves that the
signer is member of a specific group, see [MFG+12] for details. In the case of SO2,
its signature would identify it as a member of the group owned my master1. The
signatures are unlinkable, SO2 could identify itself as owned by master1 with
different signatures against master2 and other masters, and at the same time
staying unlinkable. A specific use case for the use of group signatures will be
given in Section 4.3.4.
The protocol starts with the management of keys and certificates. Every object
gets a member signing key and a group verification key, to be able to unequivocally
identify other members of the group. The keys and certificates are managed by
the master. Objects identify themselves by signatures as owned members of a
group, which allows them to have several unlinkable identities due to the nature of
group signatures. When an object changes its possession and enters a new digital
Data Protection for the Internet of Things Santiago Reinhard Suppan, 2017
2. FRAMING THE INTERNET OF THINGS 57
shadow, it authenticates itself with a signature. The master of the new digital
shadow verifies the signature with the object’s certificate either provided by the
object itself or provided over a public resource identifier and a respective lookup
for a trusted certificate authority. In the process, the new master can identify the
old master and the respective ownership relationship. The new master (master2
in Figure 2.16) has to decide whether the new object may enter its digital shadow
and participate in communication. The decision might be based on policies that
where defined by the owner or through direct feedback, e.g., a push up notice
by the smartphone. If the decision is positive, the new object may enter the
new intranet and agree on how to communicate within the intranet and agree on
possession based policies which the object has to follow.
Policies are an integral part of IoT and interplay by nature with ownership
and possession. In the next Section, ownership, possession and policies are set
into relation within the Rerum IoT domain model.
2.5.3.5 Ownership in the Rerum Domain Model
Section 2.5.3.3 introduced ownership and indicated how important it is for social
behaviour and context awareness of objects in IoT. In order to resemble ownership
in IoT, respective building blocks have to be defined and integrated in the IoT
domain model. Figure 2.17 depicts the Rerum IoT domain model extended by
ownership relations.
Ownership can be of two forms. Absolute ownership, where a user has absolute
rights (and duties) over an entity, or, physical possession, where the user has only
physical access to the entity, but might be limited in his actions by the rules of
the (absolute) owner.
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Figure 2.17: Integration of ownership in the Rerum domain model
Ownership is a relation between a human user and an entity. The relationship
is therefore a composition between one or several physical entities and one or
many human users, one for absolute ownership (a user owns/has the rights for
one thing) and many for multi-party ownership (several users own/have the rights
for one thing). Absolute ownership and physical possession may coexist as two
compositions for the same entity and user. Ownership influences how users interact
with entities in real-life, in IoT this is done via policies. Rerum defines two types
of policies30: access policies and privacy policies. Although the domain model
defines that an administrator sets (or defines) each policy type, it is the owner
that the policies relate to. In both cases the administrator is either the owner
himself or the administrator acts in the interest of the owner.
Ownership controls the access to the virtual entity by means of the policies,
therefore no direct relation between VE and ownership is needed.
In the proposal for the establishment of policies, the HIP was mentioned as a
30See Section 2.4.3.1 for details.
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possibly relevant technology. In the following Section, several technologies will be
discussed that can be possibly used to implement the building blocks that were
presented over the course of Section 2.
2.5.4 Implementation of the Rerum Domain Model
The Rerum middleware is an implementation of the Rerum domain model, as
shown in Fig. 2.7, which follows the intranet / gateway based communication
scheme, see Chapter 2.5.2. The middleware is based on the implementation of
the OpenIoT platform which also follows the IoT-A ARM, see [SKH+15]. Rerum
considers the following building blocks as the key to the implementation of the
domain model (taken form [MTF+]):
1. Rerum Devices (RDs) that can be constrained or unconstrained devices,
see the classification of Section 2.6.2. They equip one (or several) sensors
and actuators. Rerum defines specific functional components for that run
on the Rerum devices, called Rerum embedded mechanisms. Some of
these mechanisms are used for privacy enhancement and are presented in
Chapter 4.
2. Rerum Gateways (RGs) as part of the intranet / gateway based communi-
cation scheme. The gateways have some middleware functionality such as
network and protocol translation (particularly from proprietary protocols
on the devices to 6LoWPAN, as described in the IoT protocol stack, see
Section 2.6.3) to communicate with the rest of the Rerum environment.
3. Rerum Middleware (RMW) that performs virtualisation (as formulated by
the IoT-A ARM, see Section 2.6), performs transmission of data between
devices and virtual entities and that provides publish/subscribe services for
third parties.
4. Rerum Security Server hosts all security and privacy functional components.
The security server can be a standalone component or an integrated part of
the RMW.
5. Application Server hosts the applications of Rerum or is an external container
for third party service providers.
The middleware consists of a collection of functional components in order to manage
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virtual entities, data processing and the registration of Rerum and federated
devices. These components are categorised in functional groups [MTF+]:
1. Service Manager handles requests from applications. For example, an
application might need the temperature of a room and requests that Feature
Of Interest (FOI) from the service manager. The Service Manager will resolve
the FOI and map the virtual entities (and possibly virtual federations of
entities) that relate to devices that are in physical proximity of the room.
The process is transparent for the application. Additionally, it hides the
devices, IP addresses and MAC addresses of the devices, such that the
application provider cannot know exactly where the data comes from.
2. General Virtual Object (GVO) Manager handles the registration of Rerum
devices and the creation of virtual entities by using predefined templates.
The properties of the devices (sensors, actuators, RFIDs, context) are used
to find the best match of a given template. The virtual entity is then
registered in the GVO Registry.
3. Federation Manager is responsible for creation, composition and orchestra-
tion of federation. The federation manager could also support other forms
of interaction31 that require a leading entity.
4. Data & Context Manager processes the data received from devices. One of its
components, the stream processor can either simply pass the data to VRDs
and service agents or pre-process the data, e.g. perform map-reduce on a large
data stream [YDHP07], data aggregation, the computing of mean, minimum
or maximum values and other window functions. The data translator
converts the stack of a device (e.g. 6lowPAN) to another stack needed
by the application (IPv6 + REST). The context manager is a dedicated
component that analyses data and, according to some rules [RER15], extracts
the context surrounding that data.
5. Security Server which offers different components and technologies for se-
curity, privacy and trust that are deployed on the Rerum middleware and
on the devices (SPT components). The security server holds them on the
middleware. A full list can be found in [RER15,MTF+]. A partial list with
31See Section 2.5.1.
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a more technical insight has been published in [TPS+15]. The components
for privacy in all publications overlap largely with the technologies presented
in Chapter 4 as they have been developed for Rerum and this thesis.
Figure 2.18 interprets the interleave of building blocks and functional groups.
Figure 2.18: Rerum middleware
2.6 Technologies for IoT
In the previous Sections, conceptual and architectural building blocks of IoT
were presented. Many of the building blocks are located in the devices, which
are foreseen to be low cost and constrained in storage, computational as well as
battery power. The reason for these constraints is that IoT devices have to be
economic and very small as they will have to fit in everyday objects like home
appliances (TVs, washing machines, fridges, ovens, ...), body wear (glasses, jackets,
shoes, ...) and static objects like walls, windows and doors.
The size and economic constraints allow a significantly different “best effort”
quality of services compared to portables, tablets and smartphones. IoT devices
Data Protection for the Internet of Things Santiago Reinhard Suppan, 2017
2. FRAMING THE INTERNET OF THINGS 62
change their location regularly, they have large sleep (passive) and wake-up
(active) states. Networks formed by these devices have high information loss, low
throughput and frequent topology changes. Therefore, technologies which have
been developed for similar building blocks in ICT systems cannot be transferred
to IoT directly. In this Section an understanding of why constraints exist and an
overview of technology proposals for IoT will be given. This Section serves mainly
as a snapshot of the state-of-the-art, as technologies are subject to change in the
future. It should be noted that neither security nor privacy nor trust technologies
will be reviewed in this Section, as these are part of the extended IoT domain
model. Details can be found in Section 4.
2.6.1 Economical Value and Size Constraints
In order to exemplify why constraints on many IoT devices exist, current32
developments in body wear and health care can be consulted for orientation.
Health care providers have yielded a number of body tracking systems, such as
smart bands to monitor the heart rate of users and smart shoes that can help
to train balance and assess fall risks for elderly people, see e.g. [McC09] and
[NAD+08].
The example of smart shoes can be used to analyse the costs and size constraints
of an IoT device. In [Lor97], Lorand has broken down the costs of $70 shoes
(non-smart, customer retail price)33. The shoes manufacturing costs are $20,
thereof $9 only for materials. Operational costs and profit are amounted with
$15.50, with $0.25 for research and development (R&D). The rest of $34.50 are
the retailer’s costs and profits. Following results can be obtained if the costs are
set into relation:
1. Total costs (retail price): $70 (100%)
2. Manufacturing costs: $20 (29%) with $9 material costs (13%)
3. Operational costs and profits: $15,50 (22%) with $0,25 (< 1%) for R&D.
4. Retailer related costs and profits: $34,50 (49%)
32Products and prices were last checked on August 17, 2017.
33The breakdown by Lorand is from 1997, but comes quite close to similar breakdowns
reported in 2014, see for example [Ben14]. In addition, Lorand adds more detail for every cost
item.
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It can be assumed that smart shoes retain a similar distribution of costs, although
retailer (online vs. in-store retailers) and operational costs (supplier costs and
profits) may vary.
To set IoT device costs into relation to the costs of the shoes, the following use
case can be analysed: the product in [Ama14] is an additional module for a special
brand of sport shoes. The module can be attached to the sockliner of the shoes
and can be connected to any smart phone, tracking the pace, movement speed,
distance, time and other parameters. The price for the product was calculated
with $19 (recommended retail price). To break down the price structure of this
product, a price calculation of electronic goods is needed. The price calculation of
Kraemer et al. in [KLD11] will be used here. The calculation of the shoe sensor
according to Kraemer et al. gives the following items:
1. Total costs (retail price): $19 (100%)
2. Manufacturing costs: $9,50 (50%) with $5,89 material costs (31%)
3. Operational costs and profits: $6,65 (35%) with $0,95 for R & D (5%)
4. Retailer related costs and profits: $2,85 (15% - electronic devices have a
smaller margin)
The IoT device itself costs $5,89 for materials including assembling and $0,95 for
R&D including software development and quality testing, making a total of $6,84.
Compared to the overall price of a pair of smart shoes (shoes price $70 plus sensor
kit price $19) the device makes up 8% of the total product costs including R&D34.
Table 2.1 summarizes the cost breakdown and gives insight to the size related
constraints. In addition, a device from the popular Raspberry family ($40 retail
price, material and R&D costs estimated with 36% according to [KLD11]) is added
as a comparison to the Table. The Raspberry device is far more powerful than
the IoT Device and would support the application of many existing privacy and
security technologies. At the same time the Raspberry is several times larger in
size and costs, making it arguably difficult to use in the Smart Shoes and many
other IoT scenarios.
34In cost and performance accounting, the operational and retail related costs are assigned
directly to the individual products, but in this case, they are excluded: these costs can be
combined when shoes and device are sold together and reduced in the final product. Manufac-
turing and R&D costs are directly related to the shoes and devices respectively and cannot be
combined, giving thus a much better indicator for proportions of costs.
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Smart Shoes (size 42) IoT Device Raspberry
Total Costs $89 (100%) $6,84 (8%) ca. $14,4 (16%)
Product size ca. 27 x 15 x 10 cm (100 %) 2,4 x 3,5 x 0,8 cm (> 1%) 12,7 x 10,2 x 7,6 cm (24%)
Table 2.1: Comparison of size in relation to costs
The price and size data was taken from [Ama14,Ama16b,Ama16c].
2.6.2 Classification of IoT Devices and Networks
The IETF has classified constrained devices by their computation and storage
capacities in [BEK14], Table 2.2 shows the individual classes.
The most used IoT devices have been identified in “class 1”, with a working
memory restriction of 10 KB RAM and a storage capacity of 100 KB Flash,
see [Bor15]. Class 1 devices are typically powered by coin or dry cell batteries with
a maximum capacity of 2376 joules or 0,66 watt hours35, see [Dev11]. Networks
that consist mainly of devices of class 1 or less are called low-power and loss
networks. The IETF define this networks as “typically composed of many embedded
devices with limited power, memory and processing resources interconnected by a
variety of links [...].” The classes are not clearly cut and other classes are used in
some cases for IoT. For the elicitation of adequate privacy enhancing technologies,
the constraints of class 1 are those that will impose a significant factor. We will
look into details in Chapter 4.
35The lifetime of the battery depends on the device actions and on the sleep and wake up
times of the device. This makes it difficult to estimate a reasonable average lifetime.
Name Data size (e.g., RAM) Code size (e.g., Flash)
Class 0 less than 10 KB less than 100 KB
Class 1 10 KB 100 KB
Class 2 50 KB 250 KB
Table 2.2: IETF classification of constrained devices
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2.6.3 IoT Protocol Layer Stack - IETF LLN
The IETF has developed and proposed several technologies as part of the Routing
Over Low power and Lossy networks (ROLL) working group to build an IoT
protocol stack. The proposal retains the layers of the TCP/IP protocol stack,
Figure 2.19 shows the comparison.
Figure 2.19: Comparison of the TCP/IP stack (left) and the IETF IoT LLN stack
(right)
The upper layers are represented by a respective working group in the IETF,
where as the link and physical layers are addressed by the Institute of Electrical
and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). The Low Power and Lossy Networks (LLN)
stack differs primarily from the TCP/IP stack due to the addition of the adaption
layer. The layer was introduced due to following constraints:
For low-power devices, such as wireless sensor networks (WSNs) and wireless per-
sonal area networks (WPANs), the protocol family IEEE 802.15.X has been widely
accepted as the standard for low-power radio transmission, see [BPC+07,LKR04].
The IEEE 802.15.4 protocol was designed for body and personal area networks,
two networks that are very prominent in IoT. Therefore, the IEEE 802.15.4 pro-
tocol is mentioned specifically in the stack. The IEEE 802.15.4 protocol defines
the architecture for the link and physical layers with a maximum payload size of
127 Bytes, see [Ass11].
The upper layers of the TCP/IP stack, specifically based on the IPv6 standard,
define a header overhead of 68 Bytes for the TCP and IPv6, UDP, ICMP and
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TCP headers, which takes over fifty percent of the possible payload transmission.
Additionally, the maximum transmission unit of the IPv6 standard requires 1280
Bytes which differs strongly form the 128 Bytes maximum frame size of the IEEE
802.15.4 protocol. This discrepancies are resolved in the adaption layer. As
mentioned before, the IEEE 802.15.4 standard is envisioned as the protocol for
the link and physical layers. The adaption layer is covered by the 6LoWPAN
protocol (the acronym stands for "IPv6 over Low power Wireless Personal Area
Network"). 6LoWPAN resolves the overhead by encapsulating the IPv6 headers,
fragmenting them and occasionally compressing the headers if possible. A full
descirption can be found in [MKHC07]. An overview of the whole LLN family
can be found in [ICT+13].
2.6.4 IoT Protocol Layer Stack - IETF LLN + HIP
In Section 2.5.3 the host-identity protocol was mentioned. The host-identity
protocol (HIP) was firstly described by Moskowitz et al. in [MNJH08] in 2008
and has been proposed as a key technology for the IoT stack in [Uri09] in 2009.
The idea has been recently picked up as a possible addition for the IoT LLN stack
in [VMZS+13,GMKK+13]. Also, a new version of the protocol is being proposed
in [MHJH15a].
The main idea of the HIP protocol is to separate host and network identifiers.
Host identifiers are used to identify network participants, as seen in the domain
name system. Network identifiers describe the address of the participant in order
to identify where network packages have to be routed to, as with IP and MAC
addresses.
In traditional networks, the IP address serves as both, the host and the address
of the host. If a participant changes his IP address, he cannot be identified
and reached in the network unless an agent updates his address (as seen in the
mobile IP protocol [Per98]) or the participant itself propagates its new IP address.
Occasionally he can use a higher level protocol for authenticating himself as the
previous participant.
HIP adds an additional host identifier layer to the TCP/IP protocol stack to
allow the separation of the two identifiers. An application would now identify
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a network participant by his host-ID, which remains in the network even if
the participant changes his location an IP-address. The host identifier is an
authenticity credential, it has to be generated by cryptographic material to avoid
masquerading as an arbitrary participant. The HIP has defined the HIP key
exchange for this reason, one of the main mechanisms of the protocol. Figures 2.20
and 2.21 show a simplified comparison of IP-based and HIP-based communication.
Figure 2.20: IP based communication
Figure 2.20 depicts a scenario where two parties, Alice and a Server, commu-
nicate over an IP-based network. The communicating parties use IP-addresses to
send and receive messages. In case of an IP change, e.g. due to physical movement
of Alice (step 1), the Server will still send messages to Alice’s old IP-address
(step 2), as this is the only identification the Server has from Alice. Consequently,
the network will not be able to deliver the message, as Alice’s IP-address is now
unused (steps 3 and 4). The Server will receive an IP not found notice from the
network (step 5) and close remaining resources, e.g. sessions, instances, etc.
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Figure 2.21: HIP based (bottom)
Figure 2.21 depicts the same scenario where Alice and a Server communicate
over an HIP-based network. HIP participants exchange unique and verifiable
identities via the HIP key exchange.
The communicating parties use their identities to send and receive messages.
The network itself is able to validate the participant’s identities as well, therefore
able to reliably route messages (over IP-addresses). In case of physical movement
of Alice (step 1), the Server will still send messages to Alice’s identity (step 2),
as this is the only identification the Server has from Alice. Consequently, the
network will try to find Alice by her identity, which is possible as soon as Alice
reconnects to the network. The network will be able to deliver the message, as
Alice can be identified and her IP-address can be resolved (steps 3, 4 and 5).
Although several protocols integrate host related concepts to allow updating a
participants position, the HIP offers a set of attributes that can be helpful for IoT
settings:
• The HIP allows end-to-end encryption and integrity protection, as the HIP
key exchange can be used to derive further keys for respective protection.
This is similar to the use of Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS), as
HIP end-to-end protection does not rely on state management.
• In case of message overflows, participants can quickly change their identities
without changing the transport or physical layer attributes. Compared
to other denial of service mitigation mechanisms, this is an effective and
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simple mechanism against denial of service attacks that supports resource
constrained IoT devices.
• The host identifier is a value with high entropy by design. Host identifiers
could be used as a pseudonym for network participants to enhance their
privacy, even using multiple pseudonyms for the communication with mul-
tiple participants. The end-to-end protection remains also with multiple
pseudonyms.
• Host identifiers can be used in combination with group authentication
attributes. That means, a network participant (e.g. an IoT device) can
authenticate itself as a member of a certain group. This again can be used
to resemble real-life ownership / possession relationships36.
The first version has been discontinued and has been given an errata by
the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG) for using obsolete or inefficient
cryptographic primitives which could not be changed or adapted. The full IESG
errata was publicly added in the first HIP draft by Moskowitz et al. A second
version was published in April 2015, see [MHJH15b], which addresses the concerns
of the IESG, adds crypto agility37 and implementation related changes. In
comparison, although many of the properties of HIP are useful for IoT, HIP has
not been thoroughly researched as the protocols and technologies found in the
LLN stack and it remains to prove that HIP can be an efficient and reliable
alternative. As of August 17, 2017, the an errata exists for the second version of
the HIP in [MHJH15b] as well.
36For example, a device is owned by a subject versus a device is in physical possession of a
subject. Details on ownership and possession are can be found in Section 2.5.3.
37Crypto agility is the ability to easily switch from one cryptographic primitive to another.
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Chapter 3
Privacy in the Internet of Things
The fundamental conflict between IoT and privacy was pointed out in the intro-
duction. The introduction also gave an insight to possible consequences of data
breaches and the challenges of applying data protection to future IoT systems.
The conflict stems from the significance of data. Data is an asset of immense
business value for companies, but so is the trust that customers and users have
in them. Privacy violations may endanger both, the value of the data and the
trust that people have placed. Moreover, the costs of privacy related lawsuits
could be huge as will be discussed later. Yet, privacy breaches and violations are
not uncommon, although they are not always put in public focus. For instance
in 2009, Facebook settled a privacy related lawsuit over $9.5 million due to
its service Beacon. Beacon tracked a user’s behaviour at 44 external shopping
websites and published the consumption activities of the user in its Facebook
profile under the “News Feed”, see [Per08]. Beacon was introduced in Facebook
as an opt-out approach and needed no explicit user consent. Following the
lawsuit, Facebook tried to implement further privacy controls and easier opt-out,
see [Zuc07], nevertheless, Beacon was shut down shortly after that.
Anthem Inc., second largest insurance company in the United States, leaked
80 million records including names, social security numbers, dates of birth and
other sensitive details such as health status [MY15].
Google Buzz is a further example. Buzz was a social online network that was
supposed to compete with Facebook and Twitter [Gro10]. Google took advantage
of its Gmail user base and linked both services to generate a high user traffic.
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Based on the email contacts of the users, Buzz profiles showed user names and
relationships between each other.
The latter was the most intrusive property of Buzz, as email relationships of
users were exposed publicly. Google was confronted with high criticism, including
a lawsuit filed by The Federal Trade Commission, which was settled for $8.5
million, see [Act10].
In Chapter 1 the costs per breach and the outcome for users and companies
was outlined. Companies might not see the need for data protection, as they can
calculate the costs of a breach and use administrative strategies to mitigate the
consequences.
A possible way to solve this indifference is to adapt regulations to demand
proper assessment of adequate privacy protection in companies and organisations
and calculate fines accordingly. That means that regulative directives have to
demand for protection and at the same time give guidance on how to do so.
Complimentary privacy guidelines through privacy principles have been proposed
by research communities in the past, which are found in a similar form in current
privacy protection regulations. New proposals may serve as the basis for a modern
privacy regulation as well. In order to assess the current picture, current data
protection directives, their possible problems and additional scientific proposals
will be discussed in Section 3.2.1.1.
One of the main problems in data protection is the interpretation and the
integration of those guidelines and principles in the lifecycle of a system. In the
following Sections, engineering frameworks which support that integration are
discussed and followed up with a possible PDLC in Section 3.3. The current state
of regulations and the possibilities of privacy engineering will be mapped to the
picture of IoT. The mapping will use the characteristics that were outlined in
Section 2.2. The next Section will examine the motivation and role of different
stakeholders that participate in data protection for IoT.
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3.1 Stakeholders
Elias et al. underline in [ECJ02] that every R&D project affects different stake-
holders in a different way and that a proper analysis can be crucial to the success of
a project. Privacy engineering and privacy research for IoT are branching projects
in many directions; the following (incomplete) list of stakeholders should set the
first stone towards a stakeholder analysis by touching on the topics: dynamics of
stakeholders, rational (who is interested and what are their motivations), process
(which relationships exist) and transactional (how to approach) levels, as proposed
in [ECJ02].
Chapter 2 introduced users and companies as two of the main stakeholders.
A third type of stakeholder are (privacy) researchers. Researchers may be
users themselves and are generally interested to exploit the possibilities that arise
with new technologies. Within that process, they contribute to an essential part
in making transparent what is viable for privacy protection in form of concepts,
architectures, technologies and other wise.
A fourth type of stakeholders stems from jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is a main
pillar of data protection and is used as the core in business environments.
Throughout the course of this thesis, all of this stakeholders have given input
on their point of view of privacy protection. The following list summarizes the
input.
Companies. The viewpoint of companies range broadly based on their interests.
For brevity, the two most heterogeneous are considered: companies that see
data protection as a business differentiator and companies that see data
protection as legal topic that is mostly handled in agreements and contracts.
Companies that aim to differentiate themselves with privacy topics have a
very profound knowledge of privacy enhancing technologies and know how
their service could affect the privacy of users. Services provided by these
companies are offered with different paying models or rely on donations
in favour of renouncing to the extensive collection of user data. These
companies often replicate other popular services that are data intensive,
e.g. on-line social networks or search engines, but try to provide a similar
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quality without being intrusive to the privacy of users. Privacy engineering
is motivated on a voluntary basis through open collaboration.
Companies that handle privacy as a contractual issue rely heavily on consent1.
Legal departments of these companies strive to formulate service agreements
that use consent to cover all aspects of processing user data during service
provision. Privacy research is given lesser priority or is rejected unless an
incident involving user data has impacted the company. Involvement in
privacy research and engineering may be motivated by the technological
advancements in impact areas that they act in. Additionally, concepts like
privacy by design and new regulation may further motivate data protection,
see Section 3.2.1.3.
Users and Researchers. Users may have different experiences and awareness
regarding data protection. Again, the two most heterogeneous types of users
are considered: users that have little awareness of the impact of privacy and
users that are highly aware and behave accordingly.
Users that have little awareness maybe indifferent towards privacy research.
On the one hand, they may argue that companies have the last word on the
intrusiveness of services or that the disclosed insight about their privacy is
insignificant. These users have shown to change their viewpoint on privacy
when shown the criticality of privacy breaches as mentioned in Section 1.1.
The interested reader is referred to the elaboration of Solove in [Sol07] for
further details on this topic.
Users with a high awareness on privacy impacts are careful with their be-
haviour in ICT systems and their choices regarding companies and services.
These users, possibly privacy researchers themselves, have a high technical
understanding and generally support privacy engineering and privacy re-
search. These users deliberately choose service based on their policies and
tend to avoid intrusive services. This behaviour positively impacts privacy as
a business differentiator. On the contrary, the stringent orientation towards
data minimization may cause an objection of services that rely on data
exchange. For example, users of this category have objected privacy research
1The concept of consent is explained in the following Sections.
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as a whole in the impact areas described in Section 2.1 as they see them
unnecessary, due to the fact that they fundamentally object the services
and the impact areas themselves (´´who needs a talking fridge?”). In this
case, the socio-economical problems that are found in impact areas and the
benefits of data exchange therein, as shown e.g. in healthcare, can help to
motivate the participation of these users as consumers and researchers.
Legislative stakeholders. Legislation sets the framework and motivates com-
panies to comply with data protection. Privacy research and legislation
have to work together in order to establish organisational and technical best-
practices that help to determine if protection is done adequately. More on the
synergies of legislation and privacy research is elaborated in Section 3.3.9.
3.2 Privacy Engineering
Compared to privacy, security in software and system engineering is a well known
domain today.
Similar frameworks to support privacy from the design of a system will be
discussed in the following Sections and followed up with a possible privacy devel-
opment lifecycle framework in Section 3.3.
3.2.1 Privacy Principles
There are several well-established security engineering principles, best practices,
and guidelines for software and system development. Frameworks or methodologies
like the Security Development Lifecycle, see [HL06], the Building Security In
Maturity Model, see [MCM09] and the Software Assurance Maturity Model,
see [CD12], can help developers to have a clear overview of their security from
the design, identify the assets in their systems, assess threats and risks, as well as
develop mitigation and benchmarking tools to test their security in a verifiable
and comparable way.
In the case of privacy, the situation is not clear-cut. There are several so
called “key approaches”, “manifestos” or “foundational principles”, and guidelines
like “Privacy Engineering” by Ian Oliver [Oli14] and “The Privacy Engineer’s
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Manifesto” by Dennedy et al. [DFF14]). The approach by Denny et al. aims
at companies and resembles (and also cites) security standards such as the ISO
2700X standards family. The approach does not include any threat and risk
based measures, even those recommended in the standards, which are a best
practice known in security lifecycle development. Oliver’s work uses ontologies
and a very high level description of what privacy maybe to reach a common
terminology, but there is still no consensus on how a possible privacy development
framework should look like, nor what the main engineering principles would be,
nor how an engineer could implement those principles. The interested reader is
referred to a case in point analysis on this issues by Rubinstein et al., see [RG13].
Further foundational principles for privacy can be found in the privacy by design
framework, see [Cav09a], which will be briefly presented later. Considerable
privacy engineering proposals can also be found in PRIPARE [Not15] and in
the privacy guidelines in Spiekermann and Cranor [SC09]. These will also be
presented and discussed in the remainder of this Chapter.
According to the Internet Privacy Engineering Network “one reason for the
lack of attention to privacy issues in development is the lack of appropriate tools
and best practices [...]. There are, unfortunately, few building blocks for privacy
friendly applications and services[...]”, see [BW15]. Some building blocks and
privacy enhancing technologies for the Internet of Things that were developed
during the course of this thesis are formulated in Section 3.3.3. The building
blocks were designed as proof of concepts for privacy technologies in IoT and to
support privacy in the four main use cases of Rerum.
In the remainder of this Section, the current approaches to Privacy Engineering,
including Privacy by Design and PRIPARE, will be discussed. Also, it is sketched
how a PDLC based on security best practices should look like.
First privacy principles from a regulation point of view will be looked at.
3.2.1.1 The European Data Protection Rules
The basis for European Data protection is the EU directive of 1995. It adopted
many principles of fair information practices, which are basic guidelines for the
processing of electronic data, see [Rei94]. Similar principles can be found also in
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the Canadian Privacy by Design model. The principles have been updated in 2002
and can be found in two directives, Directive 95/46/EC, see [Dir95], and Directive
2002/58/EC, see [Par02]. The directive of 2002 is an extension of the privacy
protection rules of 1995 for privacy in electronic communications. In summary,
the principles are:
Consent states that personal data shall be collected and processed only for
a specified, explicit and legitimate purpose. The words “specified” and
“legitimate” imply that a data subject and the processing party have to
agree on a common consent to how the data is exactly processed and which
processes are outside of a legitimacy.
Purpose legitimacy and specification is closely related to consent. This con-
cept demands service providers to understand and specify how specific
personal data is used and for which purpose.
Collection limitation means that the collection of personal data must be “ade-
quate, relevant and not excessive”.
Data minimization is intertwined with the previous principle. Data minimiza-
tion heavily supports privacy by design, by helping to avoid the collection,
generation and storage of personal data.
Notice and Access is defined as “communication to him [i.e., the data subject]
in an intelligible form of the data undergoing processing and of any available
information as to their source, [and the] knowledge of the logic involved in
any automatic processing of data concerning him at least in the case of the
automated decisions[...]”.
Individual participation according to the European Directive 95/46/EC on
Protection of Personal Data (art.12 (b)). Data subjects have the right
to withdraw from the processing of their personal data, including data
collection.
Accountability points at data subject’s right to receive compensation from a
processing party in case of data breaches. Therefore, data controllers have
to be identified clearly and responsibilities have to be assigned for the data
they are controlling.
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The principles express fundamental rights of all EU citizens and have helped
to harmonize data protection regulation in Europe as they are widely applicable
due to their neutrality in terms of technology. On the other hand, some aspects
remain unspecific. For example, it is unclear how much choice and control citizens
should have.
In [Koo14], Koops discusses the directives from a citizen perspective and
observes that exercising data subject rights is “highly theoretical. Yes, you can be
informed, if you know where to look [...]. Yes, you can request controllers [...] if
you know that you have such a right in the first place [...]. Yes, you can request
correction or erasure, if you know whom to ask (but how are you ever going to
reach everyone in the chain[...] ?). There are simply too many ifs and buts to
make data subject rights meaningful in practice.”
In 2012, a review of the Directive 95/46/EC and Directive 2002/58/EC had
started to create a new European Data Protection Regulation. The new regulation
should target the difficulty to apply the protection rules and the unclear scope
of the previous regulations by defining more specific and additional regulations.
The new regulation is also envisioned to replace directives and regulations of local
European governments, such that following one regulation ensures data protection
over the whole European Union.
3.2.1.2 European Data Protection Rules - Review 2012
The review of 2012, entitled “Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament
and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data and on the Free movement of Such Data” was reviewed and finally
released in December 2015 as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),
see [C+12a]. The regulation governs every country of the European Union and
consists of two instruments, the data protection directive and the general data
protection regulation, see [Com15a].
The directive serves as the basis for law enforcement. The regulation adds
several new principles and makes previous principles more accessible. The EU
lists the following principles as the most notable2:
2Adapted from [Com15a].
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Easier access for a subject’s own data. Individuals have more information
on how their data is processed, this information should be available in a clear
and understandable way. The implementation of this principle in highly
distributed systems such as those of IoT, where the linking between systems
and databases generates privacy relevant information, remains technically
and organisationally challenging.
The right to data portability. The EU denotes that it will be easier to transfer
a subject’s personal data between service providers. This happens only at a
legal level, the technical implementation of the transparency demanded in the
first rule, specially throughout several sub-processors, remains challenging.
Clarified “right to be forgotten”. The directive states that when a subject
no longer wants his data to be processed, and provided that there are no
legitimate grounds for retaining it, the data will be deleted. The challenge,
specially for IoT systems, remains in the verification of such a process.
Service providers need to have a deep understanding of their systems, and
perform assessments on where and in which circumstances personal informa-
tion may be generated. The wish of a user to delete his personal data from
the system may trigger a complex (and legally challenging) transparency
process throughout several sub-systems and sub-contractors.
The right to know when a subject’s data has been hacked. Companies and
organisations must notify the national supervisory authority of serious data
breaches as soon as possible so that users can take appropriate measures.
The terminology used here (“serious”) leaves room for possibly conflicting
interpretations.
Companies and business organizations are provided with new legal grounds to
build privacy protection. Noted are3:
One continent, one law. The regulation establishes one single set of rules in
the EU. The rules are stated to “make it simpler and cheaper for companies
to do business in the EU”.
One-stop-shop. Businesses will report to one single supervisory authority. This
is estimated to save 2.3e billion per year.
3Adapted from [Com15a].
Data Protection for the Internet of Things Santiago Reinhard Suppan, 2017
3. PRIVACY IN THE INTERNET OF THINGS 79
European rules on European soil. Companies based outside of Europe have
to apply the same rules when offering services in the EU.
Risk-based approach. The risk based approach resembles the best practices as
known in security life cycle development.
Rules fit for innovation. The regulation motivates “Data protection by design”.
Privacy-friendly techniques such as pseudonomysation are encouraged and
may be a measure to decide weather proper data protection is applied in a
company or not.
While the new directive and regulation set a promising new legal ground, the im-
plementation of the according processes and the support by adequate technologies
remain a big challenge. Solove describes in [Sol15] further implications.
Penalties. Article 79 of the GDPR defines penalties for non-compliance to the
regulation and the supervising authority, stating that the penalty may be
either up to 10e million or 2% of the total worldwide annual turnover
of an organization or company for infringements regarding the regulation.
Also, up to 20e million or 4% of the total worldwide annual turnover are
demanded for non-compliance adjudged by the supervising authority. Solove
underlines that the infringements concern basic rules such as conditions for
consent as well as transfers of personal data in non EU-countries. These new
penalties may also serve as a motivation, as companies and organizations
may regard the high fines as potential risks to their businesses.
Cross border data transfer. Soloves sees a blurry situation regarding cross
border data transfer. The GDPR requires countries outside of the EU to
have an adequate level of protection, but a solution to the judgement that
brought down the previous agreement on cross border data transfer (“Safe
Harbour agreement”), is still pending. In the judgement of the so called
“Schrems vs. Facebook” legal case, the weak protections against access to
personal data by the US government was the main complaint, see [CG15]
for details. The GDPR and the Schrems case will have some kind of impact
to a new Safe Harbour agreement, but technical means, interpretation and
reference judgements will be needed to create a solid legal ground.
Vendor management. Article 26 of the GDPR states that a company or orga-
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nization that handles the personal data for another organization or company,
may not give the data to third party or sub-contractor without the consent
of the organization or party where the data came originally from. Although
this article sets a solid ground for transparency between organizations and
their sub-contractors, the problem of consent management (which also affects
users) still remains. More on the structural problems of consent in data
protection will be discussed later in this Chapter.
Role of the Data Protection Officer. Article 35 and 37 describe when a pri-
vacy protection officer has to be designated and what the roles of the officer
are. Article 36 states that the privacy protection officer has to be “properly
and in a timely manner involved in all issues which relate to the protection
of personal data.” This ensures that the privacy protection officer is actively
involved in the operational processes of the organization and companies.
Training. The tasks of the privacy officer described in Article 37 of the GDPR
comprise “awareness raising and training of staff involved in the processing
operations.” Consequently, a process has to be established in organizations
and companies to assess when staff is involved with data processing and
when trainings have to take place. This requirement is elaborated further in
the proposal on a privacy development life cycle in Section 3.3.
Consent. Consent remains one of the main pillars of privacy regulation. Consent
establishes the relation between a data subject (the subject whom the data
relates to) and the data controller (the party that collects and processes the
data) and defines under which circumstances the data subject agrees on the
processing of his personal information. In Article 7, the GDPR defines that
the data controller carries the burden of managing consent management.
The consent of each data subject needs to be made identifiable by demand
and needs to specify why the personal data is needed for service provision.
Again, this demands a process in a privacy lifecycle. Further details are
given in Section 3.3.
The Right to Be Forgotten. The EU announcement in [Com15a] already de-
clared this as one of the most notable rights in the GDPR which is defined
in Article 17. It was already mentioned that the technical implementation
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is the main challenge of this new right. Article 17 recognizes the problem
and requires that data controllers: “tak[e] account of available technology
and the cost of implementation, [they] shall take reasonable steps, including
technical measures”. Again, the GDPR sets a new requirement that demands
an assessment of the technical possibilities.
Data Breach Notification. Two notifications are defined. Article 31 requires
reporting of data breaches to the supervising authority. Article 32 requires
notification of data subjects in case of breaches that are “likely to result
in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of individuals.” Solove underlines
the requirement of a “high risk” and states that EU authorities need to
define what a high risk means. Independently, companies and organizations
will have to assess data protection breaches with a risk based methodology.
This requirement makes it difficult to follow privacy frameworks that do not
consider a risk based approach, such as [DFF14].
Scope. Article 3 states that the GDPR applies for organizations and companies
that collect and process personal data in the European Union, even if the
processing itself happens outside of the EU.
Solove sums up his observations by stating that the GSPR is a stricter reg-
ulation than the US privacy regulation. A stricter privacy regulation has the
implication of possibly hurting data transfer and economical relationships between
the US and the EU. Solove also mentions another perspective: the EU is leading
the development of privacy regulation and protection. The result: international
companies tailor their services and business to EU regulations and EU terminology
more than any other regulation, including that of the United States.
Solove mentions that privacy protection may have benefits and may serve
strategic goals. Cavoukian has also named several favourable implications for
companies and organizations in her framework called privacy by design. Privacy by
design or similar protection concepts are often cited in data protection, such as in
Article 23 of the GDPR (“data protection by design and by default”). Cavoukian’s
proposal is discussed in the next Section.
For the Internet of Things, the cross border regulations and shifting the burden
of correct consent management to the data processors are key points of the GDPR.
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But the GDPR misses to renew the concept of consent which causes several
structural and cognitive problems, see [Sol12]. Also, the mentioned multi-party
consent, a core problem of the Internet of Things, is not given a clear legal
interpretation.
3.2.1.3 Privacy by Design
Privacy by Design (PbD), see [Cav09b], has been suggested as the solution for
data protection for several years now. The term “privacy by design” is claimed to
be introduced in [HB95] in 19954, but the term itself does not appear in the cited
publication. The first trackable combination of the terms “design” and “privacy”
are found in the work of Bellotti et al. called “Design for Privacy in Ubiquitous
Computing Environments” in 1993, see [BS93], which already discussed privacy
implications of ubiquitous systems and the challenge of adapting the term privacy
to evolving technologies.
The most advertised privacy by design framework today is the so called
Canadian framework, which compiles a number of privacy principles.
These principles resemble other fair practice principles, such as those stated by
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) principles
of governance (see [ECoD99]) in 1999 or the fair information principles set in 1994
in [Rei94].
Privacy by Design seeks to unify privacy methodologies, define processes via a
“Privacy Impact Assessment Guidelines” and identify fundamental principles in
a holistic framework. The core of the framework comprises seven fundamental
principles which stress the importance of considering privacy from the early steps
of design and through the whole lifecycle. The core principles are:
Be Proactive not Reactive. Privacy should be included in a system preven-
tively, that means in the design and architecture, not remedial.
Privacy as the Default. It has been shown that the default settings of a system
are mostly used in the life-time of a system, even if options are available.
Therefore, the most privacy preserving state of a system should be its default.
4For the claim, see https://www.ipc.on.ca/images/resources/privacybydesign.pdf, URL last
accessed August 17, 2017.
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Privacy Embedded into Design. This point re-enforces that privacy should
be embedded into the design.
Full Functionality. Integrating privacy and security does not have to reduce
the functionality or the utility of the system. There are many technologies
to choose from for this purpose.
Full Life Cycle Protection. Data protection should be present for the whole
life-cycle of data.
Visibility and Transparency. Visibility and transparency have to be employed
to create trust to users. Privacy by Design mentions three concepts: account-
ability (the responsibility for personal data should be clear and documented),
openness (show what data is used and how it is processed) and compliance
(necessary steps to monitor, evaluate, and verify compliance with privacy
policies and procedures should be present in a system).
Respect for User Privacy. User centric development has been shown to in-
crease the success of products, therefore privacy protection should be re-
garded as a tool to make a system user-centric.
The Canadian model is considered foundational, but it needs additional frame-
works to support system engineers due to its high-levelness, see for example the
opinion of [GTD11].
3.2.1.4 PRIPARE
PRIPARE, see [Not15], aims to provide a PbD methodology and process reference
model for systematically incorporating PbD in software engineering. PRIPARE
has identified a lack of privacy practice that can be used through system engineering
lifecycle. Therefore PRIPARE defines a methodology that includes processes and
best practices in order to integrate them to system engineering phases (analysis,
design, implementation, verification, release, maintenance and decommission).
The PRIPARE approach is goal-oriented and a risk-based. During the PRI-
PARE process, privacy requirements and goals are defined and integrated to other
system goals such as those for functionality and security.
The PRIPARE methodology addresses a system’s architecture from a privacy
point of view as well as privacy requirements may affect the architecture changes.
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PRIPARE defines phases, which are (see [Not15]):
Analysis. In this phase, the functional description of the system is specified
and high-level privacy requirements are elicited. The goal of this phase is
to understand what privacy controls must be implemented to effectively
operationalise privacy in the system.
Design. The design phase focuses on how the privacy controls have to be build.
The definition should contain hardware and software architecture, compo-
nents, modules, interfaces, and data flows.
Implementation. In this phase the system described in the design phase is
implemented, following an architectural model and privacy enhancing design
principles.
Verification. This phase ensures that the system meets privacy operational
requirements. PRIPARE proposes to check implementation properties with
formal verification, code reviews and dynamic flow analysis. Furthermore,
“posteriori" compliance controls are implemented to support accountability.
Release. This phase defines several processes that have to be completed before
system release. The processes include elaboration of an action plan to re-
spond to the discovery of privacy breaches, creation of a system decommission
plan, and a final privacy review.
Maintenance. In this phase a data controller has to react to privacy incidents
and try to minimize the damage for affected subjects as much as possible.
This phase requires immediate actions and a well defined communication
plan with subjects and authorities.
Decommission. The purpose of this phase is to correctly dismantle the system
according to applicable legislation and policies. The decommissioning of the
system should not result in possibilities for data breaches.
PRIPARE has united existing methodologies to accompany a system lifecycle
with similar phases to those that are the described in this Chapter albeit with some
differences. In Section 3.3, it is explained why such phases are proposed, what
their goals are and how they play together with security lifecycle development.
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3.3 A Privacy Development Lifecycle
In the previous Sections, several privacy principles and frameworks were presented.
In this Section, a privacy development lifecycle is proposed5 to introduce an privacy
engineering systematic where the principles and frameworks can be applied on.
For this goal, the processes in a SDL are analysed.
The term SDL or “System (or Software) Development Lifecycle” describes
a process for planning, creating, testing, and deploying an information system.
More specifically, a security lifecycle development was introduced as a systematic
approach for security in software engineering, see [HS05]. A privacy development
lifecycle should have similar goals, e.g., systematically introducing a privacy
methodology in system engineering. Security and privacy development lifecycles
will have significant differences, but if done in an integrated way, beneficial
synergies form both approaches can be obtained.
The Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) [Cor12b] and the OWASP
Software Assurance Maturity Model (SAMM) [CD12] are two of the most popular
security development lifecycles primarily for software development. Overall, the
seven steps6 of both security lifecycle frameworks are the following:
• Train personnel or ensure that personnel are qualified.
• Identify threats, evaluate risks (which threat is going to be mitigated, which
threats and risks will be simply accepted?) and elicit requirements.
• Design the system according to the requirements.
• Implement the system, fulfilling all requirements.
• Verify if the system fulfils the requirements.
• Deploy the system while making sure the requirements will still apply in
the deployment environment.
• Keep the system developers ready to respond to any conflicting or emerging
situation.
5Note: this Section has been previously published in [AAC16].
6The initial steps Strategy & Metrics and Policy & Compliance of SAMM are not presented
for the sake of simplicity.
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3.3.1 Education of System Developers
As with security, training developers in privacy topics is necessary. Although all
team members should understand why privacy protection is fundamental and
be familiar with the main guiding rules (say, the EU Data Protection Rules or
the applicable guidelines), it is assumed that at least one person in the team is
particularly well trained in the technical aspects of designing and implementing
privacy friendly systems. This person is tentatively called the “privacy expert” of
the team. He should know a privacy engineering framework like PRIPARE. The
most critical condition for achieving a privacy-friendly product is the presence
of one or several privacy experts in the team. The expert is responsible for data
protection expertise in the development team and should be consulted in every
phase of the lifecycle. He also brings the knowledge where to find mature technical
privacy solutions (PETs) and best practices. The lifecycle itself does not focus
on developing new technologies, which could cost a considerable amount of time,
research and technical expertise, but on using existing building blocks and suitable
PETs. A brief overview of PETs for the IoT is given in Chapter 4.
Particularly the Internet of Things requires specialized technology for com-
putational and battery constraints. A privacy expert needs therefore continuous
refinement of technical skills and state-of-the-art knowledge.
Legal support will probably be of need to resolve privacy related emergencies.
In these situations a privacy expert should be aware when legal support is required.
3.3.2 Phase 1 - Purpose Definition and Data Minimiza-
tion
The first phase of the privacy lifecycle development is the specification of require-
ments for the system. Here, the system’s functional requirements are analysed by
posing the following questions, which follow the principle of Purpose: specifically,
what personal data does the system collect? What is their specific purpose? Can
the system reach its desired functionality with less personal data?
The following process is iterated to stepwise obtain more concrete and opera-
tional privacy requirements or PETs.
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• Obtain or define the system data flow and the system’s functional goals and
requirements.
• Determine which personal data is needed to achieve the system’s functional
goals.
• Analyse the functional requirements and determine if existing PETs can
help to minimize the data that is needed for the system.
• Determine the limits of data usage and data retention in the system (say,
data is deleted after 2 weeks).
• The privacy expert analyses the proposed solution and suggests new possible
technologies to reduce data usage in the system.
3.3.3 Phase 2 - Threats and Risks Evaluation
After the definition of the required personal data in the system, privacy re-
quirements and privacy goals, this phase is used for privacy threat analysis.
Several frameworks for privacy threat analysis have been proposed, such as LIND-
DUN [WSJ15], PriS [KKG08] and FPFSD [SC09].
LINDDUN is especially well-suited for the integration of a privacy development
lifecycle as it is based on STRIDE, see [HL06], part of the SDL. System developers
trained in SDL should be able to learn the LINDDUN method easily, reuse existing
system models, particularly Data Flow Diagrams (DFDs) for their systems and
see synergies or problems of both security and privacy goals.
LINDDUN follows STRIDE in defining six steps. The first three cover the
“problem space”, focusing on the problems, identifying privacy threats and defining
requirements of the system. The last three steps cover the “solution space” which
aim at fulfilling the requirements, see [WSJ15]:
Define Data Flow Diagrams of the system. In this step a graphical repre-
sentation of the information flow in the system is created. This step is
equal to the step in the STRIDE methodology and could be combined with
LINDDUN.
Map privacy threats to DFD elements. In this step system components are
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mapped to privacy threats. LINDDUN7 defines seven threat categories:
Linkability is the property of linking two or more actions/identities/pieces
of information. Identifiability is the property of linking the identity and
an action or information. Non-repudiation is the inability to deny a claim.
Detectability is the property of being able to distinguish sufficiently whether
an entity exists or not, Information Disclosure is the property of revealing
confidential information. Unawareness is the property of not knowing the
consequences of sharing information. Non-compliance is the property of not
being compliant with legislation, regulations, and policies.
Identify threat scenarios. LINDDUN provides so called threat trees to identify
threat scenarios. The privacy analyst should examine each of the branches
of the tree with a specified DFD element in mind.
Prioritize / analyse risks. All the potential privacy threats that are suggested
by the privacy threat trees are evaluated and prioritized via risk assessment.
Elicit mitigation strategies. The suitable mitigation strategy for each threat
is determined.
Select Privacy Enhancing Technologies. The classification of privacy en-
hancing technologies according to the mitigation strategies to which they
adhere enables a more focused selection of suitable privacy enhancing solu-
tions.
LINDDUN also supports the integration of any risk assessment framework, for
instance the one the security team might in the SDL.
But there is a significant difference: in security, risk assessment is used to
prioritize protection mechanisms, to identify high and low risks, and to decide
whether a risk is simply taken without mitigation. This is not the case for privacy.
Wherever personal information exists in the system, it should be protected in
an adequate way. Several steps of this phase are similar in security and privacy
and, depending on the frameworks, can be unified. The first step (defining a data
flow for a system) can be unified for SDL and LINDDUM, as the same DFD of
a system can be used for both, which is a great benefit. In the second step, the
threat mapping occurs, followed by the third step of identifying threat scenarios.
7The acronym LINDDUN stems from the seven categories.
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In this step it becomes clear which components of the system are valuable assets
from a privacy and security standpoint. Privacy related assets may have been
missed in the security part, thus making this step complementary.
Risk analysis in security is used to decide what countermeasures should be
implemented, but a decision might change if again a privacy point of view is added
to risk analysis. For example, a component that may have been categorized with
low impact from a security perspective might become critical if privacy related
risks are high. This could lead to higher investments in privacy and related
security protection for that component.
3.3.4 Phase 3 - Design
The design phase develops strategies for implementation, verification, release
and response. In this phase also functional, security and privacy requirements
are adjusted to one another. For example, functional requirements might need
to change to respect policies, security procedures might need to be adapted to
support unlinkability and privacy requirements might turn out impractical due to
core functional requirements and need to be reshaped.
Conflicts might appear between goals, therefore best-practices can be useful.
Best practices are strategies that have been employed by others with good results.
For example, Hoepman, see [Hoe14], has defined eight design strategies for privacy
which can be realized using privacy patterns (i.e. best practice solutions), namely:
Minimize states that the amount of personal data that is processed should be
restricted to the minimal amount possible. This is the most basic privacy
design strategy.
Hide states that any personal data, and their interrelationships, should be hidden
from plain view.
Separate states that personal data should be processed in a distributed fashion,
in separate compartments whenever possible.
Aggregate states that personal data should be processed at the highest level of
aggregation and with the least possible detail in which it is (still) useful.8
8The reader should be warned that the word aggregation is used in the privacy context with
different meanings: for instance Solove, see [Sol06], uses the word to describe “gathering and
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Inform corresponds to the important notion of transparency: Data subjects
should be adequately informed whenever personal data is processed.
Control states that data subjects should be provided tools to intervene in the
processing of their personal data.
Enforce privacy policies compatible with legal requirements.
Demonstrate requires a data controller to be able to demonstrate compliance
with the privacy policy and any applicable legal requirements.
In [Hoe14], Hoepman provides a set of patterns to each strategy to support
their technical engineering. As some strategies have rarely been used before,
Hoepman points out that new patterns are needed. The reader is referred to
the privacy patterns database9. An explanation of how patterns work based on
a pattern-language for context patterns in the domain of a smart home can be
found in [BFH13].
At this point following principles should be added to the ones just mentioned:
Early Application of Policies and Filtering. The processing of personal data
should be in the devices under the control of the data subject or if that
is not possible, at the earliest point of its generation. This strategy takes
advantage of increased processing power in personal devices. Spiekermann
et al., see [SC09], describe how this strategy can eliminate the need for
data transfer and remote storage, minimizing unwanted secondary data use,
compliance with policies and compliance with consented agreements.
Do not link. Hoepman describes a separation strategy to process data in a
distributed fashion, but e.g. storing data in separated databases is not
enough, if it can be re-linked across the databases. This strategy helps
to avoid such cases by establishing a mechanism that actively checks for
possible identifiers and allows proper separation without the possibility to
re-aggregate the data.
Usability and Data-flow transparency. Ensuring the usability in privacy con-
trols has several objectives: make privacy controls usable for a variety of
combination of various pieces of data about a person” and in that sense aggregation is a privacy
threat. Here it means abstraction or replacement by more general statistics on the data in order
to favour privacy.
9http://privacypatterns.org
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users with different skill levels, integrate privacy controls seamlessly into the
system and make the users understand what they are seeing and what they
can invoke with the controls provided to them.
Rubinstein et al. propose in [RG13] to use field studies, interviews, surveys,
and related methods to understand the user requirements, pain points,
and expectations, for the creation of narratives that help drive software
engineering requirements, which are then incorporated into the overall
development plan. The narratives or scenarios should be transparent to the
user, allowing him to visualize how his personal data is used and how it
flows in the system.
3.3.5 Phase 4 - Implementation
Proper documentation and by-default configuration are keys in this phase. Users
must be able to perform informed decisions about their privacy without much
trouble. In other words, the system should behave privacy-friendly out of the
box. This is called “privacy-by-default” and is one of the most important fair
information and privacy by design principles, as the majority of users will interact
with a system in its lifetime with the default settings, as pointed out in [Wil14].
“Secure Coding” procedures will be needed to avoid privacy issues, which
could otherwise become visible later in the system. PETs need to be securely
implemented in the same way as security mechanisms, e.g., by coding experts and
verified with code reviews. Implementation strategies, as defined in phase 3, help
to assure that the implementation effort is controllable, timely and reaches the
desired quality.
Software developers and privacy experts should work closely in this phase
to avoid problems such as an improper choice of libraries with unwanted effects
(like the use of logging of data including personal information, the presence of
vulnerabilities or leaks).
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3.3.6 Phase 5 - Verification
Verification is an important process in a security lifecycle. It serves different
purposes: to test the used security mechanisms and to evaluate the cost-benefit of
those mechanisms.
It remains unclear if security testing procedures, such as pen-testing, fuzzing,
etc., can be used for privacy purposes.
But the methods used in code review offer also good insight into data, the
information flow in programs and about the presence and enforcement of privacy-
enhancing mechanisms.
Also, specific test based on statistical analysis and machine learning could
help to evaluate privacy enhancing technologies.
3.3.7 Phase 6 - Release of System and Education of Stake-
holders
Phase 6 is used to develop strategies in case that vulnerabilities are discovered on
release. These strategies are carried over to the next phase [Cor12b]. Strategies
cover assignment of responsibilities, emergency response methods and emergency
assessments, technical actions and communication strategies.
Privacy cannot be protected simply by technical components and this holds for
security as well. The education of system stakeholders takes a significant role in
this phase. Stakeholders of the system are system administrators, operators and
system end-users. Operational stakeholders need to know which data is processed
by the system and what kind of implications this might have for users. Technical
protection might be useless in certain scenarios that might seem unlikely, yet the
operators should know them to be able to react in case they occur.
Data subjects need to be informed about how their data is processed and which
tools are provided to exercise their privacy rights. The released system should be
accompanied by an according privacy disclosure which describes the system’s use
of personal data, by a documentation of privacy tools that the system provides
and user communication tools like a “quick” or Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)
text to addresses likely user questions.
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Users, and in particular system administrators and other personnel that may
interact with the system, need to be informed about how their actions affect the
privacy of others and which actions can lead to privacy violations.
SDL proposes to validate the system’s privacy standards by a privacy advisor
or a privacy seal of quality10 prior to release. A legal privacy expert should review
the documents and overview the release process.
3.3.8 Phase 7 - Response
The last phase is one of the most significant in the lifecycle. It uses the results
from the release phase for rapid response strategies.
Breaches might have a significant impact, as discussed in Chapter 3, therefore
the team must be prepared to respond efficiently and timely to them as they can
occur unexpectedly. A response team must therefore develop a response plan that
includes preparations for potential post-release emergencies. The Canadian Office
of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC) proposes in [Can] four steps for this phase:
Breach containment and preliminary assessment. In this step immediate
actions to stop the breach are carried out with an assigned investigation
leader and a response team. Legal action against the attackers is suggested
as well.
Evaluation of the risks associated with the breach. In this step the risks
associated with the breach are evaluated and first actions are triggered. The
risk depends on the amount, sensitivity and context of the compromised data,
e.g., if the data was encrypted or not and if identifiers or other information
links them to particulars. Assessments can help to identify the individuals
affected, the root-cause and the foreseen harm and find adequate mitigation
strategies.
Notification. In this step the users are notified of the possible consequences
the breach might have. The notification should be as soon as (reasonably)
possible and personal, by phone, email etc. In this step, also further
10For example, a privacy seal of quality can be obtained in Germany by ULD, see https:
//www.datenschutzzentrum.de/guetesiegel/
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organizations can be informed, such as cyber-defence centres, credit card
companies (if credit card data was stolen), etc.
Prevention. A prevention plan is defined. The OPC suggests the level of effort
should reflect whether it was a systemic breach or an isolated instance.
This steps aim at fast communication and support strategies between companies
and users. They help the users to understand what possible consequences the
breach may have and give them a transparent view of the emergency response
strategies form the company.
A legal support might be needed to handle consequences, but also to initiate
legal actions against the attackers. A root-cause mitigation team investigates
why a breach was possible and develops a mitigation plan that has to be realized
rapidly.
3.3.9 Challenges of Privacy Engineering in IoT
The challenges of privacy engineering in IoT are based on the structural problems of
privacy engineering for any kind of ICT system. The characteristics of IoT systems,
as described in Section 2.2, bring additional challenges for privacy engineering.
3.3.9.1 Best Practices for Privacy Engineering
The proposed lifecycle of this thesis in Section 3.3 covers the most cited and
reasonable proposals from the scientific community for engineering privacy. In order
to measure the performance of such a lifecyle, the security lifecycle frameworks
can be used again as a comparison. A Security Development Lifecycle (SDLC)
relies on security standards and best practices driven by the interest from research
communities, organisations and companies. For example, the Microsoft Security
Lifecycle which has been proposed in 2004 and has been a mandatory practice
since, see [Cor12a]. The security is coupled to the product lifecycle management
processes through policies, such that every developed product has to comply with
the security policies.
Privacy engineering has neither been the focus of organizational interest and
nor has it been developed from a business perspective. Privacy is driven by
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law enforcement and has thus been treated as such in corporate environments.
Corporal experience exist in jurisdictional interpretation of the privacy protection
directives and not in the product lifecycle integration and the technical engineering
of privacy.
A privacy development lifecycle needs to be adapted to corporal and organiza-
tional needs. For example, the evaluation of market data and needed resources
to start a project is a typical process in product lifecycle management. If the
privacy requirements are not identified in the same phase, the successive deci-
sions on resources for training developers, the elicitation of requirements and the
development of technical means may be ill-advised.
The new privacy protection rules as presented in Section 3.2.1.2 motivate
companies to do more in terms of preparation and integration in other lifecycle
processes. The alignment of privacy, portfolio and product lifecycle requires
privacy experts as well as project leaders, project managers and quality managers.
Their interactions will have to be adapted per company and organization and will
need time to materialize to measurable best practices.
3.3.9.2 Cognitive and Structural Problems
The two foundational principles of privacy are centred around the transparency
of privacy and privacy self management. The first principle of consent describes
acquiring an agreement on the collection, processing and disclosure of data between
a data subject and the processing party. The second principle of purpose definition
demands the formulation of the purpose the data is collected for, processed and
disclosed.
In practice, these principles are implemented in the form of privacy policies.
Privacy policies are usually a unilateral proposal (from the service provider to
the user) on the purpose of data collection, use and disclosure. The data subject
is normally a user that wants to access an ICT system and who has to give his
consent on that privacy policy. Until now, consent has rarely been demanded
explicitly11. When the user starts using the system, he has implicitly given his
consent.
11The GDPR requires consent to be demanded explicitly.
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Solove has analysed in [Sol12] these foundational principles from the point of
view of practicability and has identified several cognitive and structural problems
that hinder the proper application of both principles.
Cognitive Problems. Privacy protection is regarded as a compliance require-
ment. Therefore privacy notifications are often formulated with the intention to
comply with those requirements in contrast to their original purpose of notifying
the users and to inform them about what will happen to their data. In consequence
privacy policies are often covering requirements of privacy regulations in long,
hardly legible text fragments.
According to Solove, legibility is only one cognitive problem. In general, users
are uninformed of why privacy policies exist and what their context is. Uninformed
users will access the system without reading privacy policies and even when forced
to, they will skip through as the purpose of the policies itself remains unclear.
Legibility becomes a problem when users want to exercise their rights and read
the policies, but ultimately give up on understanding the formal, legal statements
that are described in them. Solove states that even when users understand the
notifications, they often lack the background knowledge to make an informed
choice as whether to consent to those policies or not.
The reader is reminded of the Schrems vs. Facebook case, where a highly
educated law student was able to recognize incoherency in the privacy policies
and the practices of Facebook. Schrems is a public example of users that can
understand the privacy notifications, understand the implications of the policies.
But even if this group of users exist, their decision can be skewed in various ways.
For example, a service can suggest to be available at a special rate only for a
limited time and draw the user in consenting in favour of economical value. Often,
services offer a “all-or-nothing” deal, where consent rejection leads to the rejection
of the whole service12.
In the Internet of Things, service provision may be highly distributed among
many subcontractors in several countries. The cognitive problems described by
12The reader is reminded of the introductory quote: “Necessity is blind until it becomes
conscious.”
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Solove aggravate with every additional layer of providers. Providers maybe elicited
dynamically, thus needing a on-demand notice on use, processing and disclosure.
IoT systems may also affect non-users, as described in Section 2.2. The
notification of non-users or specifically, their identification and their execution is
an additional challenge for privacy self-management. Also, the description and
evaluation of multi-party consent in privacy policies is a novelty that cannot be
represented by static, unilateral privacy policies made by the service provider.
In this thesis consent has been evaluated through a central management system.
A proposal for a consent management system is presented in Section 4.2.2, although
the statement in Section 3.2.1.2 still holds: multiple-party consent can only be
clarified by new regulatory guidelines that consider ownership and possession13.
Structural Problems. Solove further shows in [Sol12] that cognitive challenges
can be generalized to show that consent and purpose mechanisms have structural
problems as a consequence. This problems again aggravate for the Interent of
Things.
Firstly, consent does not scale well. The cognitive problems described above
apply per service provision or ICT system. In the case of IoT, where several
services and applications might request a user’s consent for each service, service
composition or similar, the user will be faced with one or several possibly very
complex privacy policies. Technical solutions could help, such as a consent
management assistant that supports the user to automatically reject or accept
certain pre-defined purposes based on user defined policies. Prerequisites are
standardised, machine readable privacy policies which are able to represent several
layers of data processing. Some privacy policies have been proposed to be machine
readable, see [Cra03], but no format has achieved general consensus, therefore
machine readable policies remain a future challenge.
Secondly, consent mechanisms in the form of privacy notices do not aggregate
well. Data collected by one IoT system maybe aggregated with data of many
other systems to reveal information that was not seen before. The aggregation
13The reader is reminded of the problem with an example: a subject enters the car of another
subject, where the car senses the comfort quality of the passengers by sensing their heart rate,
transpiration, etc. If the owner of the car consents to the evaluation but the guest does not,
how is the conflict solved?
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may reveal also new personal information of subjects that has not been consented
to by the respective person. Here, additional privacy principles like intervention,
transparency and access can help to inform the subject about the new information
that has been retrieved, even if the user has not consented to it. However, it
remains to be evaluated how a technical implementation performs when several
applications with respective subcontractors are in place.
Finally, the problem of assessing the harm of the disclosure of personal data
centres as the main problem that leads also to many of the cognitive problems.
Solove underlines privacy protection is the management of personal data over
a long term. The possible effects are perceived to be none, if not immediately
obvious (e.g. the consequence of the disclosure of embarrassing pictures). Users
have to decide over privacy individually and far in advance, making the need for
transparency more critical.
Next Steps. The cognitive and structural problems show that privacy self-
management based on consent is problematic. Solove notes that consent is an
undertheorized concept, see [Sol12] and proposes therefore four complementary
directions:
Rethinking Consent. Solove formulates a proposal for law enforcement, where
consent is not validated in a binary way (e.g., consent has been given or
not), but as a concept with many nuances.
Developing Partial Privacy Self-Management. Solove argues that privacy
self-management is needed for users that want to use privacy related services
(such as social networks) and those that don’t want to. Solove sees a
similarity between privacy aspects and safety aspects. Users have a wide
range of freedom when buying goods that require safety (e.g. cars or food)
but those goods are regulated, such that micromanagement of risks by users
is not needed.
Adjusting Privacy’s Timing and Focus. Consent and purpose-binding are
concepts that target the initial relation between users and service providers.
But data may reveal more information about a user in a future point of the
service provision where data analysis or aggregation took place. Solove calls
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this the timing of privacy protection. He proposes that consent should not
be asked for once and be valid in advance, but it should be required when
the new data is becoming visible.
Moving Toward Substance over Neutrality. Solove underlines that consent
can be used to “[waive] many constitutional rights”. Consent can be used
to equally accept many forms of risk. Solove proposes to use a form to
codification similar to the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) to rate risk
more precisely and to base consent on it. The UCC categorizes different
responsibilities and risks in sales and commercial transactions, see [Hil76].
The proposals by Solove can be directly transferred to privacy engineering in IoT.
The application of consent has been targeted by privacy enhancing technologies
in the form of policies, where privacy policies and privacy agents try to capture
the nuances of consent in languages like Extensible Access Control Markup
Language (XACML). A proposal for the architectural integration privacy policies
in IoT is presented in Section 4.2.4. The problem with XACML and similar policy
definition languages is that the languages are complex and heterogeneous, thus
often fail to find practice. A legislative definition of fine grained consent could help
as a foundation for further refinement and a common understanding of privacy
policies.
Privacy agents target partial self-management. Agents act in the name of
the user and constantly monitor the privacy requests and data flows of the user.
The agent’s decisions are based on the user’s policies and inquire the action
of the user only when policies are unclear, a technical proposal is given in the
“activator/deactivator of data collection”, see [RER15]. Evidently, agents act
according to the user’s decisions. If the user is unaware of certain risks, the agents
will not prevent him from miss-assessing the risk. Technical and legal solutions to
partial privacy self-management are therefore complimentary and cannot advance
without the other.
Timing of privacy has direct relevance to IoT. Data aggregation by a service
provider is a focus topic of IoT. Consequently, the renewal of consent at the time
of privacy related revelation of information is a duty of the service provider and
can be introduced and motivated by law and compliance.
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Solove does not go into technical details, but as formulated above, for most reg-
ulatory foundations, respective technical representations are needed. As mentioned
in Section 2.19, IoT has several constraints where traditional privacy enhancing
technologies cannot be used. In turn, that means that even with new regulation,
privacy could not be engineered into systems because required technology is not
present.
In this thesis several technologies have been evaluated as a proof of concept to
allow privacy enhanced technologies in IoT. The constraints have been introduced
in Section 2.6.1, the technologies are based on the use cases of Rerum, see [RER14a]
and are detailed in Chapter 4.
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Chapter 4
Privacy Enhancing Technologies
for the Internet of Things
Chapter 3 firstly mentioned the need for privacy enhancing technologies in the
General Data Protection Regulation and in the proposed privacy development
lifecylce, see Section 3.3.
This Chapter introduces several technologies based on the requirements of the
Rerum use cases1.
The technologies are categorized according to Güerses et al. proposal,
see [Gür14], namely privacy technologies for control, practice and confidentiality.
The technologies serve as a proof of concept. Their elicitation, development
and evaluation aimed at the implementation of the Rerum trial use cases and
follow the same constraints as described in Section 2.6.1. The Rerum use cases
can be found in [RER14a], they comprise UC-O1 Smart Transportation, UC-O2
Environmental Monitoring, UC-I1 Home Energy Management and UC-I2 Comfort
Quality Management. Their economical background is described in Section 2.1.
1Note: the content of this Chapter has been previously published in [SWC+15] before. Some
of these technologies have become intellectual property of Siemens AG, an additional note will
be given in the respective Section.
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4.1 Categorization of Privacy Enhancing Tech-
nologies
The technologies presented in this thesis are categorized according to Gürses
work in [Gür14] and according to the “hard” and “soft” privacy control definition
of [SWC+15].
Gürses describes the three categories of privacy research as follows:
Privacy as Confidentiality. Gürses characterizes privacy as confidentiality
with three principles, data minimization, avoidance of a single point of
failure and openness to scrutiny. Data minimization enhances privacy by
minimizing the acquisition information. Avoidance of a single point of failure
means an architectural decision to avoid any single point of data acquisition
within an ICT system. Openness to scrutiny denotes the openness of the
design of PETs to the public eye in order to increase the maturation and the
trust in the respective technology. A wide known technology in this regard
is the TOR network, see [MBG+08].
Privacy as Control. This type of privacy research supports methods to inform
users about the purpose for which they are consenting personal data col-
lection, which data is exactly collected and the period the data is stored.
Related technologies are access control mechanisms, policies and dashboards.
Privacy as Practice. This research category analyses the mediation between
transparency and feedback mechanisms in IT systems, and privacy related
decisions of users. The central assumption is that the higher the privacy
awareness is of a user and the higher the feedback is of a system to a user,
the better is the user’s decisions concerning his privacy. One example comes
from online social networks where a user might or might not post an image
if he realizes that it will be publicly visible.
Hard and soft privacy controls are categorized as follows:
Hard privacy controls. Hard privacy mechanisms enforce privacy as confiden-
tiality and privacy as control with technical means. The mechanisms are
verifiable and are often under the control of the data subject (e.g. the user).
Such mechanisms can provide data minimization (e.g. reduce granularity
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of data), anonymization (hide a user’s identity) and unlinkability (several
actions of one user are not linkable by a thrid party) among other concepts.
Soft privacy controls. In Gürses description of privacy as confidentiality, the
second principle detailed the avoidance of a single point of failure, i.e., the
avoidance of a single point of data storage and the “trust” that this point
confiably protects that data. If this principle cannot be achieved due to some
constraint (e.g. scenario specific), controls are applied that are denominated
as soft privacy controls. That means, that the controls cannot be verified or
enforced, but they are merely a supporting mechanism for the data controller.
One example are sticky policies that travel with data of a user and state
under which circumstances the data is allowed to be processed. In this case,
the policies cannot be technically enforced, the data controller is assumed
to be trusted in following the policies.
4.2 Privacy Enhancing Technologies Supporting
Practice and Control
Diaz and Gürses describe in [DG12] privacy enhancing technologies supporting
practice as technologies that raise transparency and understanding about the flow
of personal data through feedback and awareness. If users are able to understand
how information is collected, aggregated, analysed and used for decision or value
creation, they might be inclined to question, intervene, and renegotiate their
decisions regarding their personal data.
Privacy supporting control is described in [DG12] as technologies that provide
a means to users in order to control the disclosure of their information and at
the same time gives some framework for service providers to adequately define
privacy policies. The technologies should additionally enforce those policies in a
way that prevents the abuse of personal information for illegitimate purposes.
The technologies presented in this Section support Rerum use cases UC-O1, UC-
I1 and UC-I2 [SWC+15] and represent both aspects, practice and control. Although
each technology could be classified into either the control or practice paradigm,
the usefulness of each technology only becomes evident with the complement of
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both paradigms. An example: Diaz and Gürses categorize access control and
dashboard mechanisms in the respective paradigms control and practice. On
the one hand access control mechanism cannot be applied without somehow
user-friendly interface for the definition of policies, something that is provided
in the Rerum privacy dashboard, a single point of contact for the user. On the
other hand, the dashboard (or privacy mirror) misses the underlying components
that allow to make data flows transparent to the user. Gürses [Gür14] notes that
users can be encouraged opportunistically to review their privacy settings with
transparency mechanisms. For this practical reason, the paradigms of practice
(review privacy settings) and control (edit privacy setting) will be contemplated
as one.
The technologies in this Section will be presented individually. In Section 5 all
technologies are integrated into a final IoT domain model.
4.2.1 Privacy Dashboard
The intent of a privacy dashboard2 is to help users gain an overview of the personal
information collected about them, particularly when the data sources, personal
data and related services in question are as numerous and unobtrusive, as in IoT.
This is achieved by a graphical interface which enables the management of policies
and consent for the private information of users [ZAM14].
The dashboard supports the principles of individual participation, notice and
access, see Section 3.2.1.1, fulfils the requirements to Right of Access of the
GDPR in Article 15 [Par14], and is classified as a transparency enhancing tool,
see [JWV13]. A privacy dashboard answers the question “what does a system
know about the user?”.
Since it is impossible to expect that all users of an IoT system have a strong
technical background, it is not viable for them to express their privacy policies in
a complex policy language. The graphical interface visualizes how a user’s devices
behave in an IoT system and it allows changing that behaviour according to the
user’s preferences. These preferences are converted (automatically) to policies in a
machine-readable format. Additionally, the privacy dashboard helps to understand
2The content of this Section was previously published in [SWC+15,SC16].
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what kind of data their devices are sharing with the IoT system3, thus avoiding
that users are overwhelmed with raw data.
4.2.1.1 Related Work
The idea of privacy dashboards exists and has been practised successfully. Most
prominent is the example of Google, which provides a dashboard for users to
overview the data linked to their accounts and to remove or edit their interests
via an option called “ads settings” [Inc16]. Rubinstein and Good note that is
now commonplace for ICT services to provide users some form of access to their
personal data, see [RG13]. The idea of the privacy dashboard has also been
described as a privacy pattern, see [DGZM15].
The first common privacy vocabulary for machine readable privacy policies was
proposed by P3P, see [Cra02]. This vocabulary has been the foundation for many
dashboard implementations. Doty et al. have described the privacy dashboard as
a privacy pattern.
Janic et al. categorize in [JWV13] implementations of dashboards and trans-
parency enhancing tools in four categories:
1. Tools that provide insight in intended data collection and processing based
on website privacy policy. A dashboard implementation for web browsers has
been provided by the W3C in [Rag11]. Costante et al. propose a graphical
representation of website privacy policies in [CSPH12]. Implementations
for web browser exist as seen in Privacy Icons [OPW+12] and Privacy
Bird [Cra09].
2. Tools that provide insight in already collected and/or stored data. The
European projects PRIME and PRIME Life have developed the Data Track
Privacy Dashboard [WS10], a client-side tool that tracks the information
that users disclose to websites by intercepting his traffic. Google Dashbaord
is a server-side example of tools in this category, it shows what data has
been collected and processed by Google’s services.
3. Tools that provide insight in third parties tracking the user. Some examples
3It is assumed that the user knows which devices he owns. This might be based on the
ownership model presented in Section 2.5.3.3.
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are provided by Angulo et al. in [AFHPW15] and by the Mozilla Firefox
plug-in Lightbeam, see [VKC15].
4. Tools that provide insight in data collection and processing based on website’s
reputation. The most famous tool is the Web of Trust4 [WOT07].
5. Tools that raise awareness of possibly unwanted data disclosure by promoting
awareness. Some examples are Friend Inspector and Privacy Score for
Facebook5. Me and My Shadow [Tec12] is a website that helps users to
understand privacy risks, how technology of tracing works and gives practical
advice on how to better protect privacy by using PETs and by changing
common behaviour.
Janic et al. come to the conclusion that although all of the tools support
awareness, none of the tools show the user where his data is stored and how it is
processed, merely which data he has released to the public.
Fischer-Hübner et al. have proposed in [FHAP13] an approach towards
tracking user data throughout service provision. The approach relates to the
Data Tracker [WS10] and extends it with further logging capabilities. The created
logs are based on a multilayer of different policies throughout service provision
and show a trace of the services that have received the user’s data. The logs
contain respective data storages, processing and disclosing policies used within
the traces. The approach takes usability aspects into consideration and addresses
ex ante (which information does the user need to give his consent?) and ex post
transparency (what does the system know about the user?).
Bier et al. propose in [BKB16] “Privacy Insight”, a dashboard based on
data flow and data usage control, as defined in [PLB12]. The dashboard is
deployed by the service provider in a technology independent, user friendly way
(e.g. by showing tool-tips) and is routed into an XACML policy architecture.
The dash board is supported by event listeners of operating systems and tracking
components. Event listeners intercept system events and forward them to the
4The Web of Trust service has received a considerable amount of critique as the WoT
service seems to acquire personal data of its users and sell it. Additionally, the rep-
utation system is supposed to be affected by fraud. See https://www.kuketz-blog.de/
wot-addon-wie-ein-browser-addon-seine-nutzer-ausspaeht/, last accessed on August 17, 2017,
for a snapshot of the discussion (German).
5Both tools have been referenced in literature but were unavailable as of August 17, 2017.
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tracking components. Event listeners are coupled with a policy enforcement point
and the tracking components are interleaved with a policy information point to
allow the information flow to be checked by the tracking component and to enforce
the user’s preferences by the XACML architecture.
4.2.1.2 Rerum Dashboard
The Rerum dashboard is a part of the Rerum middleware functional components
for privacy, see seciton 2.5.4.
The dashboard offers a graphical user interface to the users, it tracks how
many devices the user owns, it visualises for which services the user has given his
consent, what data the user’s devices have published, and it allows him to define
policies based on a simplified language as well as instantly suspend his consent
and deactivate data collection. The dashboard is supported by additional Rerum
middleware Rerum Security, Privacy and Trust Components (SPT) components:
the consent manager, see Section 4.2.2, an extended XACML architecture for the
Rerum domain model, see Section 4.2.4 and the activator and deactivator of data
collection that is interleaved to the data and context manager, see [SWC+15].
The dashboard follows a similar concept to that of Bier et al. [BKB16], albeit
published one year prior, see [SWC+15]. Differently than the Privacy Insight
dashboard, the Rerum dashboard is an architectural element and has not been
implemented, although the supporting elements have been implemented for the
Rerum trials. Also, some design decisions were made to integrate the Rerum
dashboard in the Rerum domain model. For example the data provenance model
is much simpler as third party service providers were left out of scope in Rerum.
This could be remediated by including data usage control and compliance of third
party service providers as seen in Bier et al.’s approach.
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Figure 4.1: Draft for the Rerum dashboard [SWC+15]
Figure 4.1 proposes a graphical interface of the dashboard. A dashboard layout
was not specified in Rerum [SWC+15] as Rerum did not target the user application
layer. The dashboard could follow the privacy icon proposals form Haduong et
al. [HTQ12], Holtz et al. [HZH11] or [Me16] while the mash-up of content could
follow the proposal for a dashboard in smart homes by Bush et al. [BKS14].
4.2.1.3 Integration in the Rerum Domain Model
The integration of the dashboard will be detailed based on an example: a service
requests access to user data. The consent manager searches for existing policies to
verify if consent exists. If no consent exists, the consent manager requests consent
from the dashboard. The dashboard visualizes the request, notifies the user and
presents a readable form to the user. If the user accepts, the privacy dashboard
will confirm the given consent to the consent manager, which will trigger a policy
generation and storage. The dashboard will also handle the interaction between a
user and his devices. As devices will adopt different pseudonyms, the dashboard
will interact with the anonymising / pseudonymising manager to retrieve the
real identities, in order to visualize activities to the user. Figure 4.2 depicts the
interaction of dashboard and consent manager.
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Figure 4.2: Interaction of Privacy Dashboard and Consent Manager
Figure 4.3 includes the Anon./Psnym. Manager to the message flow. The
sequence unifies for brevity the Rerum middleware and the service provider without
detailing the actions between both.
As a first step, a device agrees on a pseudonym. The anonymising and
pseudonymising manager takes care of the pseudonym generation and issues either
a pseudonym seed, so the device can further generate more pseudonyms, or a
single pseudonym to the device. This agreement (and the mapping of pseudonyms
to devices) will be displayed to the user on the dashboard. The device can now
identify and register itself under the pseudonym nym-1 (message 3). Note that the
device can register itself under different pseudonyms at the same time. Once the
middleware accepted the registration (message 4), it will forward the activities of
the device to the respective privacy dashboard (message 5). The relation between
device and privacy dashboard is negotiated through the device’s ownership and is
part of the registration information of message 3.
The privacy dashboard will ask for the real identity of nym-1 and, if ownership
relations apply, receive the original identity (message 6 and 7). The privacy
dashboard will then present the activities of device to the user (message 8), even
if the device uses several pseudonyms.
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Figure 4.3: Interaction of Privacy Dashboard and Anonymising and Pseudonymis-
ing Manager
The dashboard is the main interface for the user in terms of privacy control, a
further description is given in the privacy dashboard technical Section below. The
user is allowed to interfere anytime, e.g. in case he wants to opt-out from a service.
The responsible component is the activator / deactivator of data collection with
the privacy dashboard as its interface. Service agreements and device’s activities
will be shown in the dashboard. The user will have a possibility to opt-out of
the service with the click of a button, sending a command to the activator /
deactivator and triggering a data collection stop at the Rerum middleware. A
detailed description of the activator / deactivator including all its dependencies of
the Rerum middleware is given in [SWC+15].
Figure 4.4 shows the sequence of deactivation of data collection after an initial
request was allowed.
The example assumes that a request was made to a device and that policies
are checked to evaluate if the request should be allowed or not: first preferences
of a user policy are matched to the request (messages 1 and 2). The request is
allowed and the decision is served to the device (message 3). The device notifies
the Rerum middleware of an accepted request and publishes data (message 4).
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The service provider requests data from the device through the Rerum middleware
(message 5). The request is redirected to the device (message 6) and responded
(by the device to the middleware) with a data stream (message 7). The data is
redirected from the middleware to the service provider accordingly (message 8).
Simultaneously, the data provision is registered by the middleware to the
privacy dashboard (via the activator / deactivator of data collection, message
9). The user may stop the data collection at any time (message 10). If so, the
activator / deactivator sends a notice to stop the data collection to the middleware
(message 11), note that also a new policy entry could be added for that service.
While data is still served from the device and the service provider still awaits or
is subscribed to the Rerum middleware for the data stream, the middleware will
respond with an inexplicit “Data Stream not available” notice, without publishing
any reason. This ensures that the user can intervene in the processing of his data
as required by the GDPR anytime without having to fear consequences of the
service provider.
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Figure 4.4: Interaction of Privacy Dashboard and Activator / Deactivator of Data
Collection
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4.2.2 Consent Manager
A Consent Manager6 is a dedicated component of an ICT system that allows a
user to see which applications request access to his personal data, the purpose of
the request and the circumstances surrounding the request. A given or denied
consent is stored in a consent database, thus retrievable for accountability issues.
In addition, the consent manager could help the user to assess the risk and benefit
of a request, hence assisting the service provider in offering the user informed
consent [FLM05].
A data subject may declare his consent to a service provider or withdraw a
previous one at any time, thus supporting Consent, Notice and Access, Participa-
tion & Accountability. The GDPR additionally demands that “it shall be as easy
to withdraw consent as to give it”, Article 7(3) [Par14], thus the requirement to
offer the user an easy way to manage his consent.
The consent manager is an interesting component for IoT: the user might
constantly be requested to consent to services that want to collect data from his
devices and offer him some value in return. The user will be able to accommodate
this situation by specifying policies which support the automation the consent
process. The user must be able to comprehend which services he consented to
and under which circumstances.
The consent manager is therefore related to an authorization engine and a
dashboard where the final decision on a conflicting request or the withdrawal of it
is made by the user personally.
4.2.2.1 Related Work
Related work on the consent manager targets informed consent and a consent
manager. Related work on informed consent explicates what is needed in order to
inform a user adequately and in such a away that he understands the complexity
of the system. The consent manager supports the user in weighting the sensitivity
and the risks stemming from his consent against the foreseen benefits.
Related work on the consent manager is the delineation of a technical and/or
architectural component that assists the provision of informed consent.
6Partial content of this Section was previously published in [RER15].
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Informed Consent. For the sake of completeness, the reader is referred tp the
consent discussion in Rerum [SWC+15] and the structure proposal of informed
consent by Friedman et al. [FLM05]. The most significant insights into informed
consent have been provided in the area of Health Care (HC). Researchers in the
HC area have mentioned many of the shortcomings of consent that have been
subject to recent privacy discussion (a.o. simple language, visualisation, risk
assessment support, standard templates, see [SWC+15]). Informed consent has
been identified as challenge to explain a patient7 how a complex system (his body)
works and which risks and benefits his consent (and accordingly, the treatment
on his body) might have. The same applies for ICT and IoT, a complex system
has to be explained to the user in order for him to understand the benefits and
risks. The form and methods of explanation might be directly transferred from
health care: Cassileth [CZSSM80] surveys in 1980 why informed consent misses
the point of informing the user by analysing 200 patients. The methods used (oral
and consent forms) were examined and new methods that improve legibility and
comprehension were proposed. Appelbaum [ALM87] describes in 1987 informed
consent from a clinical and legal point of view, how it affects patients in clinical
practice and how the successfulness should be assessed.
More recently tools have been proposed to help the provider to assess the risk
first before it is communicated to the patient. In [BLP+13] Biliomoria proposes
a surgical risk calculator. The calculator is based on pre-defined clinical data
of several clinical institutions. The tool was evaluated positively in Biliomoria’s
survey. No such tool exists to help with the evaluation of risks for ICT / IoT
based systems, but might be a practical approach if the experience of experts is
integrated8.
Consent Manager. An early proposal for a consent management system for
web-service environments has been published in a patent by Dunn [Dun06]. The
manager is interleaved with an access control component to support the user in
7Patient is a user in IoT and other ICT systems
8The critical reader may question the need for such tools, as health care services carry
much higher risks compared to ICT-based systems. This might only be the case for treatments
that directly threaten the life of the patient, but not for others. Privacy breaches might cause
significant damage to the affected subjects as well, see [Sch78].
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handling several consent requests. Whenever a request is not authorized, the
consent management system is invoked. The validation of the request is based
on the P3P language [CW07]. The user defines his preferences using the P3P
preference exchange language APPEL [Con02] which are compared to the P3P
policy definitions of the service and the user is presented one or more options to
consent to the service or not.
Other proposals for consent management have been made recently in the area
of health care. Researchers in the area of health care have mentioned many of the
shortcomings of consent that have been subject to recent privacy discussion.
Dunn’s proposal [Dun06] has strong similarities with the Rerum consent
manager (matching of policies and preferences, storing of consent, informing the
user, interleave with access control), except for the architectural integration. Dunn
considers web-services as its main use case, whereas Rerum focuses on use cases
with constrained devices. The architectural integration separates both proposals,
although being conceptually close.
Wang and Hongxia [WJ12] propose a consent management system based on
an own informed consent model for HC. The consent manager supports weighing
benefits and risks of a consent request based on expected benefit, sensitivity and
relevance. Benefits maybe the treatment results of a primary physician (high) or
targeted advertisement from a drug store (low). The risks are rated according
to sensitivity (generally health status) and relevance, that means which data is
requested and how it relates to a service (if irrelevant data is requested for a
service, the risk becomes higher). Relevance is rated through statical learning
methods. That means that similar requests are compared over time to learn the
normal amount of data records that are needed for a special request. The manager
also needs a pre-access definition by the patient and an administrator to rate how
sensitive records are and how important a request may be.
The architecture of the consent manager is as follows: every request to a pa-
tient’s health records is redirected to the consent manager. Based on the statistical
learning engine, requests are rated and a decision (accept, deny) is suggested to
the patient. On acceptance requests are accepted and responded to accordingly.
This architecture resembles that of Dunn [Dun06] and Rerum [SWC+15]: the
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redirection is part of all proposals, although an enforcement point and XACML are
not directly mentioned in [WJ12]. A benefit-risk calculation and formalization is
missing in [Dun06,SWC+15] but found in [WJ12]. The proposals in [Dun06,WJ12]
do not consider a real-time data consumption stoppage by revoking the consent,
which is formulated in [SWC+15]. Only [WJ12] was implemented and evaluated
over an increasing scale of patients and requests.
In summary, consent management is a maturing technology. Advances can
be found in health care scenarios, especially in the presentation of informed
consent and benefit-risk evaluation. Architectural extensions for IoT scenarios are
marginal, but the overall architecture has been similar through all proposals and
can be applied to IoT as well. How well existing consent managers can be carried
over to IoT, particularly those of health care, remains an open question.
4.2.2.2 Integration in the Rerum Domain Model
The architectural location of the consent manager is discussed here and subse-
quently put into relation with the consent manager via the sequence diagram
shown in Figure 4.5.
In the Rerum Middleware the service manager is located conceptually at the
Security Center, he interacts with the Rerum Devices and the data processing
parties above the Middleware, see Section 2.5.4. The consent manager is essentially
a part of the Security Center as it interleaves with other security services such
as the authorization framework. For simplicity, it is assumed that the consent
manager can create authorization policies and access information (such as tokens9),
and that the VRDs can evaluate this kind of information. Figure 4.5 depicts the
sequence of consent gathering based on a formerly unknown and unauthenticated
request.
9Tokens, tickets and similar artefacts are structured access control information of authentica-
tion, authorization and accounting services. This topic is addressed in detail in Section 4.2.4.
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Figure 4.5: Sequence of the acquisition of user consent
Assuming that a new application requests access to personal data from a VRD,
the functional interplay between the components is as follows:
1. A new application requests access to a set of private data residing in the
Virtual Rerum Device. The VRD checks for access policies. At this point,
there are none, as the service has never been authorized before.
2. The VRD redirects the request to the Consent Manager, as the user has to
decide on granting access. Possibly, a user-defined policy could be used to
give consent to certain applications. For instance, the policy could state
that access is granted only to certain statistics of the user’s data or only to
requesters with reputation ranking of high or above and with a certificate
from a certain given trusted group.
3. The Consent Manager receives the access request and asks the application for
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the specific purpose for requesting the data, how the data will be processed
and which data it wants to gather specifically.
4. The Consent Manager checks the request for policies or existing consent.
The application is notified that none was found and that the user has to
approve the request.
5. Upon checking the request, the Consent Manager includes the purpose
information in a notification message and sends it to the user. The Consent
Manager will wait for the approval of the user.
6. The user gives his consent. He accepts this service to access specific data for
a certain purpose. The consent is recorded. (Please notice that besides this
consent, an access control layer is also on effect. It is reasonable that in some
cases, the accessing service must present particular credentials of the user on
behalf of which he is accessing the data in order to grant some information
to that user. Those credentials should be evaluated at the access control
policy enforcement point).
7. After successfully gaining consent from the user, the Consent Manager
triggers the creation of access policies for this application, including the
data it is allowed to access, the way the data should be processed and the
purpose.
8. The Consent Manager then redirects the application to the VRD and
9. Requests access with the attached access information.
10. The VRD checks the given access information.
11. On success, the VRD allows access.
Figure 4.6 shows a snapshot of Rerum’s consent manager in the context of the
indoor use case in Tarragona.
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Figure 4.6: Rerum Consent Manager: Example for consent request in the UC-I2
trial
In Rerum, the consent manager interleaves with the access control layer to
trigger the creation of policies, to authenticate the user, retrieve his consent, to
validate if a request shall be automatically consented by means of user policies,
etc. Differences and similarities with the access control layer are further addressed
in [SWC+15].
4.2.3 Privacy Friendly Access Control
This Section describes how access control can be realized in IoT10. The need for
access control was already mentioned in relation to the consent manager. User
consent is an agreement between a user and a processing party on a purpose, which
describes why (purpose) personal data is collected and processed. This purpose
needs to hold at all times, whenever personal data is processed. The requirement
of “purpose” is realized by the definition of Privacy Policies as formulated in the
XACML 3.0 privacy profile [Ris13].
These policies can be enforced before disclosing data by checking if the request-
ing party can fulfil them. The enforcing component is called Policy Enforcement
10Note: the content of this Section has been previously published in [SC15,RER14b].
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Point (PEP). There are two main cases, where an enforcement point can be placed.
• Directly at the Devices, the Privacy Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) will
check fulfilment of an adequate policy for a certain requested data set.
• Decoupled, a trusted Privacy PEP will check policy protected data in transit.
The trusted Privacy PEP has to know the adequate policy for this data set
or the data set carries it alongside or has a link to the adequate policy, see
Section 4.2.3.1.
In Rerum both privacy PEP versions were considered. The first one is integrated in
the Virtual Rerum Device, as depicted in the snapshot of the Rerum middleware
in Figure 4.7. The second one can be deployed in Rerum’s Security Center,
universally available for checking the data in transit.
Figure 4.7: The access control modules (outlined) of the Rerum architecture
Figure 4.7 showcases the three different questions that have to be taken care
of for access control to takes place in IoT. Rerum follows the XACML [Ris13]
scheme. Anticipatory, three main components will be mentioned here: the Policy
Enforcement Point (PEP) where access control is enforced, the Policy Decision
Point (PDP) where the decision to either allow or deny a request is made and
the Policy Administration Point (PAP) where the policy or information is defined
that will be used to make a decision.
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The first question concerns the integration of the XACML scheme into the
Rerum domain model. This is briefly explained in the next Section alongside with
an introduction to XACML. A full picture of the domain model with XACML is
presented in Chapter 5. The interested reader is referred to [RER15] in order to
grasp the full functional integration with the Rerum middleware.
The second question relates to the enforcement point: in IoT an application
can either request data from a device that maybe physically nearby or it may
refer to the middle ware to check which (physically distant) device can provide
certain information (compare the applications in Figure 4.7.). Therefore two PEPs
are needed as mentioned in the introduction of this Section. The PEP on the
middleware follows the XACML standard, although it has to rely on additional
information for data in transit. PEPs on the devices however, are constrained in
computing power and network connection. A device has to either make a decision
by itself and employ lots of processing power or delegate the decision to a party
that it trusts and rely on ubiquitous network access. A novel way of finding a
trade-off between both has been developed for this thesis and proposed for Rerum,
see Section 4.2.5.
The third question in focus for the middleware PEP is how to link policies to
data in transit. Policies can either be known by the PEP (and the PDP), linked or
stuck to the data. The scheme developed for Rerum is discussed in Section 4.2.4.
In the next Section an introduction to related work and basic understanding
of used mechanisms will be given.
4.2.3.1 Related Work
In this Section related standards that were used in Rerum will be presented, namely
policies for data in transit, the Extensible Mark-up Language XACML, the access
control protocol Open Authorization standard (OAuth) and the Delegated CoAP
Authentication and Authorization Framework (DCAF). For completeness, the
related standards Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) and Kerberos
will be briefly discussed.
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Sticky Policies. The sticky policy mechanism suggested in [PM11] will be
described here, which aims to allow access to personal data only upon satisfaction
of the attached policies. These is achieved by encrypting the data set and
disclosing decryption information to parties fulfilling the policies. The sticky
policy mechanism can be described by three basic steps, as shown in Figure 4.8.
Figure 4.8: A simple Sticky Policy mechanism
Three parties are assumed: person one (“P1”) is the data subject creating
data sets, the second person (“P2”) is the data controller processing the data, and
the third person is a Trusted Third Party (TTP), which is able to verify that the
data controller fulfils policy obligations.
Step 1 P2 requests personal data from P1. P1 generates a data set privData and
according policies POL1. The data set is encrypted with a secret S1 and
the policies are attached as metadata to the encrypted data. Alternatively,
the policies could be stored in a public registry with only a policy pointer
sticked to the data set’s as metadata. Person one signs the policy with his
private key privateKeyP1 and sends the data, the policy and the signature
to P2.
Step 2 P1 sends an encrypted message to the Trusted Third Party with S1, his
signature over S1, POL1 and its signature.
Step 3 P2 wants to access the data set, which is encrypted with S1. P2 understands
the attached policies POL1, he requests S1 from TTP, showing that he can
fulfil the requirements from POL1. P2 receives S1, if TTP is convinced that
P2 can fulfil the policies satisfyingly.
It should be noted, that in this small example, there is no need for a Trusted
Third Party, P2 could ask P1 himself for S1. In case of data in transit through
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multiple parties, P1 might not be available, thus TTP is assumed a party with
much higher availability and connectivity than the data subject himself.
XACML. The Extensible Mark-up Language (XACML) [Ris13] is a standard
XML scheme for authorization ratified by the OASIS group firstly in 2005. The
standard focuses on the definition of authorization policies although an architecture
proposal exists. At the time of this writing, the most recent version is profile
version 3.0. A series of profiles have been proposed that help to apply the XACML
scheme with other authentication schemes such as the Security Assertion Markup
Language SAML [HCH+05] and the OAuth protocol [Sir14] in order to facilitate
a complete access control framework.
The XACML scheme is defined through four main components. For under-
standability, a visual image is used to exemplify the scheme (Figure 4.9), a deep
technical description is given in [Ris13].
Figure 4.9: Exemplification of XACML by mapping a real life example
Policy Enforcement Point. The PEP can be envisioned as a door that has to
be opened for a requester to access a resource. The PEP is an dependent
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component that cannot decide by itself if a request is to be allowed or not.
But the architectural location of the PEP is independent, it can be scattered
throughout a system wherever a request has to be validated. It should
be noted that it is reasonable to place the PEP and the policies as close
as possible to the resource. This is visualized in Figure 4.9, the door is
ultimately placed in front of the property including its policy (sign).
Policy Decision Point. In the imaginative context of the PEP being a door,
the Policy Decision Point (PDP) acts as the bouncer. The PDP decides
upon the information it has been given if the request is allowed or not.
Mandatory information for the PDP is: the resource that is requested (e.g.
via a resource identifier), a policy that was defined for that resource by the
owner (also sometime the possessor, see Section 2.5.3) of the resource and
proof on who the requester is or whom he relates to.
Policy Information Point. The PDP might need further information to be
able to successfully match a given policy to a request. The PDP is hereby
assisted by the PIP. Additional information or tasks might be: resolving
IP-addresses to geo-locations, retrieve further credentials to identify the
requester, get time zones, get IoT context information, etc.
Policy Administration Point. The administration point is where policies are
defined. The PAP is uniquely accessible to the owner of the resource. The
PAP also serves as the policy store. In the image, it corresponds to a
protected place where the owner of the property create the policy sign.
All the elements of the XACML scheme can be found in Rerum, an overview
is given in Figure 4.10.
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Figure 4.10: Integration of XACML components in the Rerum middleware
The XACML scheme is initiated in Rerum as follows:
1. An authenticated application requests access to data of a device.
2. The device does not decide itself upon granting or denying access, it redirects
the request to the Policy Decision Point, located at the associated Virtual
Entity.
3. The PDP checks which policies apply for the data requested and if the
requester can fulfil them.
4. If needed, the PDP will request more contextual information from the PIP
for the decision.
5. The PDP sends the decision to the PEP, which will act accordingly. There
are three decision types that the PDP can send to the PEP: allow access,
deny access, request undecidable.
6. The PEP will act according to the decision and either send the requested
data or deny the access. (It is assumed “deny” as default, if no policy applies
positively or in case of conflict.)
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Figure 4.11: Sequence for the access of protected data in Rerum through XACML
Figure 4.11 diagrams the sequence. It should be noted, that while the policy en-
forcement point and the policy definitions for privacy and security are functionally
different, the underlying infrastructure is the same in Rerum.
OAuth. The OAuth framework (RFC 6749) [Har12] is an open standard for
authorization ratified by the IETF firstly in 2010. At the time of this writing,
the most recent version is version 2.0. OAuth and XACML standardize different
aspects of authorization, while XACML specifies policies which are used to reach a
decision concerning access requests, OAuth standardizes the sequence of messages
transferred between the parties involved. OAuth provides a protocol for requesters
(called clients) to access so called resource servers on behalf of resource owners,
such as: a smart phone (client) accessing a resource (heart rate sensor) on behalf
of a user in an ownership relationship (user owns client and resource).
It also provides a process for users to authorize third-party access to their
resources without sharing their credentials. Notably, OAuth leaves open what
content exactly is transferred and how each party handles the OAuth messages to
reach authorization decisions. For the message content, OpenID Connect [SBJ+14]
has been proposed as an authentication layer on-top of OAuth. For decision
handling, an interleave between XACML and OAuth has been proposed, see for
example [Tha14].
In the following, the OAuth 2.0 protocol for requesting and renewing access
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information (in form of tokens) will be described here on its main scenario of
delegated access. The involved parties (or Roles, as OAuth defines them) are
described first before outlining the OAuth protocol itself. The Roles are:
Resource Owner (RO) The owner of the resource which will be accessed. The
owner is capable of giving access either due to the ownership relationship of
it and the resource (then it is called a user), see Chapter 2.5.3, or due to
a delegated ownership form the user (or organization) to some device that
will be representing the user as the owner of the resource.
Resource Server (RS) The server hosts the protected resource. The term
“server” suggests a powerful entity with high connectivity and computing
power, but that is not necessarily the case. The resource server can also
be a small IoT device that hosts the information it reads as the protected
resource. The server is capable of understanding access control information
and responding to requests that target protected resources.
Client (C) An entity that makes requests on behalf of the resource owner and
with the owner’s permission. The client is an unspecified entity that could
reside on another resource server, a desktop or any other form of software
artefact.
Authentication Server (AS) The server issues the access control information
in from of OAuth tokens to clients. The client needs to authenticate as
a representative of the resource owner against the authorization server.
Additionally, the resource owner must have authorized the client previously
for the client to receive a token. The authorization server is an conceptual
entity: it may be the same server as the resource server or a separate entity.
Also, a single authorization server may issue tokens accepted by several
resource servers.
OAuth messages flow between the roles client, resource server and resource
owner as summarized in Figure 4.12.
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Figure 4.12: Sequence of the OAuth 2.0 protocol
The protocol starts with the client. The client knows the resource owner
(message 1) and asks it for the authorization to access its resource. The resource
owner decides (how the decision is made, is out of scope) and gives Access Grant
(AG) information to the client. The content of the grant is out of scope as well.
The client requests an access token from the authorization server by authenticating
itself and attaching AG (message 3). If both are valid, the authorization server
issues the access token (message 4). The authorization type, expiration date and
other constraints refer to the information of the access grant. Message 5 and 6
represent the authorized access request by the client and the successful response
by the resource server.
The OAuth standard notes explicitly that the interaction between the autho-
rization server and resource server is beyond the scope of the specification [Har12],
as is the specific content of the token. This interaction is not trivial, as both
servers have to agree on a common understanding for a variety of clients, resources,
contexts and conditions. The missing interaction between both servers inspired
the proposal in Section 4.2.5 for constrained IoT devices.
DCAF. The Delegated CoAP Authentication and Authorization Framework
(DCAF) [GBB14] was firstly drafted for the IETF in 2013. DCAF specifies a
protocol for establishing a Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) channel in
constrained environments. DCAF uses the same roles as OAuth, but specifies the
delegation of client authentication and authorization from a constrained client to
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a more powerful role called Authentication Manager (AM)11. DCAF additionally
focuses on the use of CoAP, the Constrained Application Protocol, which was
introduced in Section 2.6. The authentication manager is again a conceptual role,
as AM and client can be one role in DCAF as well to fully resemble the OAuth
protocol. The protocol flow is as shown in Figure 4.13.
Figure 4.13: Sequence of the DCAF protocol
Notably, the resource owner does not appear in the sequence. DCAF maintains
the role of the resource owner as the principal entity that defines access permissions
to the resource server, but does not focus on how it does so. Therefore, the role
of the RO is taken out of the protocol specification.
The DCAF protocol may start in two different ways, by either the assumption
that the client knows the RS’ related AS or by the client requesting the related
authorization server of the resource server. Figure 4.13 starts the protocol with
the latter.
The client sends an unauthorized (and unauthenticated) request to the Resource
11If interpreted carefully, the notion of delegation was already introduced in OAuth, as the
authorization server and the resource owner take care of authentication and authorization for
the resource server.
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Server. The RS responds with a pointer to its Authorization Server. The client
understands this response as the need to request more access information from
the client’s Authorization Manager. Here is where the protocol definition for
requesting access information starts: the AM requests a DTLS connection to the
AS (message 1). By means of public key infrastructure or otherwise (this is out of
scope for the protocol), AM and AS mutually authenticate and establish a DTLS
channel. Over the DTLS channel, the AM requests access information in form
of a ticket (message 2). The resource owner has deposited some policy on the
AS, such that it can decide if the AM is to allow the request. Assuming that it
is, the AS issues a ticket to the AM (message 3). The AM transfers the ticket to
the client (message 4). The client can now request the establishment of a DTLS
channel with the RS. The key material is hereby provided to the client in the
ticket. The RS has a priori knowledge of key material (message 5). The client
requests access to the resource (message 6) which is responded due to a valid
ticket (message 7).
DCAF partially defines some of the possible content of the ticket and inter-
actions between the delegating parties, although leaving privacy aspects out of
scope. Adding privacy and retaining efficiency for constrained devices is thus the
main contribution of Section 4.2.5.
4.2.3.2 Other Authentication Protocols
For the sake of completeness the Kerberos protocol and the Elliptic Curve Qu-
Vanstone Implicit Certificates are briefly mentioned.
The Kerberos protocol (RFC 4120) [SNS88] is an open protocol for authentica-
tion and authorization firstly proposed in 1978. At the time of this writing, the
most recent version is version 5.0. Kerberos was designed to allow authentication
over unprotected networks. The protocol was extended to add additional informa-
tion regarding authorization for the involved parties. The protocol partly relies on
the Needham and Schroeder’s Trusted Third Party authentication protocol [NS78].
Kerberos uses a strong attacker model, which is able to break assertions by a
host’s operating system, modify host addresses, break physical security of all the
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hosts on the network, and read, modify and inject network packets at will. The
protocol does this in the following (simplified) way:
Kerberos is purely based on symmetric cryptography. There is no definition of
a key distribution, therefore the PKINIT Kerberos extension [ZT06] (RFC 6112)
may be used. A scenario with three parties is assumed: a Client, a Server and
a Trusted Third Party (AS). The AS shares a symmetric key with the Client
(KAS,C) and the Server (KAS,S) respectively. The Client and the Server share no
secrets, although this is the goal of the protocol. The Client asks the AS for a
shared secret with the Server. The Client does this by encrypting its request with
the the common key (KAS,C). If decrypted successfully, the AS responds with
a shared key for the Client and the Server (KS,C), encrypted with the common
key of Server and AS (KAS,S) and the common key of Client and AS (KAS,C).
Consecutively, the Client can decrypt the new common key of Client and Server
generated by the AS, but it cannot modify the message sent to the Server12.
Additionally, the AS can also send an attachment in the encrypted block that
the Client receives and that is intended for the Server. This attachment may
contain authorization and identification information such as the name, IP-address,
access permissions, etc.
The protocol ends after the Client has sent the encrypted message of AS to
the Server. The Server successfully decrypts the message and sends an acknowl-
edgement with the new symmetric secret (KS,C) to the Client.
The Elliptic Curve Qu-Vanstone Implicit Certificates [Res14] is an asymmetric
certificate scheme, based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography [HMV06] and has been
firstly proposed in 2004 as an intellectual property item (patent) by Qu and
Vanstone [QV04]. The scheme involves a Certificate Authority (CA), a claiming
party “A” and a verifying party “B”. It works as follows: A proves its identity to the
CA. A receives some cryptographic material from CA, which, together with A’s
identity, will serve as A’s private key (as in a private-public-key scheme). A wants
to prove its identity to B. A creates a signature with the cryptographic material
previously received form the CA and the information “IamA”. Additionally, With
12Here, “Kerberos encryption” also assumes integrity protection. This is not necessarily the
case, as RFC 4120 explicitly refers to this problem and different modes of operation.
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the information of the proclaimed identity “A” and CA’s private certificate, B can
construct A’s public key and verify the signature and, implicitly13, A’s identity.
This is the goal of the scheme.
Kerberos and the Implicit Certificate scheme have several interesting proper-
ties for IoT. Kerberos is a well understood protocol where the protocol design
reference implementations have been studied for over 30 years. The protocol
is purely based on computation efficient symmetric cryptography, which fits to
the constraints of IoT devices. Still, Kerberos data flows have to be adapted for
IoT, as each commonly generated secret and access information (so called Ticket)
is only usable for one single partner. Implicit Certificates are based on Elliptic
Curve Cryptography which generate small sized certificates and also efficient
computation of verification and sign operations, although those certificates are
still considerably larger than the symmetric material Kerberos and other protocols
use. A more complete overview and comparison of these protocols is therefore
presented in [Che15] and summarized in Table 4.2.
4.2.4 Sticky Policies for Data in Transit
In this Section policies for data in transit are integrated into the Rerum domain
model. The content of this Section has previously been published in [SC15,
SWC+15].
In order to support the privacy principles of Purpose Legitimacy & Specification,
and Individual Participation, see Chapter 3, the user should have a way of
expressing his privacy choices to the system, in the form of user-defined privacy
policies. It is important that the policies are easy to retrieve when needed. This
is not so easy to guarantee in an IoT-based system with huge amounts of data.
For this purpose the policies should be linked to physical entities they relate to,
when the data is at rest. Data in transit should travel with sticky policies, as
introduced in Section 4.2.3.1.
13The aspect of implicity comes with the idea that B needs A’s identity to successfully
construct A’s public key.
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4.2.4.1 Integration in the Rerum Domain Model
For the integration of policies, the reader is breifly reminded how IoT-A and
Rerum relate Physical Entities to Virtual Entities.
The Rerum domain model refers to physical objects as Physical Entities. PEs
can be any object in the “real world” including living things. PEs are represented
as Virtual Entities in the virtual space. The relationship between Physical and
Virtual Entities is defined as a conceptual entity called Augmented Entity. If an
AE exists, the corresponding Virtual Entity changes according to the Physical
Entity. If the Physical Entity changes physically, the values of the Virtual Entity
are updated. Virtual Entities expose resources that can be requested by clients,
for example, by service providers. Note: the Virtual Entity could also change the
Physical Entity, if actuators can react accordingly.
A natural way of binding the privacy policies to a Physical Entity is to link
them to the entity in its virtual representation. The policies can now be enforced
on access requests for a Physical Entity, as the requests have to be directed to the
virtual representation. Sticky Policies are privacy policies that are attached to
data and accompany it whether it is stored or in transit. This policies promote
the user’s wishes of allowed actions and consent obligations for parties processing
the data.
In the Rerum domain model, sticky polices can be located on the Virtual
Entities as well. The reason is that the Virtual Entities are the earliest point of
data creation where policies can be stuck to the data as soon as it is created.
The integration of sticky policies in the Rerum architecture relies on the policy
generation as described in Section 4.2.3.1 (XACML). Figure 4.14 illustrates where
data is protected and policies attached.
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Figure 4.14: Sticky Policies in the Rerum domain model
For the application of sticky policies, policy generation and the provision
of data is needed. Datastreams, which are not protected by sticky policies,
are provided by Rerum devices, while pre-processed datasets are provided at the
Virtual Entity. Policies are stored per Physical Entity at the corresponding Virtual
Entity (see Rerum Deliverable D2.3 [RER14b], Section 6.11.2.2). Therefore, a
protected dataset can be generated at the Virtual Entity. That means a dataset
is encrypted, policies are attached and then both are sent to a requesting party.
The corresponding secret is sent to either a Trusted Third Party, which could
be another more powerful device of the data subject, or to a global privacy
enforcement point at the Rerum Security Center. Exercising the generation of a
sticky policy protected dataset, the Virtual Entity would follow these steps:
Step 1 The Virtual Entity is requested a multiparty dataset. Multiparty datasets
are always protected by sticky policies. The Virtual Entity generates the
dataset and a corresponding secret S1. The policies to be attached are taken
from the policy database of the Virtual Entity.
Step 2 The Virtual Entity encrypts the dataset with S1 and attaches the policies
to the dataset. The Virtual Entity signs the policies with its private key (or
with another secret which is verifiable by a public counterpart).
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Step 3 The encrypted dataset, the policies and the signature are sent to the
requesting party.
Step 4 The secret S1 and the policies are again signed by the Virtual Entity
and sent in a confidential way to the Trusted Third Party. The TTP in
Rerum could be a device of the data subject which has a higher availability
and connectivity or a trusted service found in Rerum’s security and privacy
center.
Step 5 The requesting party shows to the Trusted Third Party that it can fulfil
the requirements of the sticky policy. The TTP provides the secret in a
confidential way to the requester.
Depending on the policies, there might be many requirements to be fulfilled
before acquiring the set’s secret. Pearson et al. [PM11] describe following possible
policy requirements:
1. Specify proposed use of the data. Example: use only for research and
transaction processing.
2. Use of the data only within a given set of platforms with certain security
characteristics, a given network or a subset of the enterprise.
3. Specific obligations and prohibitions such as allowed third parties, people or
processes.
4. Blacklists, notification of disclosure and deletion or minimization of data
after a certain time.
5. A list of Trusted Authorities (TA) that will provide assurance and account-
ability in the process of granting access to the protected data, potentially
the result of a negotiation process.
It should be noted that sticky policies first and foremost describe the obligations
needed to process the data, but they cannot prevent misbehaviour after the data
has been decrypted.
Sticky policies are a soft mechanism for privacy protection that allows service
providers to be compliant with the user’s consent and to respect a user’s wish for
privacy. Sticky policies are used to attach policies to data, protect a data set until
a service provider proves that it fulfils privacy requirement (this works up to a
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certain point), and allow a service provider to respect a user’s wish, even with
data sets from an unknown user.
4.2.5 Privacy Enhancing Tokens
This Section briefly details the IETF draft Privacy-Enhanced Tokens for Au-
thorization firstly proposed in 2015 the Authentication and Authorization for
Constrained Environments IETF Working Group (ACE)14 [CSH15]. Addition-
ally, new results on energy efficiency and the formal verification of the protocol
that were made during and after the first and second versions of the draft15 are
summarized. A part of the content of this Section has been published for Rerum
in [SWC+15].The draft is lead and maintained in the IETF by Siemens AG.
The IETF has classified devices by their computation and storage capacities
as introduced in Sections2.6.2 and 2.6.1. The most used devices in IoT are “class
1” with a working memory restriction of 10 KB RAM and a storage capacity of
100 KB Flash. Class 1 devices are typically powered by coin or dry cell batteries
with a maximum capacity of 2376 joules, see [Dev11].
The classes are not clear cut and other classes are used in some cases for IoT.
For the elicitation of adequate privacy enhancing technologies, the constraints of
class 1 are those that will impose a significant factor.
Smart devices in the Internet of Things range from desktop computers to small
hardware embedded in everyday objects such as clothing. As previously discussed,
not only are these small computers constrained in computing power and memory
but also have economical limitations. Therefore it is difficult to integrate state-of-
the-art privacy technologies. Thus, the following proposal targets authorization
and exemplifies a currently researched approach that allows that mechanisms to
be fulfilled.
4.2.5.1 Efficient Privacy Friendly Authorization
Many services will consume data from IoT devices and, accordingly, the authoriza-
tion of those services against the devices will be needed. Authorization frameworks
14Draft abbreviation: draft-cuellar-ace-pat-priv-enhanced-authz-tokens.
15This results have been published in [Che15] and on IoT Week 2016.
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such as SAML and OAuth16 are based on tickets/tokens, which require an autho-
rization party to fully understand the token and deny or allow the request based
on policies. A device with 10 KB RAM and a storage capacity of 100 KB would
be very constrained in managing the tokens, policies and its functional processes
for measurement, actuation etc. IoT devices therefore need a light-way approach
for authentication.
The basic idea is to delegate the “heavy” computational effort, such as policy
validation, access decision and token generation, to another component. An access
request from a service provider to a device is delegated (by the device) to its
“authorization manager”. The authorization manager is an entity that knows the
device’s resources and policies and decides upon access or denial of the request. If
the decision is positive, a token/ticket is generated and sent back to the service
provider. The token/ticket information is generated in such a way that the device
can unequivocally identify an access permission for a respective request. The
service provider sends a new request with the token/ticket to the device. If the
request matches the ticket/token information, the request is granted.
This approach is depicted in DCAF, see Section 4.2.3.1. The DCAF architec-
ture defines a constrained device as a “resource server”, if the device senses data
and “serves” it to service providers and clients. Accordingly a Server Authen-
tication and Authorization Manager (SAM) is defined, which is the delegation
component assigned to the server.
A client or service provider has to obtain a ticket or token from the SAM17
first to request data from the server. The server has a white-list approach: if the
ticket or token is known to the server and the request matches the token, the
access is granted, else, the access is denied.
However, building token material that does not identify a client every time
it wants to consume data from a server is a further challenge. This privacy
enhancement aims to protect the client from being constantly identified when it
is using the same (or an identifiable) token.
As delegation takes place, privacy mechanisms have to be integrated in both
16OAuth itself only targets the protocol flow, it is OpenID Connect that puts an identification,
authentication and authorization layer on top of OAuth, see [SBJ+14].
17Ticket or token depends on the underlying authorization protocol.
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components, Server and SAM. An extension with privacy friendly token material
is therefore proposed18. Here, the authentication between SAM and client is
done in a privacy enhanced way, e.g. with group signatures. The tokens are
privacy enhanced by constantly changing secrets. The secrets are generated in
such a way that the constrained server is still able to identify them by itself with
only little resources, even if they are often changing. Both approaches, DCAF
and privacy enhanced tokens as an extension, are actively being developed in
the IETF ACE working group. They show how delegation can help to overcome
computational constraints and how it might be a building technology for further
privacy enhancing technologies in IoT.
Protocol Overview. The Privacy Enhanced Tokens or Pseudonym-based Au-
thorization Tokens (PAT) protocol extends DCAF. The reader is referred to
Section 4.2.3.1 where the DCAF protocol was outlined.
The protocol uses the same roles as DCAF. For simplicity, the resource server is
simply called “Server” or abbreviated Server (S), the authorization manager which
interacts with the resource server is called “(Resource) Server Authentication and
Authorization Manager” or abbreviated “SAM” and the authentication manager for
the Client is called Client Authentication Manager (CAM) as well. Arguably, SAM
and CAM support the Server and the Client with authorization and authentication,
therefore the “A” stands for authentication and authorization. The PAT protocol
adds token information related to each role:
• Server Token (ST): the token which is generated by the SAM for the Server.
Besides parameters and which may contain authorization information that
represents the Resource Owner’s authorization policies for C, also contains
a secret, St, called the ST − secret. This secret can be used to verify the
Authorization Token and to generate other secrets which are discussed later.
• Client Token (CT): the token which is generated by the SAM for the Client.
It contains a secret, Ct, which can be used to generate the Authorization
Token. Optionally CT may contain authorization information that represents
RO’s authorization policies for C.
18This proposal has been fristly published in [CSP15].
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• Authorization Token (AT): the token which is generated by the Client and
presented by him to the Server. It contains a secret AT, which changes
regularly (in a similar way to one-time passwords). The AT contains all
information needed by the Server to verify that it was granted by SAM.
• VerifK, PSK, IntK, ConfK: derived keys between C and S used respectively to
(i) verify that they are talking with the intended partner, for the Client C it is
used as proof of possession of the (current) Authorization Token, (ii) as pre-
shared key to establish a DTLS secure channel, (iii) for integrity protection
in message authentication codes and (iv) for confidentiality protection (to
be elaborated in a future version of the draft).
S and SAM and C and CAM are assumed to have a secure channel preserving
integrity and confidentiality.
Using this secure communication channel SAM provides to S a main secret x
which is used within the initial version of the Server Token (ST). The server
token ST = St,paramS, where St is a secret created by SAM (in a way that is
outside of the scope of the draft), and paramS is a set of parameters, determining
the functions G, g1, g2, g3, g4 that are discussed later and, optionally, the
authorization policies for the clients. To gain access to a specific resource on a
Server S, a Client C requests a token from the SAM, either directly or using its
CAM. In the following, for simplicity, only the collocated CAM-C role is discussed;
the separation of the roles was explained in Section 4.2.3.1 to the reader.
After SAM receives the request from C, he decides if C is allowed to access the
resource. If so, it generates a Client-ID and a corresponding Client-Token used
for the authorization and for securing the communication between C and S.
For explicit access control, SAM adds the detailed access permissions to the token
in a way that C or his CAM can interpret and S can verify as authentically
stemming from SAM.
Then C presents the Authorization Token to S, demonstrating his authorization,
and C and S can establish a secure channel.
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Message Flow Overview. In Figure 4.15, a PAT protocol flow is depicted. A
noteworthy difference in comparison to DCAF is the different order of messages
7 and 8 and that the DTLS channel between C and S for messages 10 and 11
are optional. Note that other native PAT methods (g* functions) could be used
besides DTLS to do this.
Figure 4.15: Pseudonym-based authorization tokens
It is assumed that the Server S and its Authentication Manager SAM share
a secure channel. This is not necessarily a (D)TLS channel, it could also be a
physical or near field communication, e.g. by transmitting the information via
an USB stick or by putting one device physically (very) close to the other. No
particular concrete secure channel is therefore described, but it must be stressed
that the security of the protocol strongly depends on how the security of this
channel is designed and implemented for the communication between SAM and S.
It is also assumed that CAM and SAM share a secure connection, say over DTLS.
As in DCAF, to determine the SAM in charge of a resource hosted at the
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S, C may send an initial unauthorized request (message 1) to S. This optional
unauthorized Resource Request message is a request for a resource hosted by S
for which no proper authorization is granted. S must treat any request as an
Unauthorized Resource Request message when any of two following holds:
• S has no valid access token for the C and the requested resource.
• S has a valid access token for the C, but the token does not allow the
requested action on the requested resource.
S then denies the request and sends the address of its SAM back to C (message 4,
also possibly by asking the SAM itself for the pointer, messages 2 and 3). This
message is also found in the original DCAF protocol. Or, instead of the initial
unauthorized request message, C may look up the desired resource in a resource
directory that lists the available resources (this option is not shown in the sequence
diagram).
Message 3 is especially important: while retrieving the pointer information for
C, the server could also provide what is considered the security anchor of this
protocol. The owner of the server determines a number N which is (probably)
an upper bound on the number of Clients that the Server will simultaneously
serve. This number N should not be too high, as the storage and computation
effort of the server19 will increase (linearly) with N. The protocol does not restrict
changing N in any state, N can be increased or decreased if necessary. Using the
secure channel, SAM sends to S the initial value of ST = (St, paramS), where
St is a (preferably, random) number that can’t be guessed by an attacker and
paramS is a set of parameters that encode the number N, the choice of functions
G, g1, g2, g3, g4 and the permissions Client Nr “i” has been assigned (either for
each Client i or for a set of them). The permissions may remain undefined or
incomplete and can be extended or modified later at any time. They may also
contain validity periods or other restrictions in the Service Level Agreement. At
any later point in time the SAM may change ST : send a new value for St, either
change or extend the permissions or change the number of expected Clients N .
19The reader is reminded that the devices serving data in the area of IoT are mostly class 1
devices, see Section 2.6.
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Once C knows SAM’s address, it can send a request for authorization to SAM
(directly, or as in messages 5 and 6 indirectly using its own CAM). The Client
expresses hereby the set of permissions he needs to access the resources of the
Server.
If the access is to be authorized, SAM generates a Client Token (CT) for C (or
CAM as in message 7, which is then transferred to C in message 8). SAM decides
which Client Number “i” the Client C should have. Each Client is assigned a
different number. The number “i” is an integer between 1 and N, the number of
Clients. The choice of value for “i” depends on which permissions the owner has
foreseen and, more importantly, the SAM has encoded as parameters sent to S.
The ticket contains keying material for generating all necessary tokens and keys.
If necessary, a representation of the permissions C has for a resource is also added
to the ticket.
With their common knowledge in St and Ct, C and S are able to establish a secure
channel (message 9). This is were one of the functions g* is used.
Each time C sends S a resource request, it generates and presents a (current)
Authorization Token to S to prove its right to access (message 10 and consequently
message 11). In possession of the Client Token (CT) the Client can construct
valid Authorization Tokens (AT) which demonstrates his authorization to access
the resources he is requesting. Regularly, message 10 has to be sent afresh and a
new AT must be used, that means, that C has to renew his authorization status
at the Server. The frequency in which the Client has to send a new AT can be
enforced by C and is determined indirectly by the owner of S (or by SAM). This
allows a fine-grained control on the service level that the Server will provide to the
Client (for instance, on the amount of information of sensor data). It is assumed
that the frequency of renewal is the same for all Clients, but each Client has a
different number of Authorization Tokens it can construct.
The following paragraphs specify how the token secrets St, Ct and At are con-
structed, how the tokens can be revoked and how S and C can use their common
knowledge to verify the authenticity of the ATs and how to obtain the shared keys
VerifK, PSK, IntK, and ConfK.
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Construction of Tokens. The main data structure used in this document can
be represented as a tree of values. Each value is a Bit string of a fixed size, which
is denoted with m. As an example, m can be chosen as 265 Bits. This data
structure may be implemented in several different ways, for instance as a set of
tables representing the currently relevant parts of the tree.
The tree construction is based on a “root secret”, which is denoted by “x”,
and a Pseudo-Random Generator (PRG), commonly used to generate stream
ciphers. In particular, ChaCha20 [Ber08] could be used as a lightweight and
efficient algorithm for constrained devices, see [HCFF08]. The ChaCha20 block
function can be used as a key-derivation function, by generating an arbitrarily
long keystream. ChaCha20 takes as input a 256-Bit key k, a 64-Bit nonce v (could
be a unique message number) and a 64-Bit block number. The ChaCha20 output
stream can therefore be accessed randomly where any number of blocks can be
computed in parallel.
Instead of ChaCha20, other PRG can be used as well, including cryptographic
hash functions. With any of those building blocks, it is easy to construct the
functions G, g1, g2, g3, g4. Algorithm 1 details the steps.
Algorithm 1 Construction of functions G, g1, g2, g3, g4.
1: procedure G(K,I) . The function G maps values from the sets K and I.
2: G :K←KxI . K is the key space {0,1}265 and I = {0,1,2, ..N}.
3: end procedure
1: procedure g1, g2, g3, g4(K,I)
2: g1,g2,g3,g4 :K←KxI . Analogous to the function G.
3: end procedure
K is the key space {0,1}265 (the keys are 256 Bits long) and I = {0,1,2, ..N}
where N is an appropriate integer (a parameter of the construction). In other
words, any function G,g1,g2,g3,g4 takes an element from the respective sets K
(a key) and I (an integer) and maps the output to the set of K again (the output
is a key again).
Starting from a secret x, a tree of derived secrets20 is constructed. The main
property of the secrets in the tree is that an attacker can’t use the information of a
secret to obtain information about other secrets in the tree, except for descendants.
20For simplicity, the words “keys” and “secrets” are used indiscriminately.
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The knowledge of secrets on the tree reveals nothing about any secret that is not
a descendent of any of them.
The children of any node are constructed using a function G (“generator”)
that takes a key k (of size m = 256 Bits) and an index i (the “block number”)
and creates a new key of size m = 256 Bits.
The Token secrets St, Ct and At are all values in the tree and thus can be
constructed from x using G. Other functions g1, g2, g3 and g4 will be used to
generate the derived keys V erifK, PSK, IntK, and ConfK accordingly.
It is assumed that G, g1, g2, g3 and g4 are all publicly known functions.
Main Data Structure. The main data structure used for the PAT protocol
may be viewed abstractly as a tree of values, as described above. Each value is a
Bit string of a fixed size m (e.g., 256 Bits). But this data structure may also be
implemented in several different ways, for instance as a set of tables representing
the currently relevant parts of the tree.
For the tree structure, a sequence of integer numbers is used as indexes for
the nodes. To avoid parentheses, commas, and semicolons, sequences are written
as a string concatenation: “123” is the sequence of three numbers “1”, “2”, and
“3”. In order to avoid confusions in all examples, integer sequences do not employ
numbers that require 2 or more digits, that is, numbers greater than 9.
The sequences of integers are used to index values in a tree: xa is the value at
the node with position (address) a. In other words, the nodes and their values
are denoted as xa, where a is a sequence of integer numbers. The tree has a root
x (also can be written as xa with a = , where epsilon is the empty sequence).
The children of x are x1, x2, x3, ..., xN , where k = 1..N is a singleton list21. If xa
is a node in the tree, then the children of xa all have the form xa′ , with a′ = a; i
where a; i is the concatenation of a and an integer i. The value xa′ = xa;i = xai
is calculated as G
(
xa, i
)
. Assuming that the output of G is constructed with a
cryptographic hash function h
()
, G performs as shown in Algorithm 2.
21A singleton list is a list with only one number.
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Algorithm 2 Construction of main data structure used by the function G
1: procedure G(xa, i) . Analogous to Algorithm 1.
2: xa;i← f (xa, i) . f () composes the new subindex for a new variable and
3: creates a new value by concatenating the value of xa with the value of i.
4: xa′ ← h
(
xa;i
)
. h
()
is a cryptographic one-way function.
5: . Ideally, h
()
is an HMAC function.
6: end procedure
f
()
is a fixed (publicly known) function such that for any fixed i the function
f
(
a, i
)
is one to one. The choice of G should not be regarded a secret: it is a
publicly known parameter of the installation for S. It follows that if xa is known,
all descendants of it can be calculated, that is, all nodes in the subtree with root xa.
But not vice-versa: since h
()
is a cryptographic one-way function22, the knowledge
of xa;i is not enough to calculate xa. An example is given in Algorithm 3. The
example is constructed with the first six characters from the output of the SHA256
function for an arbitrary input that resembles the root x.
Algorithm 3 Example generation of a value for G
1: procedure G(33a209,1) . xa is a 33a209, i is 1, a is .
2: xa;1 ← f (33a209,1) . f () creates a new variable and assigns a value by
concatenating 1 to the value of x.
3: xa′ ← hash
(
33a2091
)
. h
()
is a cryptographic hash function.
4: Return xa′ ← b21293.
5: end procedure
xa is read as x sub a or x subindex a. a is called the index or address of the
node. Noteworthy hereby is: since also concatenation of Bit strings take place,
parenthesis have to be used in that case: xa;i means x(a;i), while (xa) ;bs means
the concatenation of the Bit strings
(
xa
)
and bs.
A procedure for traversing parts of the tree is needed. For simplicity, a tree of
a fixed degree is assumed. That is, each node of the tree has either no children
or has exactly a certain amount of children. The notation of i is used as follows:
assuming that a “current parent node” xa and a “current node” (i.e. a child of xa)
exist, the child is written as xa;i. Thus, i is an index (an integer) that reveals the
child relationship of nodes. For example: the fifth child of xa is xa;i, with i = 5.
22The properties of a cryptographic one way function are discussed in detail in Section 4.3.2.2.
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Traversing the tree with respect to the current parent node xa, starting at xa;i
gives the sequence of nodes (loop) as in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 Traversing the PAT data structure
1: Start on node: Cursor ← xa;i and parent node ← xa
2: while most right sibling of xa;i is not reached do
3: if xa;i is the right-most child of xa then
4: Return value of cursor and stop. . This will be the output of G.
5: end if
6: for each increment of i do
7: if xa; i is the right-most child of xa then
8: Cursor ← xa; i
9: Stop For-loop.
10: else
11: Increment i.
12: end if
13: end for
14: if xa; i has a child node then
15: Cursor ← xa; i;1 . Either only child or most left child.
16: else
17: Cursor ← xa; i
18: Return value of cursor and stop. . This will be the output of G.
19: end if
20: if xa; i;1 has a right sibling node then
21: Cursor ← xa; i;1 and parent node ← xa; i
22: Repeat While-loop.
23: else
24: Return value of cursor and stop. . This will be the output of G.
25: end if
26: end while
Construction of St, Ct and At. The secret x is the main secret. It is
generated by the SAM as a random or pseudo-random number of m Bits (m is
taken to be 256 Bits). The method used to construct x is out of scope, but it
should be practically impossible23 to guess by an attacker, even if he knows a
sequence of previous or future choices of x.
23The notion practically impossible is used here to denote that an attacker would need a
considerable amount of time (e.g. years), computing power and/or economical resources to
feasibly attack the used mechanism.
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Algorithm 5 Initial creation of St
1: procedure St(x)
2: St← x . Initially, St = x.
3: Return St
4: end procedure
St is generated initially as shown in Algorithm 5 and is sent by the SAM to
the Server S in the message 3 of Figure 4.15. The value of St at the Server may
change if the current value of St is revoked by the SAM.
The root has N children, one for each foreseen Client. The value xi, for i= 1..N
is a secret associated to Client number i, but it is not known by the Client. The
values of the nodes x, x1,x2, ..,xN are secrets that never leave the SAM or the
Server S and should not be leaked. The first children of x1,x2, ..,xN are the initial
values of Ct. In other words, for Client number i:
Algorithm 6 Creation of Ct
1: procedure Ct(x, i)
2: xi← h(f (x; i))
3: Ct← xi;1← h(f (xi;1)) . Initially, Ct = xi;1.
4: Return Ct
5: end procedure
Ct is generated according to Algorithm 6 and sent by the SAM to C(i), where
i is the Client as in message 7. Also in this message, the SAM sends the “current
node” (used by C to start a traversal), the depth and the degree of the sub-tree
at the node Ct.
The value of Ct at the Server may change if the current value of Ct is revoked24
by the SAM. If this happens, it is necessary for the Client to obtain a new Ticket
Grant (message 7). To create the sequence of Authentication Token secrets, At1,
At2, ..., the Client traverses the tree according to Algorithm 4 starting at a
“current node” (determined by the SAM in the parameters of the Ticket Grant at
message 7) with the current parent node being the current value of Ct.
Formal verification and evaluation of efficiency. Chen models in [Che15]
the PAT protocol (draft version 01) using the Scyther language25, see [Cre14a] for
24Details on revocation are planned for a future version of the protocol.
25A deeper insight into Scyther is given in the Section B.2.
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the language’s formalization details. The Scyther model does not fully represent
the protocol due to the short comings of the Scyther language (e.g., state conditions
cannot be properly modelled such as changing the cursor in the data structure as
shown in Algorithm 4.) Therefore, Scyther identifies two critical vulnerabilities
that exploit replay messages for the Client and the Server. Chen has formally
analysed the shortcomings of the Scyther model and shows that the protocol is
indeed not vulnerable to the identified attacks.
Also, an evaluation of the efficiency and power consumption of several Autho-
rization and Authentication (AA) schemes for constrained26 devices are found
in [Che15]. Chen measures the energy consumption of different cryptographic al-
gorithms (SHA256, Advance Encryption Standard (AES), Triple-Data Encryption
Standard (3DES) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algroithm (ECDSA) Sign
and ECDSA Verify) that are needed by the respective authorization protocols
(Kerberos → AES or 3DES and SHA265, Elliptic Curve Qu-Vanstone Implicit
Certificates (ECQV) → ECDSA Sign and ECDSA Verify, and the PAT protocol
→ SHA265 or CHACHA20 on a MSP430 LauchPad with a MSP430F5529 micro-
controller [Ins14], which has 8KB RAM and 128KB Flash. The micro-controller
has no hardware accelerator for any cryptographic algorithms. This is a key
aspect as discussed in the evaluation of economic constraints27. The cryptographic
functions are provided by the open source cryptographic library of the operating
system RIOT [HBG+13]. In the evaluation, the consumption profile of the 802.15.4
protocol (send and receive) is contained as well. Figure 4.16 shows the comparison.
26The constraints of Sections 2.6.2 and 2.6.1 apply to Chen’s evaluation indiscriminately.
27Detailed in Section 2.6.1.
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Figure 4.16: Energy profile comparison of different cryptographic functions
[Che15]
The values shown are relative values in mWs/Byte (1 mWs = 1 mJ for compa-
rability with the battery capacity listed in Section 2.6.2). Because the processed
block sizes of the cryptographic algorithms differ, the results are divided by the
number of the respective operated Bytes: SHA256 operates with 32 Bytes, AES
with 16 Bytes and 3DES with 8 Bytes block of data. ECDSA with the specific
curve secp160r1 (a 160-Bits curve) signs and verifies 20 Bytes of data.
The evaluation contains three types of algorithms: hashes, symmetric encryp-
tion and asymmetric encryption. Notably, symmetric (AES, 3DES) and hash
algorithms (SHA265) are much less energy consuming than the most efficient
asymmetric counterpart (ECC), namely up to a factor of four thousand (4727,6).
The factor may considerably affect the battery lifetime of constrained devices and
enable security and privacy in use cases that could not have been possible before.
An additional analysis of the computational consumption can as well be found in
Chen’s work [Che15].
As mentioned, the energy profile of the data transmission is also plotted (light
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blue bars in the chart). The corresponding measurements used a CC2530 network
processor (2.4 GHz IEEE 802.15.4) [cc2].
Chen has further broken down the protocols by their cryptographic operations
and message sizes to generate an overall computational and power consumption
profile:
Algorithm Average Mes-
sage Size in
Bytes
Energy Con-
sumption per
Message (mJ)
Memory Con-
sumption in
Bytes
States needed
(for n active
Clients) in
Bytes
ECQV
(ECDSA)
40 + 114 47.92 > 6858 56 * n
Kerberos
(AES)
40 + 48 0.56 > 43262 32 * n
PAT
(SHA256)
40 + 32 0.53 > 1450 32 + n
Table 4.1: Comparison of energy and computational profiles of AA schemes
Table 4.1 compares the profiles of all three AA schemes. Overall, the PAT
protocol has the lowest energy and computational consumption profile. The
symmetric schemes are more efficient by a factor of approx. 2 for message size and
a factor of approx. 88 in energy consumption per authorization request message.
Note that the authorized request message includes generation (usually by the
Client) and verification (usually by the Server) efforts. If both symmetric schemes
are compared, the PAT protocol has a much better computational consumption
than Kerberos due to the use of SHA256. Also, the burden of the Server is much
lower in the PAT protocol, as the Server has to remember only one 32 Byte hash
value and concatenate the n integers (the subindexes) to construct the keys for
various Clients. This is not the case in Kerberos, as the Server has to remember a
respective key per Client (thus 32 Byte * n).
It should be noted that with the ChaCha algorithm family, the computational
and power consumption profile can be improved by a theoretical factor of five to
twelve. This alternative is proposed in the draft of the PAT protocol itself and
in [Che15, pages 49, 115]. Table 4.2 summarizes Chen’s evaluation of AA schemes
for constrained devices in lossy networks.
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Algorithm ECQV Kerberos PAT
Performance - + ++
ECDSA consumes con-
siderably more energy.
3DES neither energy
efficient nor consid-
ered secure. The
AES implementation
consumes a non-
negligible amount of
flash memory.
SHA265 and AES are
applicable. SHA256
has a low energy
and computational
consumption profile.
Scalability ++ + ++
Based on the asym-
metric cryptographic
algorithm ECDSA.
Session keys are
managed by a non-
constrained Kerberos
Key Distribution
Center. Server has to
memorize one key per
client (32 * n Bytes).
The data structure al-
lows the Server to
memorize only 32 +
n Bytes. Addition-
ally, the delegation of
authorization and au-
thentication manage-
ment from the Server
to the SAM supports
scalability.
Key Generation - + ++
and Agreement
Complexity
The public key of a
Client must be calcu-
lated using the pub-
lic key of the CAM.
The CAM must be
able to mime a Cer-
tificate Authority in
a PKI environment,
which is arguably dif-
ficult. Agreement be-
tween parties is effi-
cient.
A RS is assigned a
Kerberos ticket, which
is an encrypted set
of keys. The RS
verifies the acquired
ticket by means of
decrypting the ticket
and optionally testing
a keyed message au-
thentication code.
Used secrets are
agreed on by only ex-
changing few integers
(sub-indexes).
Revocability - - -
Certificate Revocation
List grows with time
considerably.
Revocation has con-
siderable management
effort and influences
overall possible ticket
lifetime.
Method detailed in a
further version of the
draft.
Maturity + ++ -
Used in ZigBee
networks, but no
open source imple-
mentation can be
found.
Open source and refer-
ence implementations
exits.
Formal verification ex-
ists but no reference
implementation.
Table 4.2: Evaluation of AA schemes for constrained devices in lossy networks
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Where “++” means the evaluated property is fulfilled, “+” means partially
fulfilled and “-” means not fulfilled.
4.3 Privacy Enhancing Technologies supporting
Confidentiality
In this Section, privacy enhancing technologies supporting confidentiality are intro-
duced. This technologies have data minimization by design and try to circumvent
intentional or unintentional hoarding of personal data and the aggregation and
linkability of user information through several systems.
The technologies presented in this Section support all Rerum use cases: UC-O1,
UC-O2, UC-I1 and UC-I2 [SWC+15]. They are all part of the Rerum security,
privacy and trust technologies, implemented solely on the Rerum devices.
In this Section, the technologies will be presented individually and sequentially
integrated into a final IoT domain model in Section 5.
4.3.1 Position Hiding in Floating Traffic Observation
Geo-Location PETs support data minimization in traffic applications. They enable
the system to send the minimal amount of information to location-based service
providers. This is of significant importance, as the tracking of location information
discloses a large amount of information about the habits, activities and preferences
of users.
In this Section28, a location privacy PET for floating car observations will
be presented. As this PET is tailored to Rerum’s mobility use case, a short
description of the use case is given in Section 4.3.1.1.
4.3.1.1 Floating Car Observation
Smart transportation is one of the main scenarios of Rerum. The geo-location
PET was tailored for Rerum’s use case, although it can be applied in any floating
car observation scenario. It should be noted that floating car observation differs
28The contents of this Section have been previously published for Siemens AG as an intellectual
property item (number 2014E07575DE) and for Rerum in [RER14b,SWC+15].
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from many other smart mobility use cases, such as Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks
(VANETs).
Floating car observation is a variation of traditional traffic flow monitoring.
Periodic monitoring serves as the foundation for road construction and traffic
planning. Planning includes e.g. variation studies, traffic forecasts, traffic and
road engineering and accident statistics. The German Federal Highway Research
Institute (BASt) states that the most important data for this purposes is (i) the
type and amount of vehicles in traffic, (ii) weight and speed, and (iii) the route
taken [Ins15].
Traditionally, stationary devices record the needed data. Selected parts of high
ways and federal roads are equipped with data collection systems. Additionally,
manual traffic monitoring is carried out on regular intervals.
In order to increase the granularity of that data (speed, amount and current
route that is being taken), particularly routes that are less frequented, digital
floating car observation can be implemented. The digital acquisition envisions
the use of an ubiquitous GPS module on every traffic participant [STBW02].
Figure 4.17 visualizes the data that is gathered in a GPS-based traffic measurement
setup.
In the simplest scenario, apart from a user’s IP-address, information about
a user’s exact position in certain points of time is transmitted. Figure 4.17
shows measurements M1 and M2 as an example. In every measurement, the user’s
position is given as a latitude/longitude set, including the time of the measurement.
This is enough to calculate a vehicle’s speed (difference of distance and points of
time between measurements) and direction (difference between locations), as well
as to disclose information about the user’s current route and his daily points of
interest (by mapping of measurements to geo-databases).
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Figure 4.17: Geo-location data in traffic measurement
The measurements have to be sent in such a way, that the sending participant
cannot be linked to the data sent to protect him of intrusive conclusions about his
daily habits. Depending on the scenario, measurements will contain information
about a certain street/route/location and the average speed, the measurements
are transmitted close to real-time.
The main idea behind the PET is to pre-processes and aggregate measurements,
omit detailed coordinates and hide the user’s identity. The resulting scheme should
still allow the service provider to obtain the needed information for traffic analysis
and forecast.
4.3.1.2 Related Work
Many proposals to avoid tracking in vehicular environments exist, such as [BS04,
HMYS05,BHWW09]. To understand why floating car observation scenarios are
not covered by currently proposed geo-location PETs, the existing approaches have
to be categorised. Most geo-location privacy approaches hide traffic participants
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in vehicular networks, where messages from vehicles are routed through traffic
participants, using other vehicles as routing nodes. In a such a simplified vehicular
network, a traffic participant requests nearby vehicles to route its message over the
network to hide itself as the source. In more advanced scenarios, for example noted
in [BS04], the vehicles broadcast sets of their positions, speeds, motion vectors
and acceleration as so called Beacons every 100 to 300 milliseconds. Mechanisms
in VANETs protect these Beacons and other VANET messages by hiding the
vehicle’s identity with pseudonyms and obfuscating the sending routes. Similar to
mix-cascades and onion routing for network traffic, VANET privacy mechanisms
use mixing of message routes and identities, creating so called mix-zones, as
described by Beresford [BS04]. There are more variations of the mix-zone concept
including trusted third parties and pseudonyms. An extensive overview is given
by Scheuer in [SPF08].
In floating car observation, the situation is different. A traffic participant
does not need other participants to broadcast his message. The traffic data
measurement is transmitted directly to a service provider, possibly using a cellular
mobile network (e.g. 3G or 4G). As the network transmission can continuously
identify the participant, anonymous routing techniques have to be applied. This
will not be a research focus, as many applicable anonymous network solutions
exist such as the TOR [MBG+08] and the AN.ON [Fed07] networks.
In addition, most VANET privacy mechanisms protect message routing, but not
the message content itself. The message content, i.e., the measured GPS positions
and driving speeds, is the privacy sensitive data in a floating car observation use
case. Therefore the need to identify suitable techniques for transmitting detailed
traffic information is evident, but at the same time the traffic participant as a data
source has to be protected. This is done by enlarging the set of indistinguishable
measurements.
Every traffic participant simulates not one, but several participants sending
measurements. As the number of simulated participants is generated randomly,
the anonymity set varies in such a manner that the change of distinguishing single
participants from simulated or other real participants becomes insignificant. At
the same time, the measurement data is left unaltered. There is no aggregation
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or perturbation of measurements for the service provider. A detailed description
of the mechanism is provided in the next subsection. Also, privacy considerations
are given in Section 4.3.1.9.
It should be noted that efforts exist to formally verify VANET schemes.
The verification is based on tool support, for example with the VANET simula-
tor [TSF12]. The VANET simulator simulates traffic flow of several participants
and analyses different tracking possibilities with and without PETs. The scope
is different for floating car observation, thus making it necessary to modify and
occasionally maintain an own branch of tools.
4.3.1.3 Description of the Scheme
This Section formulates the technical details of this privacy enhancing technology.
The scheme allows traffic analysis by floating car observation and the adoption of
user preferences and temporary opt-out of the data collection. For example, a user
might not want to send traffic data for a specific area. But as soon as he passes
it, it’s fine for him to participate in the data collection again. The presented
geo-location PET allows this kind of situations.
Additionally, privacy-by-default approach is adopted and the data collection is
stopped at side-roads, which are less affected by heavy traffic.
4.3.1.4 Generation of Vectors
The main data structure of the geo-location PET are vectors. The vector creation
is illustrated in Figure 4.18.
A vector is created the following way: when a user is moving, a timer decides
where the starting point of a vector will be, and how long it will take to choose
the ending point of the vector. As several vectors may be created at the same
time, the traffic participant will have a list of current vectors.
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Figure 4.18: Time controlled vectors
Figure 4.18 illustrates the vector creation. An example list of current vectors
is given in Table 4.3.
Vector Starting
Point
Time Until
Stop
Average
Speed
Average
Driving
Time
Endpoint
(Elicited at
Stop)
A (X11, Y11) 5 Minutes 50 KM/H 21 Minutes (X12, Y12)
B (X21, Y21) 8 Minutes ... ... (X22, Y22)
C (X31, Y31) 22 Minutes .. ... (X33, Y33)
Table 4.3: Generation of multiple vectors
The “starting point” and the “time until stop” are chosen at random. The
endpoint is measured at the moment when an assigned timer runs out. Afterwards
the vector information is sent to a service provider, e.g., the traffic department.
While the amount of vectors prevents the knowledge of how many participants
are really passing the same route (each vector is transmitted as a unique traffic
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participant), the attached speed and driving time averages provide information
about the overall traffic of each route. The vector creation and transmission
aim at an artificial set of indistinguishable participants and data sources and
thus create a k-anonymity set. Further privacy considerations are formulated in
Sections 4.3.1.8 and 4.3.1.9.
The scheme is designed to stop the data collection as soon as either a policy
specified location or a side-road is reached, and can be used to support privacy
location policies as well, such as [STC+13]. Side-roads and areas defined in privacy
location policies are opt-out areas, as the user (automatically) opts-out of the
generation of vectors and the transmission of traffic data. Two actions to support
a participation opt-out are defined:
The first action is stop at geodic/civic location condition, which stops the data
collection and transmission while the participant is in a defined area, and the
second action, stop at side-road, which stops the data collection whenever a traffic
participant exits a main road and enters smaller side roads.
Smaller roads lead to a participant’s home, working place, etc., and thus are,
in the presented opt-in approach, excluded by default from the analysis. The stop
behaviour is as follows: several independent vectors are generated and sent to
the a service provider at random as usual, with the addition that the generation
of vectors will stop when the participant’s policies apply or when he enters a
side-road.
To exemplify the different actions, a traffic participant driving in Regensburg,
Germany is assumed. The participant has defined policies of a location (green
circle in Figure 4.19), where the data collection system should stop.
4.3.1.5 Stop at Geodic/Civic Area defined by Policy
It is assumed that a traffic participant has defined some areas where he does
not want to send traffic information. One way of defining such policies is by
using the geodic and civic location profiles described in RFC6772 [STC+13]. The
interpretation of such a policy has been done before, see [DW10], and is thus
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not a part of this proposal. The traffic participant generates random vectors as
described in the Section above, see 4.18; as soon as he reaches the defined area the
generation vectors will stop. Active vectors will be sent to the traffic department.
Figure 4.19 exemplifies the reaction of the system when the “stop at geodic/civic
area” action is defined. The traffic participant has defined a policy to opt-out
when he reaches his residential area around Friedrich-Ebert-Strasse (green circle),
which is assumed to be an area of social flashpoint. The route he takes is depicted
by the black dotted line; the vectors generated throughout the route are of several
colours.
Figure 4.19: Stop at geodic/civic area
At reaching the circle, the data collection will behave as follows: no vectors will
be generated starting from this point, and, if any active vectors exist, a common
average will be generated and sent as a position somewhere before the entry point
to the protected area. A detailed example of how averages can be generated is
given in Tables 4.4 and 4.5.
Data Protection for the Internet of Things Santiago Reinhard Suppan, 2017
4. PRIVACY ENHANCING TECHNOLOGIES FOR THE INTERNET OF THINGS 160
4.3.1.6 Automatic Stop at Side-Roads by Default
The automatic stop at side-roads by default is exemplified in Figure 4.20.
Figure 4.20: Stop at side roads
The user’s route is depicted as a black dotted line. The user drives along
Erzbischoff-Buchberger-Allee and enters Friedrich-Ebert-Strasse. He then decides
to take detour at a small side-road along (depicted as a a black dotted line
traversing Friedrich-Ebert-Strasse). At the point of entrance (small black-framed
green circle), the data collection will stop. This means, that no vectors will be
generated starting from this point. If any active vectors exist, a common average
will be generated and sent as a position somewhere before the entry point of the
side-road.
4.3.1.7 Example of User Opt-Out with two Active Vectors
Let’s assume two vectors are still active while the user enters the side road (e.g.,
the green vector in Figure 4.20).
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Vector Starting
Point
Time Until
Stop
Average
Speed
Average
Driving
Time
Endpoint
(Elicited at
Stop)
A (X11, Y11) 5 Minutes 49 KM/h 1 Minute (X12, Y12)
B (X21, Y21) 8 Minutes 30 KM/h 7,5 Minutes (X22, Y22)
Table 4.4: Multiple active vectors before entering an opt-out area
The two vectors will be averaged, converted to one vector, an endpoint is
assigned that differs from the entry point of the side-road and sent to the service
provider.
Vector Starting
Point
Time Until
Stop
Average
Speed
Average
Driving
Time
Endpoint
(Elicited at
Stop)
A (X˜1,Y˜ 1) - 39,5 Km/h 4:38 Min-
utes
(X˜2, Y˜ 2)
Table 4.5: Averaged vector sent at entrance of an opt-out area
The new vector (shown as a two-lined gray vector in Figure 4.20) has an
endpoint with a GPS-position somewhere on the dotted black line, before the
entry point to the side road. This is the last vector sent before the participant
enters the side road. After leaving the side-road, the participant starts sending
position data again; this is denoted by the red, orange and purple vectors in
Figures 4.19 and 4.20.
4.3.1.8 Avoiding Correlation between Vectors
To avoid a possible time correlation between the last averaged vector, the driving
speed and a new vector, a random threshold time until opt-in is suggested. Thus
the correlation between the new vectors and the previous vectors through the
driving speed is blurred.
4.3.1.9 Privacy Considerations
As described previously, every vector has to be sent as a unique traffic participant’s
measurement. To achieve this the IP-address from the sender has to be hidden
with anonymization techniques such as TOR, and if needed, adding integrity
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protection in form of unlinkable group signatures [CVH91]. As seen in [CML06],
merely protecting the sender of GPS-location data is not enough.
Additional information, for example by a geo-location system and online social
networks, reveal where the traffic participant is heading to and which users are the
ones that could have possibly visited those locations. The set of these subjects, or
the k-anonymity set of data subjects where each participant is indistinguishable
from at least k-1 other participants with respect to a certain GPS-position, is
often very small. The reason for this is, that every GPS-location can be linked
to driving speeds, time correlations and locations, thus the resulting sets become
very unique.
The generation of artificial vectors enlarges that anonymity set, but without
blurring or adding noise to measurements. The artificial vectors provide even
more information to the measurements, as every vector has its unique starting
and ending point.
It should also be noted that vectors are safe of correlation by time and driving
speed, if the driving speed of participants is assumed similar. In case of pedestrians
or cyclists, the vector speeds could be significantly different and could reveal which
vectors where generated by which users. Thus the vector based GPS-location
privacy technology is only suitable for participants with similar motion speed.
4.3.1.10 Summary and Future Work
The geo-location privacy component is a novel approach to privacy friendly
floating car observation. Related work on vehicular area network has focussed
on hiding message routes, while it does not analyse GPS positioning data. The
proposal on random vector generation intends to fill this gap and allow for accurate
measurements for service providers as well as location and policy based privacy
for users. Additionally to the trial use case of Rerum, the formal verification of
the random vector scheme with tools like the VANET simulator [TSF12] or other
tools is considered as future work29.
29As mentioned before, most tools centre on VANETs and do not cover floating car observation.
Therefore, verification requires therefore a considerable effort on tool modification.
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4.3.2 Pseudonyms
A pseudonym system supports data minimization by hiding the identities of
devices and users from the services and other system participants, if they are
not necessarily needed. In cases where attackers or intruders are able to steal
records from databases, pseudonyms will prevent that individuals are tracked
down through their identities.
This Sections presents a PET for pseudonym generation, agreement and
management30. The scheme is designed to work under the limitations scoped
in Section 2.6.2. The scheme uses only symmetric cryptographic mechanisms,
particularly one-way functions, as they have proven to be efficient in computation,
energy consumption and code size, see Section 4.2.5.1.
4.3.2.1 Related work
Pseudonym systems can be categorized in three concepts, see [TPT06]. Spatial
concepts are based on mix-zones, where pseudonyms are exchanged when the
pseudonymized participants meet. Time-related concepts change pseudonyms
after a certain time. User-oriented concepts allow the users to decide when their
identity should be changed. The decision can be based on the user’s own policies
and thresholds for the automatic pseudonym change.
All this concepts have in common that they concentrate on the management
of when and why pseudonyms should be changed but not directly on how the
pseudonyms are created. This concepts are complementary to the proposed
pseudonym PET.
Other proposals rely on asymmetric schemes which do not allow obvious
re-linking of signatures to their cryptographic source material [LRSW99].
The presented pseudonym generation and management mechanism is based on
Hash-Trees, similar to those found in the Merkle-Signature-Scheme (see [Mer79]).
Merkle trees are generated in a bottom-up approach: every element of a set with
nmod2 = 0 values is hashed to generate n different hash values. The elements
are paired, their hash representations are concatenated and hashed to get a new
30The contents of this Section have been previously published as a Siemens AG intellectual
property item (patent numbers 2015P01590 DE, 102015203543 DE, and 102015203543 A1) and
for Rerum in [RER14b,SWC+15].
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set with n2 hash values. This operation is repeated recursively with every new
set of hash values until n = 2, thus the final set resulting in one single hash
value, called the top hash or, figuratively, the root of the tree. Merkle trees are
static, thus used e.g. to validate file integrity on IT systems. Also, a public key
infrastructure has been proposed with Merkle trees [Mer90], although the proposal
is practically inefficient due to the dependency of the public key to fixed and
pre-signed messages.
In contrast to Merkle trees, a top-down approach is proposed, which allows
generation of practically infinite hash values which are used as pseudonyms.
The generation of tree structures containing values and their generation with
one-way functions have been also proposed by Goldreich, Goldwasser and Mi-
cali [GGM86]. The formal tree structure resembles that of the top-down hash-trees
proposed in this thesis, but they differ in form of generation of values: the Goldre-
ich, Goldwasser and Micali (GGM) tree uses a single root value x that is passed
to several different functions subindexed G0x...Gnx. The generated output is a
practically infinite random string of values, depending on Gix. The top-down
hash-tree uses sub-indexes and particularly a binary set of 0 and 1 mainly as input
and traversal information. The root value x is regarded as the key anchor, is only
used once, and is kept as little as possible flowing in the system.
Weis et al. [WSRE04] have proposed a pseudonym protocol for RFIDs where the
IDs of an RFID-Tag are hashed. The reader brute-forces the received pseudonyms
by hashing all its known IDs (hash-functions of tag and reader are previously
agreed on). This protocol is computationally heavy on the Verifier (which could
be a constrained resource server in IoT) and allows a re-linking mechanism that
is not applicable in Rerum’s use cases.
Ohkubo et al. [OSK+03] introduce a scheme for RFID pseudonyms based
on one-way functions (hashes) and a counter. The counter increases with every
emitted pseudonym, the same counter is used to keep track of valid pseudonyms.
Again, this protocol does not protect the claimer (tag) from the Verifier (reader).
The scheme by Juel [Jue04] uses an XOR operation and a secret value table.
The problem with this scheme is that only a limited number of pseudonyms can
be generated before the table has to be refreshed by a trusted third party. Molnar
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et al. [MW04] use a hash-tree structure to achieve mutual authentication between
a RFID-tag and a reader. The scheme protects the tag from being tracked by
third parties. In an IoT use case, the RFID claimer (tag) must be also protected
from the Verifier (reader). This is not scoped by Molnar et al.’s protocol. Another
proposal by Molnar et al. [MSW05] uses a similar setup, where again an RFID-tag
is protected by a pseudonym. Different than before, the tag is protected against
the reader, thus closing the gap between a typical RFID and IoT scenario. Molnar
et al. use here a tree of values as well. One single tree is used to generate
more RFID tags (a method that is also proposed in the following PET), but the
generation differs in the way the values are created. Molnar et al.’s proposal use a
pseudo-random generator and a counter to generate the values in the form of a
GGM tree, where the input value and a counter are the same input for all the
generated pseudonyms, as proposed in the GGM tree structure. That means, that
the input value is ubiquitously used in the scheme (starting from the d1 level
in [MSW05]), and if stolen, can be used to disclose the pseudonym stream from
start to end.
The pseudonym PET of this thesis proposes a small but important change in
this regard, as the root input value is only used once to support perfect forward
secrecy. Another difference lies on the tree traversal that allows conditional
pseudonym agreement on different ownership situations. Molnar et al. target a
similar mechanism with delegation, but either a root value or a large number of
values would have to be published.
The following pseudonym PET aims to provide an efficient way to generate
practically unlimited pseudonyms, provide perfect forward secrecy for one or a
set of disclosed pseudonyms, protect claimer and Verifier and allow temporary
pseudonym agreement without re-linking the real identities of a claimer.
Firstly, the fundamentals of one-way functions and the tree data structure
are recapitulated. Secondly, the scheme is built up and mechanics to reach the
described goals are sketched. Finally, the scheme is integrated to the Rerum
domain model.
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4.3.2.2 Existing Fundamentals
In the following Section existing fundamentals for the creation of top-down hash-
trees are rounded up.
One-Way Functions. An one-way function is a function f(), which takes x as
an input and computes y as an output. Computing y as an output is hereby easy,
while computing x from y and f() is practically impossible.
Hash-functions. A hash-function is a special type of an one-way function h(),
which takes the input set X containing binary coded elements of any length, and
produces an output set Y of binary coded elements with a certain length n, where
following properties apply [NY89]:
One-way or non-invertable property: it is virtually impossible to compute x ∈X
from y ∈ Y and the hash-function h(), where h(x)=y.
Collision resistance: it is very unlikely to find two (or more) inputs x1,x2 ∈X,
where h(x1)=y and h(x2)=y.
Chaos: even similar inputs generate significantly different outputs. Changing an
input by one Bit should generate and output that is about 50% different
than the output of the unchanged input.
Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC). Keyed-Hash Mes-
sage Authentication Codes are used here, defined in RFC 2104 [KBC97]. HMAC
has been designed to generate keyed message authentication codes by applying
well understood cryptographic hash functions with a shared secret, see [KBC97].
It should be noted that this is not the only method of how to use hash-functions
with shared secrets and that the selected hash function method is irrelevant for
the rest of the approach.
A Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) is a specific construction
for calculating a Message Authentication Code (MAC) involving a hash function in
combination with a secret key. As with any MAC, it may be used to simultaneously
verify both the data integrity and the authentication of a message. Any hash
function may be used in the calculation of an HMAC. In RFC2104 [KBC97], an
HMAC is calculated the following way:
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Algorithm 7 Generation of HMAC values
1: Start with a message m, a hash function H
()
with the block-size B and a key
K.
2: if |K| < |B| then . |x| means the length of x.
3: create ipad such that the |K + ipad| = |B|
4: . ipad is a one-block hexadecimal constant with the value 0x36...36.
5: create opad such that the |K +opad| = |B|
6: . opad is a one-block hexadecimal constant with the value 0x5c...5c.
7: end if
8: create HMAC←H (<K⊕opad,H (<K⊕ ipad,m >)>)
9: . The operator < a,b > denotes the concatenation of a and b.
H
()
is a cryptographic hash function with an input block size of B. Crypto-
graphic means here, that the function has the properties described above (one-way,
collision resistant, chaos property). K is a secret key padded with extra zeros
to match the input block size of the hash function. If K is longer or the same
size as B, no padding is needed. m is the message to be integrity protected and
authenticated.
()
denotes a function input, <,> denotes concatenation. ⊕ denotes
the XOR operation. opad is the outer padding (0x5c5c5c. . . 5c5c, one-block-long
hexadecimal constant). If K is smaller than the block-size B used by the hash-
function, this padding extends the key to that length. ipad is the inner padding
(0x363636. . . 3636, one-block-long hexadecimal constant). This works the same as
the opad, but with a different value.
The HMAC scheme uses two hash operations to generate the message authen-
tication code. The hash-operation count will be important in later stages of the
protocol to verify the computational and power efficiency.
4.3.2.3 Virtually Unlimited Generation of Values
The main idea of the PET is to use the output yi from hash-functions as
pseudonyms: due to the one-way property, it is practically impossible to in-
vert x from the publicly known pseudonym y and the used hash-function h(). Due
to the chaos property, it is possible to compute two pseudonyms from a slightly
different value x and use this outputs again for the generation of other pseudonyms,
which allows generating virtually unlimited pseudonyms from one initial value.
The generation and coordination of values is based on aforementioned top-down
hash-trees:
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Figure 4.21: Hash-Tree with an initial input x
Figure 4.21 illustrates the steps needed to create a hash-tree. An initial input
x is represented as a binary sequence. It is the seed for the generation of all other
values. How the initial input x is obtained, can be very different. It might be
from an authenticated Diffie-Hellman-exchange, a hashed-password known to two
or more parties, etc. This is irrelevant for the rest of the approach. The input
x is concatenated with one additional Bit, “0” and “1”, respectively, and given
to the hash-function h
()
. The outcome is two outputs x0 and x1 with length n
(depending on the hash-function), which in turn are going to be used as inputs
for the next branches. The used hash-function and the generated lengths for the
outputs xi can vary; every hash-function with the properties described above
(non-invertible, collision resistant, chaotic) can be used for this approach. In the
next step, x0 and x1 are again concatenated with one additional Bit, “0” and
“1”, respectively. They are used as inputs for the hash-function h
()
, which again
generate two outputs each, namely (x00, x01 and x10, x11). By repeating this
step several times, a virtual infinite hash-tree can be build. Note: Figure 4.21
reuses the notion introduced in the explanation of HMACs, where <,> denotes
concatenation and h< xi,0> denotes, that the concatenated input of xi with “0”
is given to the function h
()
.
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4.3.2.4 Choosing Adequate Pseudonyms
As noted above, due to the one-way property of hash-functions, outputs could be
used as publicly known pseudonyms, without revealing the input from which they
were generated. Once an output is publicly known, it does not qualify as an input
for the generation of other pseudonyms. Thus, a path has to be chosen which
allows using outputs as new pseudonyms and at the same time allows generating
new branches of pseudonyms nonetheless. Many paths exist, in this thesis the
path shown in Figure 4.22 is proposed:
Figure 4.22: Selection of adequate outputs as pseudonyms
The value generation in Figure 4.22 follows four steps.
Step 1 – The first, initial value x is used to generate the first two levels of the
tree. The first usable pseudonyms are those in the second level, generated by
concatenating zeroes, namely ψ00 and ψ10 (the path of ψ10 is not sketched
in Figure 4.22.). An entity “A” could now identify itself as ψ00 towards
a second entity and again as ψ10 towards a third entity, instead of using
“A”. These values may not be used to generate further pseudonyms, that
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means, that the potential branches beneath them may not be calculated, see
the crossed areas in Figure 4.22. For the next round of secrets, the parties
prepare to “jump” leaves:
Step 2 – The next input will be the sibling leaf of the last used pseudonym.
Assume that ψ00 was the last pseudonym, which means that ψ01 will be
used to generate the next round of outputs. ψ01 is now concatenated again
with “0” and “1”, respectively. The hash-function computes now two new
values, namely the leaves ψ010 and ψ011. The output which was generated
by concatenating a zero as the new pseudonym is again used, namely ψ010.
Steps 1 and 2 repeat every time a pseudonym changes. These procedures will be
called the canonical jump.
4.3.2.5 Definition of Path and Jump
A path is a Bit-string that describes how branches from a hash-tree were (or
how they should be) created. Paths generate downward branches by creating
descendants of a certain starting leaf. For example, a path 00010 denotes that a
hash-tree is generated by following the description of Section 4.3.2.3 until the leaf
ψ00010 is reached.
A jump is a form of path, which combines a Bit-string with moving directions.
A jump firstly moves up from its current leaf (one or several leaves) and then
generates or traverses a different branch downwards. The canonical jump for
example moves one leaf up, generates the opposing leaf and its left descendant.
4.3.2.6 Optimization
The canonical jump is just a suggestion to help in choosing adequate leafs as
pseudonyms. Another suggestion is the dynamical generation of branches: The
hash-tree is not generated entirely, but every branch is generated on demand,
after a pseudonym was used. This could be done by saving three variables, the
root value x (permanently), the next parent value ψj and the current pseudonym
ψi, where ψj and ψi are sibling values.
Algorithm 8 shows one possible formalization.
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Algorithm 8 Creating pseudonym data structure
1: Start with setting value for root node: x ← rootsecret
2: procedure GenerateNewPesudonym(x)
3: ψ0 ← h(< x,0>)
4: ψ00 ← h(< ψ0,0>)
5: ψ01 ← h(< ψ0,1>)
6: x′ ← ψ01 . Set new parent value.
7: Return ψ00 . Return pseudonym.
8: end procedure
4.3.2.7 Changing Pseudonyms
Generating new pseudonyms is done with the canonical jump. The mechanism
is based on hash-functions which are easy and fast computational mechanisms
and therefore well suited for constrained IoT devices. The question in focus
when discussing changing pseudonyms is when to generate new ones. Pseudonym
exchange has been heavily surveyed in vehicular ad-hoc networks, but the re-
sults can be transferred to any other system using pseudonyms. The reader
is reminded of the related work detailed in Section 4.3.2.1: important secure
pseudonym exchanging concepts can be categorized into spatial concepts, time-
related concepts and user-oriented concepts. Spatial concepts are best represented
in mix-zones [BS04], where pseudonyms are exchanged when system participants
meet physically, although virtual mix-zones for an artificial pseudonym change
have been proposed [MKW08]. Time-related mechanisms propose to change
pseudonyms after a certain time, where a secure pseudonym exchange is only
possible when the changing participant is not participating in the system any more.
One possible solution is a so called silent period [HMYS05]. This means that a
system participant stops his participation for a short time until his pseudonym
is changed successfully. User-oriented concepts allow the user to decide when
he wants to change his current identity. The decision can hereby be completely
subjective, allowing to define own policies and thresholds for the pseudonym
change. Such concepts are Swing & Swap [LSHP06] and SLOW [BHWW09].
Although all of these concepts refer to location based systems, they can be used
in IoT scenarios, e.g., where pseudonyms expire and trigger a silent period for
data collection or where wearable medical devices form a mix-zone and call for a
pseudonym change. The question, which of these concepts is usable, depends on
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the type of IoT scenario, as a silent period, a policy based approach or a mix-zone
might be or might not be possible.
4.3.2.8 Pseudonym Agreement
Occasionally, a pseudonym has to be re-linked to a system participant for some
scenarios. For example when a user wants to access one of his devices and the
device’s identity is pseudonymised or, in case of billing a service, or for the liability
of a user in case of damage. The proposed mechanism for pseudonym agreement
is dynamical, the parties that agree on pseudonyms do not share a list of identities
or pseudonyms. They generate the pseudonyms that either one or both entities
are going to use, without knowing their real identities. This is possible, if the two
entities share a common root secret as described in 4.3.2.4. Note that the shared
root secret does not necessarily have to correspond with the root secret of the
entity that originally protected itself with pseudonyms.
New pseudonyms are generated depending on time (see Section 4.3.2.7) and
method (see Section 4.3.2.4). To demonstrate the pseudonym agreement mecha-
nism, the following is assumed: a new pseudonym is generated when a predefined
timeslot expires and it is generated with the identity of one of the entities. In the
following example the agreement mechanism is based on top-down hash-trees:
A user’s device sends consumption data to a cloud provider. The device
protects its identity with pseudonyms generated with top-down hash-trees. The
user wants to know his consumption data and asks the service provider for the
data of his device. He has to generate the pseudonym that the device has used to
retrieve his data.
Figure 4.23 depicts how both, the device and the user, generate pseudonyms
to transmit and retrieve the data from the cloud provider.
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Figure 4.23: Example of a pseudonym agreement for data retrieval
The device’s root secret x0 is a sub-secret from the user generated with the
user’s root secret x and the device’s ID. The device changes its pseudonym
according predefined periods and transmits its data to the cloud provider. If
the user wants to retrieve the data from the cloud provider, he computes the
device’s root secret x0 and generates the pseudonym according to the period that
he wants to retrieve the data from. It is assumed that the cloud provider saves all
data from any pseudonym, as long as the device is able to authenticate itself as a
customer of the cloud provider. Anonymous authentication mechanisms maybe
group signatures [CVH91] or the PAT protocol, see Section 4.2.5.
In another example, ownership may play a role. A user could receive a data
set from a pseudonym. The data set might be signed with a group signature of
one of his devices, as described in the ownership mechanism of Section 2.5.3.4,
such that he can be sure that the pseudonyms used were previously agreed on.
The search algorithm to reconstruct the used pseudonym could be implemented
as shown in Figure 4.24.
The user has a limited amount of devices for which he is able to generate
pseudonyms of the according time period. He authenticates the incoming data
sets and reads the period which the data set was generated. The user generates
the pseudonyms of the devices that come into consideration (probably not all
devices produce this kind of data).
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Figure 4.24: Example of re-constructing a pseudonym by a device owner
It should be noted that the computational capacity of the reconstruction is
considered to be high and the computational time does not equal a full binary or
n-ary tree search, as the user knows exactly which values of which branches he
has to compute. In an optimized version, the user knows which periods are not
needed anymore and he can start generating pseudonyms via a local path.
4.3.2.9 Summary and Future Work
The pseudonym data structure is simple, computational and battery efficient
due to the use of one-way functions (hashes). The mechanism allows dynamical
access to pseudonyms for single devices, fast and secure pseudonym agreement,
management and revocation.
Furthermore, the pseudonym agreement does not depend on asymmetric
cryptography or extensive pseudonym-to-ID tables and can therefore retain the
targeted efficiency.
The top-down hash-tree data structure is used in a varied form by the PAT
protocol and will also be used for the malleable message authentication codes
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and group message authentication code schemes. The structure itself is purely
methodical and may change in an actual implementation as pointed out in
Section 4.3.2.6. There are many more implementation options using native data
structures of programming languages which are going to be evaluated as future
work.
4.3.3 Malleable Message Authentication Codes
When sending a message over a communication medium, it is important for the
recipient of the message to be able to verify if the message was originally produced
by the expected party and if it has not been modified during the transmission.
This well-known property is the integrity of the message: a recipient is somehow
assured of the integrity of the message. But in some situations, it is necessary that
an authorized intermediate party is able to modify the message, in a restricted
way. Restriction means that the intermediate party should be allowed to modify
some previously defined parts of the message, while not being able to modify the
others.
In other words the problem to solve is the following: an entity S, the Signer of
a document, wants to write a message with two types of content: one is modifiable
(also, depending on the modification, termed in related literature as: sanitizable,
admissible or malleable) and the other is fixed. The Signer sends the message to
a recipient over some communication channel. An intermediary, the censor (or
Sanitizer) party, is allowed to change the admissible part of the message but not
the fixed part of the message. The recipient or Verifier of the message (or rather:
of the integrity of the message) should be able to verify that the message was
originally produced by the expected party (the Signer) and that it has not been
modified during the transmission except, possibly, for changes done to admissible
parts by authorized intermediate Sanitizers. This property is the relaxed integrity
of the message in the context of sanitization. In cryptography, a solution for the
integrity problem is the use of signatures (based on asymmetric cryptography)
and message authentication codes (MACs, based on symmetric cryptography).
For the relaxed integrity problem, e.g. the concept of a Sanitizable Signature
Scheme (SSS), see [ACDMT05], has been proposed, which allows authorized
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censors to modify the admissible parts of a signed message without interacting
with the original Signer. Implementations of SSS use a specific arithmetic. For
IoT, this means the arithmetic has to be implemented on a constrained device
first, as no off-the-shelf solutions are available. The arithmetic has to be optimized
for each specific device which might be costly or impractical.
Thus, the problem can be casted in a more particular way. A scheme has
to be designed that uses Message Authentication Codes and hash functions, as
they are available for constrained devices either on hardware and/or software.
This scheme has to be based on symmetric cryptography ans has to resemble a
malleable signature scheme, such as SSS, that allows modifying a MAC without
interacting with the original Signer.
Furthermore following properties have to be supported:
If desired, the Verifier is not able to know if a message was sanitized or not.
Otherwise, it should be possible for the Verifier to check that the message
was not sanitized or, if in fact it was sanitized.
The Signer is able to revoke at any time the ability of a Censor or a Verifier to
sanitize (or to verify) future messages.
The method should be usable in scenarios where participants have limited power
and constrained computational resources, as in the Internet of Things. A
cryptographic solution should rely solely on symmetric cryptography, which
is more efficient for such purposes (known SSS are based on asymmetric
cryptography).
4.3.3.1 Introduction to Homomorphism
The admissibility of modifications in cryptographic schemes is known as homomor-
phism. Homomorphism in signature schemes allows a controlled transformation of
signature-message-pairs, while preserving the authenticity and integrity conditions
provided in classic digital signature schemes. The transformation can be used to
change parts of a message in order to distribute information to different parties
with different granularity. The categorization of allowed transformations comes in
three flavours:
blackening parts of information, as seen in government documents, is resembled in
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sanitization schemes (see [ACDMT05]), omitting parts of a message is achieved with
redactable signature schemes (see [JMSW02]) and the transformation of a prede-
fined part of a message is obtained by malleable schemes (see [JMSW02,CKLM13]).
Successively, a malleable scheme can resemble sanitization and redaction. For
simplicity, all schemes are summarized here as homomorphic and authenticator
signature schemes, a detailed view on related work is given in Section 4.3.3.2. Many
potential scenarios have been proposed for homomorphic schemes before. Ate-
niese et al. [ACDMT05] referred to multicast and database applications, medical
applications, secure routing and sanitization of classified government documents
to underline the scheme’s utility. Other areas of potential use have been men-
tioned in [CKLM13] and [PPS+13] such as anonymous credential systems and
privacy enhancement in constrained devices. Malleable Message Authentication
Codes (MallMACs), the scheme presented in this Section31, targets specifically
the latter. The setup is explained in Section 4.3.3.3. Privacy enhancing tech-
nologies in the context of the Internet of Things have been steadily discussed
(see e.g. [May09b,Web10b,AIM10b]). The focus of the discussions have been on
privacy technologies that are suited for constrained devices, pointing at schemes
such as [BBS04] and [PPS+13]. Though these schemes may be applied in IoT,
three major constraints are regarded as the main reasons of why privacy enhancing
technologies have not been popular in IoT products and industries overall:
Arithmetic for different schemes needed in small devices (e.g. chameleon hashes
used in sanitizable signatures, see [ACDMT05]) are often too specific and
unavailable in off-the-shelf or standard security libraries (e.g. OpenSSL).
Specific implementations are costly in software development and specially in
embedded systems engineering.
Asymmetric cryptography, even elliptic curve cryptography, is demanding for
battery powered devices, as formulated in Section 4.2. Battery maintenance
is costly and thus a decision factor for constrained devices, see [DL01].
The reader is reminded of the IETF classification of most common IoT devices:
class 1, with a capacity of 10 KB RAM memory and 100 KB flash storage
(see [BEK14,KSH+12]). Albeit unproblematic for some single-processor devices
31The content of this Section has been partially published previously as a Siemens AG
intellectual property item (patent numbers 102015205111.0, 10 2015 205 111).
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(such as x-berry computers), asymmetric cryptography does not perform well on
IoT devices which are based on hardware that is of low capacity.
To gain more insight in applicable schemes for constrained devices, related
work is reviewed in the next Subsection 4.3.3.2. Here, state of the art malleable
signatures are discussed.
4.3.3.2 Related Work
In this Section, related work is reviewed and efforts in homomorphic signatures
and message authentication codes are classified according to different functionality.
Homomorphic Signatures. Johnson et al. refer to Rivest in [JMSW02] as the
coiner of the term “homomorphic signatures”. Rivest describes signature schemes
with it, that can be partially modified. Micali et al. introduced a first set of
homomorphic signatures with transitive signatures in [MR02].
In transitive signatures, two signatures of an edge x,y and y,z can produce
the proof that a third signature of x,z is on the same edge. The scheme does not
allow explicit modification of a message part which is required for the privacy
protection targeted in MallMACs. The scheme uses RSA group homomorphism,
which can be seldomly used by constrained devices due to its large key size and
heavy computation, see [WGE+05].
Johnson et al. introduced in [JMSW02] redactable signatures to allow explicit
deletion of sub-strings in a signed message. The scheme signs a message x in three
steps: first, the message is divided into n parts, say from x0 to xn. In step 2 a
GGM tree, see [GGM86], is generated until n leaves are created and n leaf values
can be associated to each message part. The leaf values k1 to kn are created from
a key k. Step 3 is the creation of a Merkle-tree (see [Mer90]) over every message
part xi and according value ki. The top-hash is signed once, put together with the
key k and re-signed to create the signature of the message x. Redacting a message
means deleting a message part xi as well as its key value ki and generating a
new top-hash including its signature. Due to the Merkle-tree, there is no need to
recreate ascendant hashes, thus the top-hash is regenerated from the top-most
tree ascendant. This is used to make the scheme faster and the signatures shorter.
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The scheme breaks the message into smaller parts, this method is still used as
a basic mechanism in recent homomorphic signature proposals. MallMACs also
break the message into sub-parts and use hash-trees for secret management, which
make the schemes similar, albeit avoiding RSA accumulators which are used for
the signature homomorphism in Johnson et al.’s proposal.
Steinfeld et al. presented “content extraction signatures” in [SBZ02], where a
part of a signed message could be extracted and still be verified with the original
signature. The scheme is very similar to [JMSW02], using Merkle-trees and
pseudo-random numbers replacing the GGM tree values.
Ateniese et al. have introduced the notion of sanitizable signatures in [ACDMT05].
As a reminder, a sanitized message is a message with unreadable or "blackened"
parts. In [ACDMT05] this is achieved by utilizing chameleon hash-functions
(see [KR00]). The scheme works as follows: A message x is again broken into
n parts. The Signer of the message decides which parts may be sanitized and
which parts may not. For the sanitizable parts xs = xi to xm with m < n,
a chameleon hash function f
()
generates a chameleon hash CH of the form
fxi,xi+1, ...xmsksign = CH utilizing a key sksign of a RSA key pair. The rest of
the message xf ix = xwithoutxi, ...,xm is hashed with any one-way hash function
to obtain H. For simplicity, it is assumed that H and CH are concatenated to
H||CH and then signed with a RSA digital signature scheme. The sanitization
is done with the corresponding counterpart of the key pair pksanit, where the
collision function of the chameleon hash finds a Bit-string CH ′ that is the exact
collision of CH. Thus the RSA signature of H||CH equals the signature of
H||CH ′. MallMACs and sanitizable signatures share the chopping of the message
in sub-parts and the definition of a sanitizable (or malleable) set of the message’s
elements. Chameleon hashes are based on prime order cyclic groups with homo-
morphic properties, similar to those of RSA. For MallMACs in IoT, any mechanism
that uses the factoring problem is avoided due to a possibly high battery and
computational power consumption (for details, see [WGE+05]). Additionally,
chameleon functions are rarely found in common cryptographic libraries such as
OpenSSL, Libcrypto [CMV02] or Relic [OAG+11].
In [PPS+13] Poehls et al. show that homomorphic signatures can be imple-
Data Protection for the Internet of Things Santiago Reinhard Suppan, 2017
4. PRIVACY ENHANCING TECHNOLOGIES FOR THE INTERNET OF THINGS 180
mented in a constrained environment. The effort displays an implementation
of state-of-the-art redactable and sanitizable schemes on a Java Card V2.2.1.
Java Cards resemble constrained devices targeted by MallMACs with 10 KB of
RAM and 100 KB of Flash memory (even less for the v2.2.x series, see [Mic02]).
MallMACs target battery efficiency, which is only a constraint in contact less
smart cards. Although other constraints exist which may also play a role, such as
code size. The reader is reminded of Section 4.2 and why signature based schemes
are unfavourable for battery powered devices, even if implementations exist and
computational overhead is tolerable.
Homomorphic Message Authentication Codes. A more recent approach
to homomorphism in symmetrical authentication is presented in [AB09,CJ11] to
prevent pollution attacks in network coding. Pollution occurs when network nodes
are allowed to rewrite information in packages (this is called network coding)
and malicious nodes intentionally falsify or flood the network with undeliverable
packages. Linear network coding algorithms break a message into n vectors of
a linear space, see [KM03]. Homomorphic MACs therefore operate in linear
vector spaces [AB09] or finite fields [CJ11] to achieve the desired homomorphism.
MallMACs are designed for privacy scenarios and therefore are not limited to
scenarios where data structures are only vectors. This allows the application of
MallMACs on unprocessed Bit-strings by using very simplistic one-way functions.
In [GW13], Gennaro et al. propose fully homomorphic message authenticators,
which verify the authenticity of an altered message y as an output of a process
ρm, where m is the original message. If a message is sanitized or changed for
personal reasons, it might be undesirable to let the Verifier know which process
altered the original message, making the proposal of Gennaro et al. unsuitable for
all privacy scenarios.
4.3.3.3 Setup
Section 4.3.3.1 listed scenarios where homomorphic schemes can be useful. In
this Section, the scenarios are abstracted in order to provide a general setup
for homomorphic signature schemes. It should be noted that SSS is used here,
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but it is only the specification of a particular functionality; there are many
ways to implement an SSS. The scheme used here follows the notation proposed
in [ACDMT05]. Also note that the proposed MallMAC scheme is not bound to
this specific SSS in particular, because it uses asymmetric cryptography as its core
concept. According to [ACDMT05], a basic SSS is computed the following way:
Signing the message. The first party, called Signer, wants to sign a message
M with his private key prvKSIG of a private/public key-pair, where he
defines which parts may be sanitized by another party called Sanitizer. In
any case, a third party called the Verifier should be able to verify that
the message is genuine, that it was signed by the Signer and occasionally
sanitized and resigned by the Sanitizer. The Signer decides which part of
the message maybe sanitized. He splits M in a fixed message part (mfix)
and a sanitizable (or admissible) message part (madm).
M =mfix+madm
Note: the + operator is used here to denote a form of concatenation: when
two or more messages are concatenated by a +, the whole message contains
both parts plus the information of where those parts “begin and end”. Thus,
from a+ b, the two parts a and b can each be unequivocally identified by
a parser. The signature functions used below use two input parameters:
the key used for signing and the message that is to be signed. Thus
Sigx = sign
(
k,m
)
denotes a signature x with key k over a message m. The
Signer signs the fixed part of the message and concatenates the public key
of the Sanitizer pubKSAN , to allow the Verifier to check the signature in
case the Sanitizer changes the message,
Sign1 = sign
(
prvKSIG,mfix+pubKSAN
)
.
He also attaches his signature over the whole message M , and sends this to
the Sanitizer,
Sign2 = sign
(
prvKSIG,mfix+madm
)
.
Signer → Sanitizer: mfix+madm+Sign1+Sign2
Sanitizing the message. The Sanitizer receives M , Sign1 and Sign2. He
checks the message and the signatures. If the Sanitizer wants to change the
message, then the Sanitizer changes the admissible part from the message
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and creates a new one (m′adm). He then removes the original Sign2 from
the Signer and attaches a new signature Sign′2 for the whole message with
his private key prvKSAN of his private/public key-pair. The corresponding
public key of the Sanitizer pubKSAN was originally signed by the Signer in
Sign1.
mfix+m
′
adm+Sign1← sign
(
prvKSIG,mfix+pubKSAN
)
+Sign′2
← sign
(
prvKSAN ,mfix+m
′
adm
)
+pubKSAN
Sanitizer → Verifier: mfix+m′adm+Sign1+Sign′2+pubKSAN
Verfiying the message. The Verifier knows the public key of the Signer, receives
the new messageM =mfix+m′adm, the public key of the Sanitizer, the signa-
ture for the fixed part by the Signer Sign1← sign
(
prvKSIG,mfix+pubKSAN
)
and with it, the verification that sanitization was occasionally done by a
trusted Sanitizer. The Verifier also receives Sign′2; the signature for the
whole message from the Sanitizer. The Verifier can now check both signa-
tures with the public keys of the Signer and Sanitizer, and verify that the
message is authentic and integer.
4.3.3.4 MallMAC Scheme - Fundamentals
Our proposed sanitization scheme is based on Message Authentication Codes for
ensuring integrity and authenticity of a message. The key management for the
Signer, the censor party (or Sanitizer) and the Verifier are based on hash-trees
as described in Section 4.3.2.2, only that this time the hash values are used as
secrets. For the reader’s convenience, this Section reviews these concepts and
techniques briefly and informally.
Hash-functions. Following sets exist: a set of binary sequences of length n
by {0,1}n, the set of all sequences of n - 0s or 1s, by {0,1}∗, the set of
binary sequences of any length, including the empty sequence  of length
0, and by {0,1}n+, the set of finite binary sequences of at least length n.
A hash-function h
()
is a function of {0,1}n+ to 0,1n+, which takes binary
sequences of a minimum length n and produces binary sequences of length
n, where following properties apply:
One-way property or non-invertible property: given the knowledge of h
()
and
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y, it is computationally impossible to compute x with h
(
x
)
= y. Collision
resistance: it is very unlikely to find two (or more) values x1, x2, where
h
(
x1
)
= y and h
(
x2
)
= y. Chaos: even similar values generate significantly
different outputs: changing a value by even one Bit should generate an
output that is about 50% different than the output of the unchanged value.
Message Authentication Codes. Recapitulated from [KBC97]: A message
authentication code is an output generated from a message and a secret
to provide integrity and authenticity assurances on the message. Integrity
assurances detect accidental and intentional message changes, while authen-
ticity assurances affirm the message’s origin. HMACs are only one method
to generate MACs; the specific MAC generation method is irrelevant for the
rest of the approach. A keyed-hash message authentication code (HMAC) is
a specific construction for calculating a message authentication code (MAC)
involving a hash function in combination with a secret key. As with any
MAC, it may be used to simultaneously verify both, the data integrity and
the authentication of a message.
Virtually unbounded amount of secrets based on hash-trees. The use of
hash-trees, as described in Section 4.3.2.2, is a top-down approach that allows
the generation of an unbounded amount of pseudo-random numbers based
on one seed which should be kept as a secret. The numbers are used as
secrets for encryption or MAC generation. It also allows the semi-trusted
Sanitizer to know a limited part of the shared symmetric secrets, with the
addition, that the secrets of the Sanitizer and the Verifier can be revoked.
By using hash-functions for both, the hash-tree and signature generation,
implementation complexity is simplified. The reason for using a hash-tree as
a design decision is that binary trees are well-known. The adjective binary
refers to the number of children for any node, not to the values of the nodes.
Trees can be seen as a particular type of acyclic directed graphs or as data
structures used to index some values (it is assumed that those values are
integers). A binary tree can be seen as a set of nodes, each node being a
pair (i,xi), the address of the node (a sequence of 0s and 1s) and the value
of the node (an integer), such that for each address i there is only one value
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xi. A binary tree can be defined by induction as follows: start with a node,
the root of the tree, and assign a value x to this node. Then, construct two
further nodes, the left child of the root and the right child of the root and
assign values to them, x0 and x1 and joint the root with those two children
by a directed edge. This procedure is repeated indefinitely: create a left and
a right child for each node and assign values to them, etc. Each node has –
in this way – two children, one left and one right. And each node has one
parent, except for the root which has no parents. Each node is associated
to a value (or each node has a certain value).
A node A is a descendant of another node B if A is a child of B or (by
induction) the child of a node that is a descendant of B. In that case, B is
called an ancestor of A. The address of a node is defined as a finite sequence
of zeros and ones, inductively defined as follows: the root has address 
(the empty sequence). If a node has the address i, then the left and right
children have addresses i0 and i1, respectively. Thus the address of a node is
an element of {0,1}∗ (the set of binary sequences of any length) that simply
describes the sequence of steps to reach the node starting from the root: a
“0” means “left” a “1” means “right”. The terminology xi for the value of
the node at address i. The address of a node will be also called the global
path of the node. A (local) path is a Bit-string that describes how to reach
a certain node starting from another one. Thus, from a given node, paths
lead to the descendants of that starting node. From an implementation
point of view, traversing a tree is moving in a sequence of steps from one
node to one of the node’s children or the parent. Traversing a tree implies
being able to read the values xi, of the nodes reached. The top-down hash
trees are constructed using hashes: the children of any node are constructed
using two hashes of the node. Thus, starting from any point in the graph, it
is easy to move downwards along any path, it requires only calculating some
hashes. But moving up in a tree is not possible without extra knowledge, as
this would require inverting a hash. The jump is closely related to a path,
but the movement is not only moving downwards: a jump first moves up
one or several times from its current node and then moves down along a
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path. A jump can be represented as a sequence of one or more “-” (minus
signs) followed by a sequence of 0s and 1s.
The reader is reminded of the canonical jump. It moves one node up, moves
to the right child and from there to its left child. The canonical jump is given
by the sequence −10 (“up, then right, then left”). The top-down hash-trees
are constructed using a parameter n (an integer) an initial seed (or “root
secret”) represented as a binary sequence of length n and a hash-function
with range in {0,1}n. The construction goes as follows: The initial seed x
is the value associated to the root (notice that the “subindex” for x is the
address of the root: , the empty sequence). If the node at address i has
value xi, then the value of the left child is xi0 = h
(
< xi,0>
)
and the value
of the right child is xi1 = h
(
< xi,1>
)
where <,> denotes concatenation.
Notice that due to the chaos and the one-way properties of the hash, the
values of xi0 and xi1 are pseudo-random and there is no efficient algorithm
to construct one from the other without knowing the common parent.
In MallMACs the values on the tree are used as private secrets, shared
secrets or one-time secrets. A private secret is a secret that an entity shares
with no one, but it is used for challenge-response protocols, to create further
secrets (which may be shared), or to demonstrate to a revision or audit
authority that some values are related to this secret. A shared secret is
a secret that several (usually a small number of) entities know, but it is
not intended to be disclosed in public. A one-time secret is a secret that is
used only once to prove that the originator knows a particular shared secret.
Such one-time secrets can be directly or indirectly disclosed publicly when
used or after being used. This is the reason why they are used only once, as
soon as they are disclosed or leaked, they are not interesting as secrets any
more.
4.3.3.5 The MallMAC Scheme
In this Section the proposed scheme for Malleable Message Authentication Codes
is presented. The setup of the MallMAC scheme resembles that of Sanitizable
Signatures [ACDMT05] with three entities: the Signer, the Verifier and the
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Sanitizer. All entities share some secrets which correspond to certain positions of
one binary graph. The Signer has the root secret x. He is able to generate every
node of the hash-tree (or: he “knows” the whole tree). The Verifier’s initial secret
is a node in the tree and therefore a descendant of the hash-tree’s root secret
(e.g., x0 in Figure 4.25). Thus the Verifier is able to verify some MACs created
by the Signer, but not all, and is not be able to forge MACs with keys that are
not descendants of the Verifier’s initial secret. The Sanitizer knows Sz, a secret
descendant of the initial secret of the Verifier. This implies that the Signer and
the Verifier are able to generate many common secrets and in particular all the
“sanitization secrets” of the Sanitizer.
Additionally, the Signer and Sanitizer share a common secret to allow the
Sanitizer to verify the incoming message from the Signer. This secret S is a node
in the tree that is not in the path to the Verifier’s initial secret (x0 in Figure 4.25).
Figure 4.25: Possible secrets and paths for Signer, Sanitizer and Verifier
Following the initial setup, the scheme defines a three step protocol. Figure 4.26
sketches the protocol’s data flow in a sequence diagram. Each step corresponds to
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the actions that the Signer, Sanitizer and Verifier are allowed to do. The actions
are:
Steps of the Signer. The Signer has a message, which he wants to send to the
Verifier. The message m is composed of two parts:
• f , contains the fixed part of the message, and a path (as described in
Section 4.3.3.4) path_to_R, which allows the generation of the sanitizing
key R.
• a, which solely contains the admissible part of the message.
The Signer now generates a MAC |f |L (resembles Sig1 in the basic SSS). The
used secret L is the first secret of the path known to Signer and Verifier (e.g., x000,
see Figure 4.25). Path_to_R is later used by the Verifier (and occasionally the
Sanitizer) to generate the sanitizing key R. There are several ways to generate
different sanitization keys from Sz:
• Path_to_R can be a sequence of Bits to generate a branch with certain
descendants from Sz. This is recommended if the Sanitizer’s initial key
needs to be replaced or refreshed.
• Instead of generating a path for every message, which might result in longer
paths and higher computational costs due to the execution of hashes to gen-
erate the tree’s branches, the Signer could include key materialKMi for every
new sanitization key Ri, where Ri← h(< Sanitizer′s_initial_key,KMi >).
The Signer then computes a second MAC for the whole message |m|R (resem-
bles Sig2 in the basic SSS) with the current sanitizing key R.
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Figure 4.26: The MallMAC Protocol
An additional signature |m|S is proposed, which is generated by the Signer
with a special key S and is only known to Signer and Sanitizer. The purpose of
this additional signature is to allow the Sanitizer verifying the message part a
(the one he is allowed to sanitize) and the used path (to generate the sanitization
key R). Finally, the Signer sends m, |f |L, |m|R, and |m|S to the Sanitizer.
Steps of the Sanitizer. The Sanitizer first verifies |m|S with the key S. If the
verification holds, the Sanitizer is able to identify the admissible part a of the
message and is able to generate the sanitization key R with path_to_R, where
path_to_R is a part of the fixed message f .
Case 1 - No sanitization. If the Sanitizer agrees to the content of a, he redi-
rects the original message and MACs from the Signer to the Verifier (m,
|f |L, |m|R).
Case 2 - Sanitation of the message. The Sanitizer decides to change the ad-
missible part of the message a, resulting in a′. He then creates a new MAC
← |m′|R with m′ ← f + a′, and the secret R. The Sanitizer now sends
m′← f +a′, |f |L, |m′|R to the Verifier.
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Steps of the Verifier. The Verifier knows L and is able to compute R from
path_to_R. Two cases apply for the Verifier:
Case 1 - No sanitization. If the Verifier is able to verify |f |L |m|R with R,
the message was left as originally signed by the Signer. The Verifier does
not need to verify |f |L. The Verifier verifies |f |L with L and computes R
from the given path (part of f) and then verifies |m|R. If the verification
holds, the Verifier knows the message is authentic.
Case 2 - Message was sanitized. The Verifier does the same as above, with
the small difference that he verifies |m′|R (and not |m|R); As the Verifier
does not know the original message m, he is not able to recognize whether
the message was sanitized or not.
Suggestions for revoking the Sanitizer’s secret. The Sanitizer is not al-
lowed to change messages by himself in the MallMAC scheme. He relies on the
path given and authenticated by the Signer in step 1. If the Sanitizer is untrusted,
there are several ways of revoking his permissions:
• The Signer neither signs nor forwards the path to use. This impedes the
Sanitizer to sign a valid MAC for the new message.
• The Signer sends a revocation message to the Verifier, which tells him to
block/disregard any breach generated by the secret Sz.
Suggestions for revoking the Verifier’s secret. In case the secrets of the
Verifier have to be revoked, the following ways are proposed to revoke his secret:
• The Signer changes L and publishes this in a secure way to all Verifiers that
are still allowed to participate. The excluded Verifier is not be able to verify
messages with the old secret.
• Additionally, the Signer changes Sz and communicates this to all Verifiers
and Sanitizers, that are still allowed to participate. The excluded Verifier is
not be able to generate valid sanitization keys anymore.
• The new L and R are computed from a new branch, as all descendants from
the secrets of the untrusted Verifier must be avoided.
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4.3.3.6 Variations of the Scheme
Several variations are possible to further enhance the revocation mechanics and
the knowledge of sanitization by the Verifier.
In a first variation, the Verifier is allowed to know when a message was sanitized.
Two different ways maybe used to notify the Verifier. The first option is knowledge
of sanitization by different use of secrets. The proposed variation of the scheme is
as shown in Figure 4.27:
Figure 4.27: Proposed variation for sanitization knowledge by using different
secrets
Steps of the Signer. Analogous to the normal scheme presented in the previous
Sections, the Signer has a message, which he wants to send to the Verifier. The
message m is composed as seen in Figure 4.26. The Signer sends, as opposed to
the normal scheme, m, |f |L, |m|L, and |m|S to the Sanitizer. That means, the
message itself is verified by a MAC that is generated with the secret L (instead of
R).
Steps of the Sanitizer. The Sanitizer first verifies |m|S and generates R as
seen in Figure 4.26.
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Case 1 - No sanitization. If the Sanitizer agrees to the content of a, he redi-
rects the original message and MACs from the Signer to the Verifier (m,
|f |L, |m|L).
Case 2 - Sanitization. The Sanitizer decides to change the admissible part of
the message a, resulting in a′. He then creates a new MAC |m′|R with m′ ←
f +a′, and the secret R. The Sanitizer now sends m′ ← f +a′, |f |L, |m′|R
to the Verifier.
Steps of the Verifier. The Verifier knows L:
Case 1 - No sanitization. If the Verifier is able to verify |m|L with L, the
message was left as originally signed by the Signer. Also, the Verifier does
not need to verify |f |L.
Case 2 - Sanitization. The verification of |m′|R with L fails. In this case, the
Verifier verifies |f |L with L and computes R from path_to_R (part of f)
and retries the verification. If the verification holds, the Verifier knows the
message was sanitized by a trusted party and thus remains authentic.
In this case, the Sanitizer may leave the message unchanged and still make use of
the secret R. By doing this, he can make the Verifier believe that the message
was changed, even if it was not. Otherwise, the Sanitizer is not able to change
the message without the Verifier’s notification. The reason is for this is the usage
of the secret L, which is unknown to the Sanitizer, but necessary for verifying the
case of no sanitization.
The second option is the knowledge of sanitization by value. The foundation is
the standard scheme of Figure 4.26, but in case of sanitization, the Sanitizer adds
one specific Bit to acknowledge sanitization. The scheme now works as follows:
Steps of the Signer. The Signer has a message, which he wants to send to the
Verifier. The message m is composed of three parts:
• f , contains the fixed part of the message, and the Bit-string called
path_to_R, which allows generating the sanitizing key R.
• a, which solely contains the admissible part of the message.
• b is a Bit that denotes if a message was sanitized (0 for original, 1 for
sanitized).
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The Signer behaves as seen in Figure 4.26, but he additionally signs b← 0
when signing m. The Signer sends m, |f |L, |m|R, and |m|S to the Sanitizer.
Steps of the Sanitizer. The Sanitizer verifies the received messages and gen-
erates R as seen in Figure 4.26.
Case 1 - No sanitization. If the Sanitizer agrees to the content of a, he redi-
rects the original message and MACs from the Signer to the Verifier (m,
|f |L, |m|R).
Case 2 - Sanitization. The Sanitizer decides to change the admissible part of
the message a, resulting in a′. He now additionally changes b← 0 to b′← 1
and creates a new MAC |m′|R with m′ ← f +a′+ b′, and the secret R. The
Sanitizer now sends m′ ← f +a′+ b′, |f |L, |m′|R to the Verifier.
Steps of the Verifier. The Verifier acts the same as seen in Figure 4.26. He
now additionally verifies b and knows from b’s value, if the message was sanitized.
It should be noted that in this case the Sanitizer is free to choose b. This means,
that the Sanitizer may or may not change the admissible part and lie about the
sanitization by changing the value of b.
Optimized secret management for better revocation. Figure 4.25 depicts
one of many possible secret distributions. The proposed distribution in Figure 4.25
is not optimal in case of secret revocation, as there is no space for the Sanitizer to
generate a new secret by means of the canonical jump (e.g., the Sanitizer would
be using the common secret S for the new secret of the Verifier). An optimization
can be achieved by including several blank nodes between each party’s secret.
Blank nodes allow the party with knowledge of the superseding secret to revoke
another party’s secrets by means of the canonical jump. Figure 4.28 displays the
possibilities given by including several blank nodes before and after each of the
party’s initial secrets.
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Figure 4.28: Variation of the distribution of secrets for better revocation
The colors of the description arrows indicate which party may act on a specific
node. E.g., by leaving x0 unused, the Signer may use the canonical jump (or
other, more complex jumps, i.e. moving up in the tree and choosing different
branches) to revoke any of the secrets known to the Verifier and the Sanitizer
and to generate a new branch of secrets. In the same fashion, the Verifier or the
Signer may use the canonical jump starting from x0010 to revoke any of the secrets
known to the Sanitizer. This optimized secret distribution allows the revocation of
secrets without having to generate a complete new hash-tree. Additionally, infinite
revocations are possible due to the canonical jump and the nature of top-down
hash-trees.
4.3.3.7 Protocol Verification
Details regarding the verification of the MallMACs protocol and the used formal
and technical tools are given in Sections B.2 and B.3.
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4.3.3.8 Summary and Future Work
The MallMAC scheme contributes a new malleable scheme purely based on message
authentication codes. This allows using the scheme in situations where resources
are restricted or where no asymmetric computation is possible. Hash-functions
are already available in even the most constrained devices, thus allowing the
implementation of the scheme with minimal additional effort. Also, by using hash-
functions for both, MAC generation and secret generation, the scheme reduces
complexity for computation and energy consumption. The modified scheme, as
presented in Figure 4.28, once set up, allows infinite revocation of secrets for
the Verifier and the Sanitizer. This scheme also allows variations depending on
the trust relationships between all participants. Accordingly the Verifier maybe
notified, if a message was sanitized.
4.3.4 Group Message Authentication Codes
Group signatures ensure unforgeability for messages, authenticate Signers and
provide k-anonymity for the members of a signing group. Since the original
proposal by Chaum and van Heyst [CVH91], there have been many adaptations
and extensions of group signatures, for example [BBS04].
Group signatures can be used in many more scenarios to provide privacy
preserving authentication. But as seen in [MFG+12], group signatures are primarily
based on asymmetric cryptography, which might be to complex or cost intensive
for low powered, low budget and constrained devices, such as those found in
the Internet of Things. As there have been no aspirations to provide a similar
mechanism with symmetric cryptography, a mechanism that resembles group
signatures is proposed, entirely based on symmetric cryptography. The proposed
mechanism maintains the same properties as the original proposal by Chaum
and van Heyst (k-anonymity of Signers, occasional relinkability, separation of
duty, revocation of secrets) and is thus applicable for the same scenarios as the
asymmetric counterpart.
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4.3.4.1 Introduction to Group Signatures
In this subsection group signatures are broadly described by detailing the simplified
scheme of [MFG+12]. The Section lays emphasis on simplified formalisation in
favour of legibility
Figure 4.29: Variation of the distribution of secrets for better revocation
Figure 4.29 depicts the several parties participating in a group signature
scheme. As in other privacy schemes, group signatures rely on strict separation
of duties and the independent action of participants. The scheme begins with
the Key Issuing Party which does the key management for all participants. The
Issuing Party generates, distributes and revokes keys. It is not involved in the
verification or opening (or “linking”) procedures of the scheme. The Issuing Party
is able to generate all keys with a function GKg
()
, which takes the initial size of
a group as an input.
The function generates three keys as an output, the group’s public key, the
member keys and the opening key. Depending on the scheme, also a revocation
key is generated. Algorithm 9 shows the generation steps.
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Algorithm 9 Generation of keys in a Group Signature Scheme.
1: GroupPublikKey, RevokeKey, OpeningKey, MemberIssuingKey1...j ←
GKg
(
number_of_groups
)
2: MemberKeyi1...in ← GKg(initial_members_i,n,MemberIssuingKeyi)
The key Issuing Party can nominate a further member Issuing Party that
solely manages the generation and removal of member keys. Depending on the
scenario, the Issuing Party may create several member issuing keys for different
groups.
The keys are further referred to as GPubKey, Memberkeyi, RevokeKey or
IssuingKey, GOpeningKey. The Issuing Party then distributes the keys between
the different parties. Algorithm 10 shows the distribution.
Algorithm 10 Distribution of keys in a Group Signature Scheme
1: Member1 to Memberi ← Memberkey1. . . i
2: Verifier(s) and Certificate Authorities ← GPubKey
3: Opening Party ← GOpeningKey
It should be noted that the Issuing Party has to remember which member
received which key to assist the Opening Party in re-linking a signature to a
member. This is done in a member-secret distribution table.
Additionally, the Issuing Party can add several members to the group with
the function AddMember
()
:
Algorithm 11 Adding new members in a Group Signature Scheme
1: procedureAdd New Members(GPubKey,number_of_new_members_m)
2: Generate Memberkeyi+1. . . i+m
3: GPubKey′ ← add Memberkeyi+1. . . i+m
4: Return Memberkeyi+1. . . i+m, GPubKey′
5: end procedure
The Issuing Party can also revoke keys as detailed in Algorithm 12.
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Algorithm 12 Revoking members in a Group Signature Scheme
1: procedure Revoke Members(GPubKey,Memberkeyi)
2: GPubKey′ ← remove Memberkeyi
3: Return GPubKey′
4: end procedure
The public key is changed in the process. It does not longer work with the
counterpart of Memberkeyi which was removed from the group.
The group members join a group by obtaining secret signing keys. They are
able to create digital group signatures in the name of the whole group. Neither a
Verifier nor the members themselves are able to recognize the source of a signed
message. A signature is created with the function GSign
()
:
Algorithm 13 Sign a message in a Group Signature Scheme
1: procedure Sign Message(Memberkeyi,message)
2: Gsignaturemessage ← GSign(Memberkeyi,message)
3: Return Gsignaturemessage
4: end procedure
The signature does not resemble the original message key and is verifiable with
the group public key.
A Verifier has access to the group’s public key and is able to verify that
the group is the authentic source of a message, but he is not able to pin-
point the group member that originally signed the message. The function
GVrfy
(
GPubKey,Gsignaturemessage,message
)
gives the output Valid / Invalid
in case of a valid or invalid verification of the message.
Algorithm 14 Verify a message in a Group Signature Scheme
1: procedure Verify Message(Gsignaturemessage,message,GPubKey)
2: V alid or Invalid ← GV rfy (Gsignaturemessage,message,GPubKey)
3: Return V alid or Invalid
4: end procedure
The Opening Party has a unique key, which allows it to re-link a signature
to one member key of the group. This property is needed in case a malicious
member is culpable of fraud or has to provide compensation of damages for his
misbehaviour. The Opening Party uses the function Open
()
with the arguments
shown in Algorithm 15.
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Algorithm 15 Re-link (or “opening”) a Signature in a Group Signature Scheme
1: procedure Open(GOpeningKey, Gsignaturemessage, m,
key_distribution_table)
2: MemberKeyi ← Open(GOpeningKey,Gsignaturem,m)
3: . m is the message
4: Memberi ← re-link MemberKeyi with key_distribution_table
5: Return Memberi
6: end procedure
The function outputs a specific member key Memberkeyi. Note: the member
key does not identify a user by itself. The Opening Party needs to know from the
Issuing Party, which user was given the key that was generated as output from the
Open
()
-function (exemplified in Algorithm 15 by a key distribution table). The
Opening Party is supposed to have a high trust level, and only re-link signatures
in justifiable circumstances. Additionally, the Opening Party should not be able
to access signatures by itself. It should only have temporary access to a limited
amount of signatures by means of the Verifier.
4.3.4.2 Related Work
Group signatures have been recognized as one of the major privacy enhancing
technologies to reach data minimization and privacy by design [MFG+12]. Al-
though many variations of group signatures exist, some of them intended to be
used in constrained devices (e.g., see [BBS04]), they are all based on asymmet-
ric cryptography. Albeit some of these group signatures might achieve efficient
results, there are scenarios, where asymmetric mechanisms are not considered
due to legacy, budget or capacity constraints for certain systems and devices.
Symmetric schemes that resemble digital group signatures are few and mostly
deeply nested in special cases, which are hard to transfer to other scenarios. For
example, [ZLL+08] implements a privacy preserving Message Authentication Code
scheme for vehicular area networks, where several cars (Signers) and a Road-Side
Unit (RSU) (the Verifier) pre-share symmetric secrets. Every vehicle obtains the
same pseudo-ID and one special, pre-shared key. When a vehicle generates a MAC
over a message, the message is signed with the vehicle’s special key. The RSU
receives the message and a MAC, and it verifies the received MAC by evaluating
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every pre-shared key, until it is able to confirm the authenticity of the MAC.
The scheme provides k-anonymity against an outside attacker, but it does not
fulfil the original idea of group signatures, where the Verifier is unable to know
who the original Signer is. In the scheme proposed by [ZLL+08], the RSU will
notice after the second verification which keys it has used and which vehicle is
using which key to sign its MACs. Additionally, VANETs can be seen as a special
scenario, where only a few vehicles are expected to be near a RSU at the same
time. But if the possible Signers rise to several thousands, the pre-shared keys and
the verification of one MAC with all pre-shared keys does not scale well. Finally,
there is neither a mechanism for the revocation of keys, nor can this scheme be
used in semi-trusted Verifier scenarios, as in the scheme of [ZLL+08], the RSU
has to know every signing key and is thus able to generate MACs itself anytime.
A Message Authentication Code scheme that resembles the properties of group
signatures is presented here. It provides k-anonymity for Signers, separation of
duty, easy key management, support of a vast amount of participants as well as
a key revocation mechanism. As in the original proposal, all participants can
have different trust levels; thus circumventing that one party is able to exploit
the scheme by itself.
Group signature properties Following properties can be derived from the
group signature scheme above.
Separation of duty. Several parties fulfil different obligations, thus circumvent-
ing mayor drawbacks, if one of them becomes untrusted (with the Issuing
Party as an exception, it has to be fully trusted). Take the as an example
the Opening Party; if the Opening Party becomes untrusted, there is no
possibility for it to relink signatures at will, as it does not participate in the
signature verification process and thus does not obtain signature message
pairs, nor does it know whom the opened key belongs to. Additionally,
the separation of duty is required in cases of revocation (see below) or in
different use cases and variations of the scheme, were a company is able to
add customers and verify group signatures (the company is the verifying
party as well), but issuing all the keys is done by one government authority
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(i.e., it is the Issuing Party) and relinking in cases of fraud is done by another
government authority (the authority is the Opening Party).
Unlinkability. Unlinkability (also after eventual relinking) of Signers by ad-
versaries, other Signers, Verifiers and the Issuing Party. The k-anonymity
properties of the signing keys allow a Signer to remain anonymous, until the
Issuing Party, the Opening Party and the Verifier work together to relink a
specific signature to its original Signer. But even after relinking one or many
signatures, the exposed Signer will be able to generate further signatures
and remain anonymous.
Revocation of secrets. Whenever a party becomes untrusted, its secrets can
be revoked without any impact on the scheme as a whole.
The Group MAC scheme will maintain the same properties, see Section 4.3.4.5.
4.3.4.3 Setup
The setup of the Group Message Authentication Codes (GroupMACs) Scheme
resembles the setup of the simplified Group Signature Scheme formulated in 4.3.4.1.
The participating entities are the Key Issuing Party, a Certificate Authority, one
or several Verifiers, a group with n Members and an Opening Party. The duties
of every party resemble those of the original as well, the Issuing Party issues keys
and, if justfied, will identify the member of a group given his member key. The
Opening Party links a MAC to the respective member secret. The Verifier takes
public information from the CA in order to verify a given MAC. The members of
a group create group message authentication codes that are (i) indistinguishable
from other group message authentication codes that they have created previously
or subsequently and (ii) indistinguishable from GroupMACs that other members
of the group have created previously or subsequently.
4.3.4.4 The GroupMACs Scheme
The presented scheme for Message Authentication Codes with adapted k-anonymity
to resemble digital group signatures is based on the same fundamentals of top-down
hashes, as seen in Section 4.3.3.4. The reader is reminded of the properties of the
top-down hash trees: The top-down approach allows the generation of practically
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infinite secrets for encryption or MAC generation based on one secret. It also
allows a semi-trusted Verifier to know a limited part of the shared symmetric
secrets, including a revocation mechanism for the Verifier and untrusted members
of a group. By using hash-functions for both, the hash-tree and MAC generation,
implementation complexity is simplified.
Proposed scheme. Firstly, the initial secret distribution is explained. After-
wards, the Group Message Authentication Code scheme with adapted k-anonymity
is detailed by explaining the every interaction of each party.
Initial secret distribution. Table 4.6 describes the initial secret distribution
for each party. Note that all the secrets in Table 4.6 are pre-shared. Secrets
described as “root secrets” are used to generate top-down hash-trees (see Fig-
ure 4.30).
Participant Initial Secret
Signer Signing root secret MemberSecreti (one
per Signer); common clock.
Issuing / Opening Party Generates a table to re-link keys and
real users; generates the Verifier keys
KVi; generates root Member Secrets
(MemberSecret1 . . . MemberSecretn).
Helping Party / CA Member Secrets (MemberSecret1 . . .
MemberSecretn); common clock; gener-
ates public verification table from Mem-
ber Secrets; knows Verifier keys KVi.
Verifier Verifier secret KVi (one per Verifier); re-
quires public verification table from Help-
ing Party.
Table 4.6: Group MACs: Initial distribution of secrets
Figure 4.30 sketches the key generation for two members, based on the root
secrets that the members were given initially in the scheme.
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Figure 4.30: Example of existing hash trees in the scheme with two Signers
How the scheme works. The scheme is described for two members of a group,
Signer 1 and Signer 2, although the scheme works for any number of Signers.
One Verifier is also described (the scheme also works for more Verifiers), an
Issuing/Opening Party and the Helping Party. The Helping Party resembles a Cer-
tificate Authority and provides the “verification table” (a form of public certificate)
for the Verifier. Signer 1 and Signer 2 receive two different signing root secrets from
the Issuing Party (MemberSecret1 and MemberSecret2, see Table 4.6. Signer 1
and 2 generate with their MemberSecret1 and MemberSecret2, respectively, new
secrets for MAC generation. There are many methods to generate secrets from the
member’s initial secrets, but the recommend way is the generation of top-down
hash-tress due to the low complexity for both, the Signers and the Helping Party,
as described in the previous Sections. The secrets will be generated each time a
time slice expires. Time slices may be freely defined and may overlap. The time
slices are based on the common clock of the Signers and the Helping Party. There
are several methods to synchronize the clock between parties, thus it should be
noted that the method of synchronization does not affect the rest of the scheme.
For example the method of [PCTS05] is adequate for constrained devices and
could be used. The Helping Party provides the verification table, see Figure 4.31,
which contains hashed values of the valid member secrets and the member secrets
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themselves. While the hashed values are published when valid, i.e. according to
their assigned time slice, the member secrets themselves are published after they
expired. The reason for this is that the hashed values are used to verify a MAC
for a message, while the clear text secrets themselves are used to verify that a
Signer knew the initial secret and that he did not just steal the hash values from
a published verification table.
Figure 4.31: Example of a verification table
The overall relationships of the participants are as follows: every Signer
generates secrets according to defined time slices. Whenever a time slice expires,
a Signer will generate other secrets, for example by means of the canonical jump
or other alternatives. The verification table provided by the Helping Party also
depends on the common clock shared with Signers and the same time slices. This
means, that if a time slice expires, entries in the verification table change as
well. To request the verification table, the Verifier and the Helping Party have
to authenticate each other. Every Verifier and the Helping Party share a unique
secret KVi. The verification table is encrypted per request by the Helping Party
with the secret that is shared with the requesting Verifier. Figure 4.32 depicts the
scheme for a Verifier and two Signers, Signer 1 in a time slice T0 and a Signer 2 in
T1. The following secrets derive from Table 4.6 and Figure 4.30. The verification
in this scheme work as follows at time Ti:
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Figure 4.32: Simplified sequence diagram for the proposed scheme
Figure 4.32 exemplifies the group MAC protocol for a Signer 1, a Verifier 1 and
the Helping Party. Although the scheme is simplified to show only one message
and one Signer, the same mechanism would apply for several messages and several
Signers. In the following the GroupMAC protocol referencing the secrets and the
distribution from Figures 4.30 and 4.31 is described.
Algorithm 16 Actions of Signer 1
1: Given are m1, MemberSecret1, Ti.
2: procedure GetNewSecret(MemberSecret1, Ti)
3: KMs1T i ← canonical jump
(
MemberSecret1,Ti
)
4: Return KMs1T0 . Assuming T0.
5: end procedure
6: Prepare GroupMAC for a message m1.
7: procedure GroupMAC(m1, KMs1T0)
8: MAC1h ← MAC(m1,h(KMs1T0))
9: MAC1 ← MAC(m1,KMs1T0)
10: h2
(
KMs1T0
) ← h(h(KMs1T0)) . h2 denotes double hashing.
11: Return MAC1h, MAC1, h2
(
KMs1T0
)
.
12: end procedure
13: Signer 1 → Verifier: m1, MAC1h, MAC1, h2 (KMs1T0).
The steps for Signer 1 are the following. Signer 1 generates the first secret
KMs1Ti fromMemberSecret1 according to the current time slice Ti. It is assumed
that this is the first time slice, thus KMs1T0 is generated (lines 3 and 4 in
Algorithm 16). Signer 1 wants to send now a message m1 to the Verifier with a
corresponding group MAC. The Signer first generates a secret KMs1T0 (the time
slice T0 is assumed). The Signer then computes two message authentication codes
denoted MAC1h and MAC for the same message by using (i) the hash of his first
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secret and the secret itself (lines 8 and 9 in Algorithm 16). Finally, the Signer
generates a hash of the hash of his first key. Note that double hashing is denoted
subsequently as h2.
The Signer has now all the information that is needed to send a Group MAC
protected message to the Verifier. Signer 1 sends the message m, and the Group
MAC consisting of h2(KMs1T0), MAC1h and MAC1. The steps for Verifier 1 are
as follows:
Algorithm 17 Actions of Verifier 1
1: Given are KV 1, m1, MAC1h, MAC1, h2
(
KMs1T0
)
.
2: Verifier → Helping Party: KV 1; request for Verification Table.
3: Verifier ← Verification Table. . From the Helping Party, if KV 1 is valid.
4: Look up h(KMs1T0) with h2(KMs1T0) . See Figure 4.31.
5:
6: In T0:
7: procedure VerifyGroupMAC(m1, h(KMs1T0), MAC1h)
8: MAC1-V ← MAC(m1, h(KMs1T0))
9: if MAC1-V == MAC1h then
10: Return V alid. . Group MAC is valid for m1.
11: else
12: Return Invalid. . Group MAC is not valid for m1.
13: end if
14: end procedure
15:
16: In T1: . KMs1T0 will be available in T1 on the Verification Table.
17: Look up KMs1T0 with either h2(KMs1T0) or h(KMs1T0).
18: . See Figure 4.31.
19: procedure VerifyKnowledgeOfSigner(m1, KMs1T0, MAC1)
20: MAC1-V ← MAC(m1, KMs1T0)
21: if MAC1-V == MAC1 then
22: Return V alid. . The Signer knew KMs1T0 in T0.
23: else
24: Return Invalid. . The Signer did not know KMs1T0 in T0.
25: end if
26: end procedure
The Verifier receives the message and the Group MAC from the Signer. The
Verifier needs to verify that h2(KMs1T0) is known to the Helping Party. The
Verifier requests the verification table provided by the Helping Party with his
secret KV 1 and looks up h2 with h(KMs1T0) (lines 2 to 4 in Algorithm 17).
The Helping Party computes the secrets in the same way as the Signers, e.g.,
by means of the canonical jump and according to different time slices, and creates
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the verification table. The verification table (see Figure 4.31) is similar to the
group public key. It is created with a round robin schedule in the steps of the
Helping Party:
KMs1T0 is a valid secret of a specific time slice. It is used to generate the hashed
values h2(KMs1T0) and h(KMs1T0) in the verification table (for details on
the generation, refer to Algorithm 16).
When a time slice expires, new entries for valid secrets in time slice Ti are
provided (e.g., h2(KMs1T i) and h(KMs1T i)).
When a time slice expires, the original input for hashes, in the case aboveKMs1T0,
is revealed in the table.
The validation of the MAC and the authenticity of the message is given, if the
Verifier can compute MAC(m, h(KMs1T1)) himself. Furthermore, the Verifier can
verify that the Signer knew the original secret KMs1T1 after it was revealed, by
computing MAC(m, KMs1T1).
Figure 4.32 displays the protocol for one Signer, but a second Signer would
do the same with his chain of keys, e.g. KMs[j]T [i] for a Signer j in time slice i.
Additionally, Figure 4.33 shows that the Verifier is able to retrieve KMs1T0 (the
original non-hashed secret) from the verification table in T1, and to verify that
the first Signer in T0 knew the original secret.
Figure 4.33: Verification of two messages in two different time slices
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4.3.4.5 Considerations and Optimization of Group MACs
In this subsection considerations on the design decisions as well as the privacy and
implementation are discussed. For the formal analysis of the protocol please refer
to the annex, Section B.4. The Sections ends with a comparison of the original
group signatures scheme and Group MACs.
Considerations on the public verification table. The scheme provides a
static table that is provided for the length of a time slice. A Verifier is able to
download and store the verification table, thus being able to stay disconnected
form the Helping Party. Additionally, the verification table only displays a few
hashed values per Signer, thus staying manageable for the Helping Party and the
Verifier. Several optimizations can be made to the verification table as well. The
Verifier does not have to download the whole table:
If the Verifier looks up hashed values dynamically, the Helping Party could
provide only one or a few values instead of the whole table.
Verification tables can be divided into smaller parts, depending on the Signers’
properties (e.g. Signers assigned to the property “legal age” are in one group,
etc.).
Important note: a Verifier needs to be semi-trusted to obtain a Verifier Key
KV i. In case a malicious Verifier exploits the hashed values of the verification
table, he is able to sign messages for the time slice assigned to those values. Once
the time slice expires, Verifiers will notice that the malicious Verifier could not
provide a MAC with the original non-hashed secrets and trigger the replacement
of all Verifier keys, excluding those Verifiers that are not fully trusted.
One possible solution to identify a malicious Verifier is to provide a verification
table with marked secrets. Honest and fully trusted Verifiers might then identify
the marked values and notify the Issuing Party to trigger a revocation.
Revocation of secrets. As in the original scheme, the Issuing Party is proposed
as the revocation authority. Revocation of secrets is generally done by updating
secrets, which are used in the MAC generation and verification processes, and
by omitting certain values in the verification table. In case of revocation of a
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Signer, the Helping Party will stop publishing the Signer’s hashed values in the
verification table. In case of revocation of a Verifier, the Issuing Party will notify
the Helping Party, excluding the Verifier from further verification (particularly,
denying any new table requests). In case of revocation of the Helping Party, all
member secrets and Verifier secrets have to be refreshed. In case of revocation of
the Issuing Party, a new Issuing Party has to issue new keys to all other parties.
Additionally, it has to recreate the member-secret issuing table.
Comparison between Group MACs and Group Signatures. Group
MACs resemble the properties of group signatures (as identified in Section 4.3.4.2)
in the scheme the following way:
Separation of duty. In Group MACs, several parties fulfil different obligations
as well. Neither the Verifier, nor the Issuing Party nor the Helping Party
can deanonymize MACs by themselves. For linking a MAC to a Signer,
the Issuing Party lacks pairs of messages and MACs, which it does not
have access to. The Verifier lacks the member-secret issuing table and the
member root secrets. The Helping Party lacks messages, MACs and the
member-secret issuing table.
Unlinkability. Neither party is able to link a MAC-Signer pair by itself, even
after prior re-linking of one or several MACs to a user. This is due to the
nature of the top-down hash-tree and the canonical jump, the Verifier is not
able to predict or recognize a given secret, even if it knows the preceding
one. The Helping Party, as well as the Issuing Party, lack knowledge of
message-MAC pairs and are not able to link messages at will.
Revocation of secrets. The Group MAC scheme allows revocation of all par-
ticipants’ secrets, as elaborated in the respective paragraph above.
4.3.4.6 Protocol Verification
Details regarding the verification of the GroupMACs protocol and the used formal
and technical tools are given in Sections B.2 and B.4.
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4.3.4.7 Summary
The Group Message Authentication Code scheme offers a novel approach to
authentication with privacy, that is purely based on symmetric cryptography
and hash-functions. This allows using the scheme in situations, where resources
are restricted or where no asymmetric computation is possible. The approach
relies on the top-down generation of hash-trees explained in Section 4.3.3.4, which
allows the efficient generation of virtually unlimited secrets. Hash-functions
are already available in even the most constrained devices, thus allowing the
implementation of the scheme under the constraints of Section 2.6.2. In comparison,
the Group Message Authentication Codes scheme resembles the properties of
Group Signatures under the assumption of a semi-trusted Verifier and an active
Certificate Authority (or Helping Party) providing a dynamic, changing and public
verification table. This assumptions exclude the Group MACs scheme form any
scenarios that offer public verification of signatures or MACs, but is seamlessly
applicable to the impact areas of Section 2.1.
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Chapter 5
A Privacy Enhanced IoT Domain
Model
In this Chapter, the Rerum domain model presented in Section 2.4.3.1 is extended
by a total of four new components: (i) Consent Management as presented in
Section 4.2.2, (ii) Privacy Policies as presented in Section 4.2.3, (iii) Access Control
Policies1 and (iv) Trust, see Section 5.1.1. This resulting domain model is Rerum’s
final domain model. Note that privacy enhancing technologies like the privacy
dashboard, geo-location privacy PET, MallMACs, GroupMACs are a part of the
instantiation of the domain model, as explained in the respective sections and, on
a conceptual level, in Section 2.5.4.
The Rerum final domain model is then extended again with all concepts and
technologies that were not integrated in Rerum, in particular (i) Pseudonym
Management and (ii) Ownership. The privacy enhanced IoT domain model in
Section 5.3 implements all contributions presented in this thesis.
5.1 Rerum Pre-Final Domain Model
This section shows the pre-final Rerum domain model. Note that the model shows
an incomplete mapping of all concepts and technologies that have been presented
in this thesis, as the Rerum project ended while certain technologies were still in
the verification stage.
1Access control is part of the security functional components, the interested reader is referred
to [RER15].
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Figure 5.1: Rerum domain model - six new extensions
The pre-final model presented in Figure 5.1 updates Rerum’s first phase
model discussed in Figure 2.7 by seven components. The reader is referred to
Section 2.4.3.1 for a full description of the main elements and concepts of the first
phase.
Data Subject. The term data subject was introduced in earlier section with the
note that throughout this thesis, a “user” is always defined as a data subject.
Rerum differentiates the types of human users that participate in IoT, one
of them being the data subject. The data subject is a special user that has
a special relation with the entities around him (the entities represent or
disclose some information about him). The data subject can give or revoke
consent and therefore affect access and privacy policies.
Consent. Whenever an entity represents or discloses some information about a
human user (in particular: a data subject) and a service provider (in Rerum
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terms: an app) is interested in processing that data, the concept of consent
is involved. Consent affects the question of “who” and “how” regarding
the access to information of Virtual Entities. As access information can
be represented as policies, consent has direct influence on access control
and privacy policies. This component and its relationships document the
discussion in Section 4.2.2.
Security Policies, Access Policies and Privacy Policies. Rerum defines three
types of policies: (i) security policies that control access to virtual devices,
(ii) access policies and (iii) privacy policies that control the access to Virtual
Entities. Privacy related policies are defined by the data subject through
consent management or directly with the privacy dashboard. Additionally,
context maybe an integral part to access decision, e.g. when an user is at
work, at home or in an emergency situation. This concepts document the
outcome of Sections 4.2.3 and 4.2.2.
The model does not capture specific technologies like sticky policies and the
PAT protocol, which are a part of the technical view in the Rerum architecture.
Rerum defines one final extension to the domain model for trust. Before the final
Rerum domain model is presented, the following section takes a brief look at how
trust affects security and privacy and why it has to be implemented for a privacy
enhanced domain model in IoT.
5.1.1 Trust and Privacy in IoT
Rerum additionally defines trust relationships for the final domain model. In
general, trust in IoT can be exemplified with access control: compliance with
access control policies cannot be forced and relies often on the expected behaviour
of the parties involved. Trust and reputation are highly related to security,
but they can also contribute to other factors such as reliability, availability and
privacy, see [YZV14]. In other words, access control needs to be based on trust
to be adequate for privacy, for IoT in particular. Gambetta defines trust as the
subjective probability by which an individual, A, expects that another individual,
B, performs a given action on which its welfare depends, see [G+00]. In web
systems, trust is often a binary probability that is linked to authentication. In a
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typical access control scenario, a user is fully trusted if he is able to authenticate
against a service. The service is then able to decide on the user’s requests, because
the service knows the role he is assigned to. Newer access control methods, such
as single-sign-on, do a variation of authentication and role assignment, but the
underlying method is the same: a user is trusted if he is able to authenticate and
his role is known to the system. In IoT, users are not predetermined and thus
cannot be known a priori by the services. Services themselves might be created
dynamically including their own access control components. Additionally, services
might be constrained and thus not able to store a high amount of user IDs and
user roles. The assignment of rights to users has to be done dynamically, that
means, if an unknown user wants to access a system, a mechanism has to reason
about if the user is allowed to access a service or not. This can be done through
delegation and trust management, as proposed in [KFJ01]. A user that is trusted
by the system can delegate all or a subset of his rights to another user that he
trusts and that can fulfil the requirements associated to the rights. Delegated
rights can be access and delegation rights. With delegation rights, the users can
generate a trust chain. Every member of the chain can access the system according
to his respective rights until they expire or until the chain is broken. This is the
case when a user becomes untrusted or fails to meet the requirements associated
with a delegated right. In that case every user in the chain will not be able to
exercise his rights, and the chain has to be created anew. How users and the
service quantify trust may be different. Depending on the context, they might
share secrets that define their trustworthiness or they might evaluate trust based
on reputation. Reputation is the collected and processed information about a
user’s former behaviour as experienced by others. This is especially interesting
due to the heterogeneity of users in IoT.
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5.2 The Final RERUM Domain Model
The Rerum final domain model shown in Figure 5.2 complements the model
in Figure 5.1 with the concept of trust as presented in the Rerum final system
architecture deliverable [RER15]. Trust and reputation, as elaborated above,
affect several concepts of the IoT domain.
Trust influences access control decisions and thus the way access and privacy
policies work. Past (mis-)behaviour is documented in reputation schemes, which
characterise what to expect form devices. The same mechanisms apply to users,
be it applications and services or human users. Misbehaviour covers intentional
and unintentional errors in measurements and threatening misbehaviour from
human and digital users.
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Figure 5.2: Rerum final domain model
Data Protection for the Internet of Things Santiago Reinhard Suppan, 2017
5. A PRIVACY ENHANCED IOT DOMAIN MODEL 216
5.3 A Privacy Enhanced IoT Domain Model
The privacy enhanced IoT domain model presented in this thesis is a key con-
tribution of this thesis. The model updates Rerum’s final domain model by
two concepts: (i) ownership and (ii) pseudonyms. Ownership relationships were
explained in Section 2.5.3. A new relationship emerges for the Data Subject. A
Data Subject is reflected by zero to many Physical Entities. This means that
zero to many Physical Entities relate to a human user, which may relate either to
absolute ownership or physical possession. An exception would be a human user
that is sensed by an entity in his physical proximity. This would only satisfy the
reflection relationship for the data subject without ownership.
Pseudonyms are the main form of identification in a privacy enhanced IoT
domain model. Pseudonyms are generated by all Virtual Entities, thus pseudonyms
are associated to the abstracted class of Generic Virtual Rerum Objects. Devices
are able to communicate by themselves and are able to generate pseudonyms as
well. Pseudonyms are an integral part of communication, as they serve as the host
and identity identifiers in IoT. Thus, the relationship is modelled as one-to-many
for the aggregation. One to many because if an entity or device exists, it has at
least one pseudonym by with it is identified.
As elaborated in Section 2.5.3, ownership affects the assignment of identities.
The reason is, that an owner must be able to recognize his devices while other
services should only temporarily be able to track a set of pseudonyms. Hence, a
relates-to relationship is defined. Figure 5.3 presents the complete model.
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Figure 5.3: A Privacy Enhanced Domain Model for IoT
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5.4 Summary
The Rerum domain model encapsulates security, privacy and trust (SPT) concepts
developed for Rerum. The enhanced privacy domain model furthermore extends
Rerum’s domain model with two additional privacy concepts. Notably in the
final result, privacy components are well represented with four out of seven SPT
components. The relationships affect all fundamental IoT components, either
directly or indirectly (e.g., devices are affected by their virtual counterpart). This
shows how influential privacy is for every aspect of IoT and how it needs to be
postulated in order to provide adequate data protection. For future practicability,
following assumptions hold:
In general, both model and architecture are living artefacts and will change
over time. They may be extended, updated and adapted along with IoT’s
growing popularity and changing technologies.
The architecture is an instantiation of the domain model. While the domain
model is a fundamental set of building blocks and is less prone to change,
the architecture is strongly affected by current and future technologies,
intended operational environment, regulations and even personal preference
(of architects and developers).
From the perspective of an IoT system developer, the domain model is a
fundamental part that is taken “as is”, while the architecture is freely adaptable.
The Rerum architecture was implemented as an open source project2 and can serve
as a starting point, but developer guidelines on design decisions, recommendations
and quality management procedures maybe further needed. This is considered as
a possible next step.
2See https://github.com/ict-rerum, last visited August 17, 2017.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
The motivation of this thesis was presented in Section 1.1. This thesis addresses
two seemingly opposing topics, the Internet of Things which centrates on collecting
and processing data, and privacy, which prominently propagates data minimization.
In order to grasp if these topics are compatible and to foresee a positive result
(“yes they are, under this conditions”) or a negative one (“no, a conflict between
service providers, legislation and users is to be expected”) three main objectives
were documented.
The first objective was the identification of building blocks of the Internet of
Things. At the time of this writing, there was neither a consensus on what IoT
really is, nor what core elements (building blocks) it is based upon. Also, although
IoT is very popular, many of its aspects (economical, technical and social) have
not been made clearly transparent. As a first step, a literature review was carried
out to understand the motivation behind IoT, its economical value and the most
promising building blocks for future IoT systems. The result was an outline of
available technical standards and architecture proposals, a reconciliation of the
building blocks of IoT systems and a holistic definition of IoT. While the method
of identification of building blocks was taken from the IoT-A and Rerum projects,
this thesis was able to verify the methodology by applying its holistic definition
to the project’s results.
With adequate building blocks, several aspects could be analysed. First, the
economical motivation in different IoT impact areas were elaborated. This step
was important in order to identify assumptions and intended environments of
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privacy technologies. Also, “tradtional” ICT systems and IoT systems have been
set into relation to get a clear understanding of similarities and differences. Form
a privacy perspective, the participation of system users can be clear-cut: in
traditional ICT systems, users are active participants of a system, their personal
data is introduced by themselves (knowingly or unknowingly). In IoT, non-users
maybe included in systems and their personal information maybe introduced
unknowingly. The cyber-physical property of IoT was also recapitulated. The
relation between physical and virtual representation opens several questions that
have only received little attention in computer science (“social IoT”), but have
been extensively discussed in social sciences. Therefore, this thesis introduced
the concept of ownership in IoT, a concept that has been a building block in
jurisdiction and modern western societies. The main contribution targeting the
first objective was a reference model for IoT, accompanied by a set of assumptions,
requirements and constraints, both technical and economical.
The second objective was to survey relevant privacy requirements, concepts
and technologies. The relevancy was measured upon IoT impact areas, IoT
building blocks, technical and economical assumptions and constraints. In the
process, the fundamental conflict of privacy and IoT became present and was
recapitulated. Several privacy principles, standards, taxonomies and frameworks
were discussed. Requirements stem in particular from legislation GDPR and
good privacy practices (privacy by design). After providing an overview of how
those apply to a general privacy engineering methodology and adopting a privacy
taxonomy for the rest of this thesis, a privacy lifecycle development was proposed
to find a reasonable approach and set of existing proposals. The lifecycle was
developed such that it supports the fulfilment of identified privacy requirements.
Working with Rerum, an overall lack of privacy building blocks and technologies
that support the lifecycle was singled out, therefore some privacy building blocks
and their integration in an IoT architecture was presented. In particular, privacy
policies, consent management, pseudonym management and ownership were added
to the IoT domain model.
As for the technologies, economical and technical constraints impede traditional
PETs from being applied to IoT. Additionally, PETs tend to use special types
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of arithmetics that are not available off-the-shelf and would cost additional
implementation, testing and maintenance effort. Thus, in an extended effort,
technologies for efficient PETs were surveyed. In this thesis it was demonstrated
and formally verified that, although none of the existing technologies satisfy the
requirements set in IoT impact areas, off-the-shelf cryptography can help to build
further PETs for constrained devices. Furthermore, it was shown that asymmetric
properties can be reached with symmetric cryptography under minor assumptions.
The results presented hereby are merely the tip of the iceberg and seem to hold
significant potential. The PETs were elicited based on scenario descriptions of the
Rerum project and aim to support the proposed PDLC. The technologies were
included conceptually in the instantiation of the domain model, namely in the
Rerum architecture.
The last objective sought to combine the IoT and privacy building blocks in a
privacy enhanced domain model. This domain model is a fundamental reference
that describes relationships and dependencies of a privacy enhanced IoT system.
The domain model, accompanied by the technologies, formulated assumptions
and constraints of previous steps, is one of the main contributions of this thesis.
The three objectives passed demonstration, evaluation and communication
phases respectively. Demonstration and evaluation of scientific and industry
aspects were achieved through publications and patents in collaboration with the
Rerum project and Siemens AG.
6.1 Outlook
Although many new insights about privacy in IoT could be identified, many
questions remain open.
For instance, the identified impact areas in this thesis are just a subset of all
possible applications of IoT, some may become evident in the future. Although
diverse, data generation in these areas follow many automatisms where devices are
programmed or follow policies to automatically collect data. Consequently, they
sense the status of anything that occasionally happens in the devices’ environments,
observing users’ activities either directly or indirectly. The question in focus is
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how these new impact areas will change the privacy enhanced domain model.
Here, computer science and jurisdiction have shown to have strong synergies, as
was the case of ownership.
The enhanced privacy domain model itself has not been implemented and
is considered as future work. Although the Rerum domain model was firstly
implemented in the Rerum architecture, some significant concepts and technologies
could be verified after the project’s end.
Also, developer guidelines on design decisions, recommendations and quality
management procedures are further needed. Additionally, the application layer of
the IoT stack has been widely left out of scope and needs to be addressed.
Regarding technologies, the assumptions and the constraints that they were
designed to work in, this thesis showed that in particular economical constraints
hardly change, and if so, on a very slow pace. Thus investments in integration
of privacy technologies (as part of industrial R&D) are limited, as R&D costs
are tightly controlled, even for highly digital products. On the other hand,
technology constraints loosen up. Nevertheless, fancy arithmetics as required by
many academics will not be implemented in the near future, due to possible high
implementation, quality management and maintenance costs.
Ownership and consent have been shown to be prime examples of interdisci-
plinary research. For future researchers interested in IoT, the readers are advised
to consider interdisciplinary work as IoT and computer science have enlarged their
scope well into other research areas.
The introduced technologies for efficient PETs that have been researched and
pointed out can help to build further PETs for constrained devices.
Privacy in IoT remains difficult, because privacy engineering itself is a task
that still needs to be well understood. Privacy engineering lacks a consensus of
best practices and supporting tools. The need for more efficient PETs suited
for constrained environments and in particular tools that support transparency
for users, allowing them to control and access their data throughout multiple
providers and processes, seems evident.
Concluding, this thesis and the acceptance of its results by several parties
shows that IoT and privacy are not disjunct topics. There is justifiable interest in
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IoT, as it helps to tackle many future challenges found in impact areas. At the
same time, IoT impacts the stakeholders that participate in those areas, creating
the need for unification of IoT and privacy.
As was shown in the course of this work, technical and economical constraints
do not impede the unification of IoT and privacy, although this process has merely
begun. Thus further work towards this goal is still needed.
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Appendix A
Assumptions on the Virtual
Representation of Users
This interview was conducted on the 11.04.2014 with Dr. Jorge Cuéllar Siemens
AG. At the time of the interview, Dr. Cuéllar was aware of the ownership, privacy
policy, consent and pseudonym concepts presented in this thesis.
Santiago R. Suppan:Hi Jorge, thank you very much for your time. In this
interview I would like to know your take on the virtual representation of a
user in IoT. The main idea is to have a digital space where the user can
manage his identity, his policies, his consent, pseudonyms etc. My first idea
would be to take his smartphone. Smartphones are an ubiquitous, personal
devices that many users have. But for the smartphone to uniqueliy identify
the user, the user would have to authenticate himself by some means that
shows that he is either the owner or possessor of the smartphone, so it can
load the correct attributes, policies, etc.
Dr. Jorge R. Cuéllar:I agree on the smartphone as the principal device for
representing the user according to the [IoT-A] model. But I don’t think the
smartphone needs to recognize ownership and possession. All of us have a
smartphone and only very seldom do we lend or share it. We can assume
ownership for a user and his smartphone.
Santiago R. Suppan:What about if a user accidentally loses his smartphone? He
will be excluded form an IoT system. If the user could uniquely identify
himself with an RFID tag plus another factor, he could use a different
smartphone quickly.
Dr. Jorge R. Cuéllar:And how seldom does that happen? Of course two factor
authentication is a good thing, but it is not necessary for ownership here.
I, and many other colleagues form the telecommunication area, think that
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the smartphone is a very personal device. Users take well care of it. If
the participation of a system is essential, the user could have two or more
smartphones as backup.
Santiago R. Suppan:I see. The smartphone fully represents the user, such that
other devices recognize ownership and possession from their relationship to
the smartphone, but not to the human user himself.
Dr. Jorge R. Cuéllar:You could see it like that. Something may change depending
on future technologies, but there is a strong assumption that [the smartphone]
will play a major role for IoT in the near future.
Santiago R. Suppan:Thank very much.
Dr. Jorge R. Cuéllar:You are welcome.
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Appendix B
Protocol Design and Verification
B.1 Design of Efficient Protocols
Note: the protocols defined in this thesis follow good design principles from the
IETF and Ryan et al., which are not further discussed here. The reader is referred
to RFC 1958 [Car96] for general good design principles of internet protocols
and [RSM+01] for modelling of security protocols. The subject of this section is
exclusively efficiency.
Many privacy enhancing technologies are based on asymmetric cryptography.
Asymmetric cryptography is a general term for crypto systems that are based on
integer factorization, the discrete logarithm problem and elliptic curve relationships.
The cryptographic primitives based on these problems have been widely studied
and have become highly efficient over time. The problem with asymmetric
primitives for IoT is two-fold:
Asymmetric primitives often need different arithmetics. For example, the
most efficient key exchange scheme is ECDH, see [BJS07]. The most efficient and
practical privacy friendly authentication scheme is the Short Group Signature
scheme, see [BBS04]. ECDH is based on elliptic curves and the Group Signatures
are based on bilinear groups. A constrained device would either need two crypto-
libraries or two crypto-processors to use both. Group Signature schemes based on
elliptic curves exist, but they lack practicality due to drawbacks in revocation and
key length, as seen in [HWL04]. There might be also differences in the properties
of elliptic curves, therefore it is still difficult to have one common arithmetic.
“Off-the-shelve” libraries and crypto-processors supporting privacy enhancing
technologies based on asymmetric primitives are rare. While crypto-processors
exist with, e.g., elliptic curve or bilinear group arithmetic, they do not support
calling atomic functions. Rather, they provide a transparent interface for signing
or encrypting inputs, without revealing the low-level (atomic) processes. This
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means that a crypto-processor for, e.g., group signatures has to be manufactured,
which is a high-cost endeavour. Software libraries exist, such as the PBC library1,
but significant effort would be needed to optimize the library for constrained
smart objects with class 1 limitations.
The reader is referred to RFC 5218 [TA08] for more indicators on what makes
a protocol successful.
A possible solution are protocols based purely on symmetric cryptography, that
resemble asymmetric protocols. This has been done before, for example, Ralph
C. Merkle proposed a public key infrastructure based on hash-trees, see [Mer79].
The original approach by Merkle is rather inefficient due to key management, but
essentially faster for the authenticating parties. The scheme has found several
revisions and its benefits have been recently been underlined, e.g., in smart city
applications, see [LLZ+14].
Another example is the TESLA protocol [PCTS05]. The TESLA protocols
resembles a broadcast authentication and integrity protection scheme, were the
broadcaster is the only party to compute authentic and integer messages. This
would be easy in an asymmetric context, but inefficient in low power and low cost
devices. The protocol again uses hash-functions only to achieve its properties.
From both, the Merkle authentcation and the TESLA protocol, several benefits
for IoT become evident:
Symmetric protocols are based on one-way functions. One-way functions, such
as cryptographic hash-functions, are easy to implement, can be found in “off-the-
shelf” crypto-processors and are up to 1.000 faster in computation and 100.000
times (compared with RSA, ca. 2.000 times compared to elliptic curves) more
efficient regarding battery consumption, see [PRRJ03].
Due to the lower battery consumption and the “off-the-shelf” availability of
symmetric protocols, the application of security and privacy protocols becomes
possible in scenarios with strong limitations. The challenge of defining such
protocols to resemble their asymmetric counterparts remains still an open challenge,
as not all asymmetric properties can be mapped to symmetric methods, see for
example [ANN06], or, if possible, are very inefficient, see [Dif88].
B.2 On the Verification of Security Protocols
The verification of security protocols aims to provide a statement about how and if
an attacker can learn something during protocol execution. One possibility would
1The PBC library is a pairing based crypto library, provided by the Stanford University, see
https://crypto.stanford.edu/pbc/.
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be to implement a protocol and actively test the protocol to prove any flaw. As
simple protocols can become very complex, a mathematical model that abstracts
some details of a protocol can also be used. A model typically defines several
assumptions about the used technology and the attacker model (time, economical
resources, technical resources), such as the model of Dolev and Yao, see [DY83].
The so called Dolev Yao makes three abstractions: first, cryptography is assumed
to be perfect, there is no way to attack the cryptographic schemes used in the
protocol. Given an encrypted message, the attacker has to know the encryption
key in order to decrypt the message and to learn the content of that message. This
assumption salves the model from any technical and implementation details (and
errors). Second, messages are always disclosed completely. There is no partial
disclosure, as the attacker is only able to decrypt a whole message and not parts
of it. Finally, Dolev and Yao give the attacker full control over the network. The
attacker is therefore able to passively eavesdrop the messages of a given protocol,
but also drop messages, change messages, repeat messages and create messages.
The Dolev Yao attacker model is considered to be the strongest attacker model
to measure a protocol against [Cer]. With the attacker model and given a security
protocol, several security claims can be derived. These claims should be tested
throughout various protocol instantiations to prove that the protocol does not
have obvious or transitive flaws. These is a complex task, therefore a branch of
verification tools have emerged.
Mitchell et al. have shown in [MSDL99] that the statement about the security
of a protocol, i.e., if an attacker is able to compromise a message in a given
security protocol, is undecidable. Therefore an additional assumption has to be
made regarding the number of execution that the protocol is bound to have. This
simplifies the verification such that a statement becomes decidable, see [MS01].
Therefore, tools based on decidable models are appropriate tools for the verfication
of security protocols.
For the verification of protocols in this thesis, work of Cremers et al. is used. A
description of the used model, semantics, assumptions regarding decidability can
be found in [CM05]. The model was chosen as its fundamental semantics cover
the Dolev Yao attacker model and provide a high completeness when modelling
pure symmetric protocols, see [CLN09] for a comparison. Additionally, Cremers et
al. offer an implementation of their verification model with the Scyther Tool. A
description of the tool, it’s abstractions and assumptions regarding error tolerance
of the implementation can be found in [Cre08].
Furthermore, a full description of the Scyther modelling language, the inter-
pretation of outputs, available claims and tool parameters can be found in the
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work of Chen [Che15] and the Scyther manual [Cre14b]. The following subsection
explains the the scyther formal model in a nutshell.
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B.2.1 The Scyther Formal Model
The scyther formal model can be described in five steps:
Figure B.1: Scyther - Basic formal model.
Figure B.2: Scyther - Protocol execution
1. Roles are sets with elements. El-
ements can be variables, time informa-
tion, random numbers, etc.
2. A protocol describes allowed op-
erations (send, receive, compare, gen-
erate, cryptographic operations, etc.)
in a specific order (so called traces)
to change, unify add or disjunct sets.
The result of a specific order is called
“event”.
3. The result of a protocol run are new
Roles (sets with elements) which, ac-
cording to claims, can only be reached
with traces of the protocol.
4. Scyther tries to generate a trace that
contradicts every claim. In particular
it generates an attacker set.
5. Scyther considers multiple protocol
runs to generate traces for the attacker
(different instances by multiple agents). Figure B.3 shows a possible attack trace
over two protocol runs. Note: in the introduction of this section it was mentioned
that the verification of protocol is only decidable, when protocol runs are limited.
Data Protection for the Internet of Things Santiago Reinhard Suppan, 2017
B. PROTOCOL DESIGN AND VERIFICATION 232
According to the Scyther documentation, it is justifiable to assume that no further
attacks a re possible if no attack where found within a bound of 5 protocol runs.
Figure B.3: Scyther - Matched typing and bounds
6. Scyther considered at-
tacks that are based on type-
flaws. A type flaw assumes
that a Role was not able to
recognize the expected message
and may mix up messages of
different types. For example, a
nonce may be exchanged for a
string by an attacker. A type
flaw would take place if the re-
ceiving Role does not recognize
the message swap. Note: in
this thesis, typed matching was
chosen, that means the assumptionthat the protocol implementation will impede
type flaws.
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B.3 Verification of the MallMACs Protocol
For the verification of the MallMACs protocol, Scyther linux version 1.13 was
used on an Ubuntu 64Bit 17.04 machine with Python version 2.7.13. Note that
the Scyther folder has to be assigned execution rights for all files. The Scyther
configuration was typed matching, 5 protocol runs as maximum bound, 10 maximum
number of patterns per claim and find all attacks.
The Scyther model file of the protocol MallMACs is as follows:
1 hash funct ion hash ;
2 user type St r ing ;
3
4 // The path from X0 to X000 − S igner and V e r i f i e r know i t ,
5 // but makes no d i f f e r e n c e i f i t i s pub l i c
6
7 pro to co l MallMAC( Signer , San i t i z e r , V e r i f i e r )
8 {
9
10 r o l e S igner
11 {
12 //m=f+a , f=message f ix+pathtor , ms i s MAC of m with key S
13 f r e s h message f ix : S t r ing ;
14 f r e s h a : S t r ing ;
15 f r e s h pathtor : Nonce ;
16 f r e s h pathtosz : Nonce ;
17
18 // as su re both p a r t i e s are a l i v e
19 c la im ( Signer , Running , V e r i f i e r , pathtosz ,
20 hash ( pathtosz , k ( Signer , V e r i f i e r ) ) ) ;
21 send_0 ( Signer , V e r i f i e r , { pathtosz ,
22 hash ( pathtosz , k ( Signer , V e r i f i e r ) )} k ( Signer , V e r i f i e r ) ) ;
23
24 var resp ;
25 recv_01 ( Ve r i f i e r , S igner , { re sp }k ( Ve r i f i e r , S igner ) ) ;
26 match ( resp , hash ( pathtosz ) ) ;
27
28 macro S = hash (k ( Signer , S a n i t i z e r ) ) ;
29 macro L = hash (k ( Signer , V e r i f i e r ) ) ;
30 macro Sz = hash ( hash (k ( Signer , V e r i f i e r ) ) , pathtosz ) ;
31 macro R = hash ( hash (L , pathtosz ) , pathtor ) ;
32 macro ms = hash ( messagef ix , pathtor , a , S ) ;
33 macro f l = hash ( messagef ix , pathtor , L ) ;
34 macro mr = hash ( messagef ix , pathtor , a , R) ;
35
36 // as su re both p a r t i e s are a l i v e
37 c la im ( Signer , Running , San i t i z e r , messagef ix ,
38 a , pathtor , ms , f l , mr , Sz ) ;
39 send_1 ( Signer , San i t i z e r , {messagef ix , a , pathtor , ms ,
40 f l , mr , Sz}k ( Signer , S a n i t i z e r ) ) ;
41
42 // recv acknowledgement from San i t i z e r
43 var Rsz ;
44 recv_11 ( San i t i z e r , S igner , {Rsz}k ( San i t i z e r , S igner ) ) ;
45 match (Rsz , hash (R) ) ;
46
47 // t e l l Scyther to v e r i f y c la im that keys are s e c r e t
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48 claim_a01 ( Signer , Secret , k ( Ve r i f i e r , S igner ) ) ;
49 claim_a111 ( Signer , Secret , k ( Ve r i f i e r , S a n i t i z e r ) ) ;
50
51 // t e l l Scyther to v e r i f y c la ims that a l l s e c r e t s are t r u e l y s e c r e t
52 claim_a02 ( Signer , Secret , S ) ;
53 claim_a03 ( Signer , Secret , L ) ;
54 claim_a04 ( Signer , Secret , Sz ) ;
55 claim_a05 ( Signer , Secret , R) ;
56 claim_a06 ( Signer , Secret , ms ) ;
57 claim_a07 ( Signer , Secret , f l ) ;
58 claim_a08 ( Signer , Secret , mr ) ;
59 claim_a09 ( Signer , Secret , Rsz ) ;
60
61 // t e l l Scyther to v e r i f y that a l l p a r t i e s where r e a l l y invo lved
62 claim_a10 ( Signer , Alive , V e r i f i e r ) ;
63 claim_a11 ( Signer , Alive , S a n i t i z e r ) ;
64 claim_a12 ( Signer , Niagree ) ;
65 claim_a13 ( Signer , Nisynch ) ;
66
67 // t e l l Scyther to v e r i f y that a l l messages were sent and r e c e i v ed
68 // by authent i c p a r t i e s
69 claim_a20 ( Signer , Commit , V e r i f i e r , pathtosz ,
70 hash ( pathtosz , k ( Signer , V e r i f i e r ) ) ) ;
71 claim_a21 ( Signer , Commit , S a n i t i z e r , messagef ix , a , pathtor ,
72 ms , f l , mr , Sz ) ;
73
74 // t e l l Scyther to v e r i f y that r e a l S igner was r e a l l y invo lved during
75 // the p ro to co l
76 claim_a31 ( Signer , Reachable ) ;
77
78 }
79
80 r o l e S an i t i z e r {
81 var message f ix ;
82 var a ;
83 var pathtor ;
84 var pathtosz ;
85
86 recv_1 ( Signer , San i t i z e r , {messagef ix , a , pathtor ,
87 ms , f l , mr , Sz}k ( Signer , S a n i t i z e r ) ) ;
88
89 match (ms , hash ( messagef ix , pathtor , a , hash (k ( Signer , S a n i t i z e r ) ) ) ) ;
90
91 macro R = hash ( Sz , pathtor ) ;
92
93 // acknowledge r e c e i v i n g o f R
94 c la im ( San i t i z e r , Running , Signer ,
95 {hash (R)}k ( San i t i z e r , S igner ) ) ;
96
97 send_11 ( San i t i z e r , S igner , {hash (R)}k ( San i t i z e r , S igner ) ) ;
98
99 f r e s h a t i l d e : S t r ing ;
100 macro mrt i lde = hash ( messagef ix , pathtor , a t i l d e , R) ;
101
102 send_2 ( San i t i z e r , V e r i f i e r ,
103 {messagef ix , a t i l d e , pathtor , f l , mrt i lde }k ( San i t i z e r , V e r i f i e r ) ) ;
104
105 // recv acknowledgement o f c o r r e c t message
106 var resp21 ;
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107 recv_21 ( Ve r i f i e r , S an i t i z e r , { resp21 }k ( Ve r i f i e r , S a n i t i z e r ) ) ;
108 match ( resp21 , hash ( mrt i lde ) ) ;
109
110 // t e l l Scyther to v e r i f y c la im that keys are s e c r e t
111 claim_b01 ( San i t i z e r , Secret , k ( Signer , S a n i t i z e r ) ) ;
112 claim_b111 ( San i t i z e r , Secret , k ( Signer , S a n i t i z e r ) ) ;
113
114 // t e l l Scyther to v e r i f y c la ims that a l l s e c r e t s are t r u e l y s e c r e t
115 claim_b02 ( San i t i z e r , Secret , a ) ;
116 claim_b03 ( San i t i z e r , Secret , pathtor ) ;
117 claim_b04 ( San i t i z e r , Secret , pathtosz ) ;
118 claim_b05 ( San i t i z e r , Secret , ms ) ;
119 claim_b06 ( San i t i z e r , Secret , R) ;
120 claim_b07 ( San i t i z e r , Secret , mrt i lde ) ;
121 claim_b08 ( San i t i z e r , Secret , a t i l d e ) ;
122 claim_b09 ( San i t i z e r , Secret , resp21 ) ;
123
124 // t e l l Scyther to v e r i f y that a l l p a r t i e s where r e a l l y invo lved
125 claim_b10 ( San i t i z e r , Al ive , V e r i f i e r ) ;
126 claim_b11 ( San i t i z e r , Al ive , S igner ) ;
127 claim_b12 ( San i t i z e r , Niagree ) ;
128 claim_b13 ( San i t i z e r , Nisynch ) ;
129
130 // t e l l Scyther to v e r i f y that a l l messages were sent and r e c e i v ed
131 // by authent i c p a r t i e s
132 claim_b20 ( San i t i z e r , Commit , Signer ,
133 {hash (R)}k ( San i t i z e r , S igner ) ) ;
134 claim_b21 ( San i t i z e r , Commit , V e r i f i e r ,
135 {messagef ix , a t i l d e , pathtor , f l , mrt i lde }k ( San i t i z e r , V e r i f i e r ) ) ;
136
137 // t e l l Scyther to v e r i f y that r e a l S a n i t i z e r was r e a l l y invo lved during
138 // invo lved during the p ro to co l
139 claim_b31 ( San i t i z e r , Reachable ) ;
140
141 }
142
143 r o l e V e r i f i e r {
144 var pathtosz ;
145
146 recv_0 ( Signer , V e r i f i e r , { pathtosz ,
147 hash ( pathtosz , k ( Signer , V e r i f i e r ) )} k ( Signer , V e r i f i e r ) ) ;
148 claim_c01 ( Ve r i f i e r , Running , Signer ,
149 {hash ( pathtosz )}k ( Ve r i f i e r , S igner ) ) ;
150 send_01 ( Ve r i f i e r , S igner ,
151 {hash ( pathtosz )}k ( Ve r i f i e r , S igner ) ) ;
152
153 var message f ix ;
154 var pathtor ;
155 var a t i l d e ;
156 // var mrt i lde ;
157
158 recv_2 ( San i t i z e r , V e r i f i e r ,
159 {messagef ix , a t i l d e , pathtor , f l , mrt i lde }k ( San i t i z e r , V e r i f i e r ) ) ;
160 match ( mrt i lde , hash ( messagef ix , pathtor , a t i l d e ,
161 hash ( hash (k ( Signer , V e r i f i e r ) ) , pathtosz ) , pathtor ) ) ;
162
163 // acknowledge everyth ing i s f i n e
164 claim_c02 ( Ve r i f i e r , Running , San i t i z e r ,
165 {hash ( mrt i lde )}k ( Ve r i f i e r , S a n i t i z e r ) ) ;
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166 send_21 ( Ve r i f i e r , S an i t i z e r , {hash ( mrt i lde )}k ( Ve r i f i e r , S a n i t i z e r ) ) ;
167
168 // t e l l Scyther to v e r i f y c la im that keys are s e c r e t
169 claim_c04 ( Ve r i f i e r , Secret , k ( Signer , V e r i f i e r ) ) ;
170 claim_c05 ( Ve r i f i e r , Secret , k ( Ve r i f i e r , S igner ) ) ;
171 claim_c06 ( Ve r i f i e r , Secret , k ( Ve r i f i e r , S a n i t i z e r ) ) ;
172 claim_c07 ( Ve r i f i e r , Secret , k ( San i t i z e r , V e r i f i e r ) ) ;
173
174 // t e l l Scyther to v e r i f y c la ims that a l l s e c r e t s are t r u e l y s e c r e t
175 claim_c03 ( Ve r i f i e r , Secret , pathtosz ) ;
176 claim_c08 ( Ve r i f i e r , Secret , pathtor ) ;
177 claim_c09 ( Ve r i f i e r , Secret , a t i l d e ) ;
178 claim_c09 ( Ve r i f i e r , Secret , mrt i lde ) ;
179
180 // t e l l Scyther to v e r i f y that a l l p a r t i e s where r e a l l y invo lved
181 claim_c10 ( Ve r i f i e r , Al ive , S a n i t i z e r ) ;
182 claim_c11 ( Ve r i f i e r , Al ive , S igner ) ;
183 claim_c12 ( Ve r i f i e r , Niagree ) ;
184 claim_c13 ( Ve r i f i e r , Nisynch ) ;
185
186 // t e l l Scyther to v e r i f y that a l l messages were sent and r e c e i v ed
187 // by authent i c p a r t i e s
188 claim_c20 ( Ve r i f i e r , Commit , Signer ,
189 {hash ( pathtosz )}k ( Ve r i f i e r , S igner ) ) ;
190 claim_c21 ( Ve r i f i e r , Commit , V e r i f i e r ,
191 {hash ( mrt i lde )}k ( Ve r i f i e r , S a n i t i z e r ) ) ;
192
193 // t e l l Scyther to v e r i f y that r e a l V e r i f i e r was r e a l l y invo lved during
194 // the p ro to co l
195 claim_c31 ( Ve r i f i e r , Reachable ) ;
196
197 }
198 }
The Scyther output can be seen in B.4.
• Claim that all keys are secret.
• Claim that all secrets are secret.
• Claim that all parties where really involved.
• Claim that all messages were sent and received by authentic parties.
• Claim that all roles were really and adequately involved during the protocol
until the end.
Scyther did not found any attacks, i.e. deviations from the aforementioned
claims, on the protocol under the assumptions that the protocol verification is
decidable within 5 rounds and 10 patters per claim.
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Figure B.4: Verification of the MallMACs protocol
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B.4 Verification of the GroupMACs Protocol
For the verification of the GroupMACs protocol, Syther linux version 1.13 was
used on an Ubuntu 64Bit 17.04 machine with Python version 2.7.13. Note that
the Scyther folder has to be assigned execution rights for all files. The Scyther
configuration was typed matching, 5 protocol runs as maximum bound, 10 maximum
number of patterns per claim and find all attacks.
The Scyther model file of the protocol MallMACs is as follows:
1 hash funct ion hash ;
2
3 user type St r ing ;
4 var time : Nonce ;
5
6 pro to co l GroupMAC( Signer , V e r i f i e r , HP)
7 {
8
9 r o l e S igner
10 {
11 f r e s h message : S t r ing ;
12
13 macro K = hash ( Signer , HP, k ( Signer , HP) ) ;
14 macro h1 = hash (k ( Signer , HP) ) ;
15 macro h2 = hash ( h1 ) ;
16 c la im ( Signer , Running , V e r i f i e r , hash (message , h1 ) , hash (message , K) ) ;
17 send_0 ( Signer , V e r i f i e r ,
18 {message , h2 , hash (message , h1 ) , hash (message , K)}k ( Signer , V e r i f i e r ) ) ;
19
20 var mh1 ;
21 recv_3 ( Ve r i f i e r , S igner , {hash (mh1)}k ( Ve r i f i e r , S igner ) ) ;
22 match ( hash (mh1) , hash ( hash (message , h1 ) ) ) ;
23
24 // t e l l Scyther to v e r i f y c la im that keys are s e c r e t
25 claim_a01 ( Signer , Secret , k ( Signer , HP) ) ;
26
27 // t e l l Scyther to v e r i f y c la ims that a l l s e c r e t s are t r u e l y s e c r e t
28 claim_a02 ( Signer , Secret , K) ;
29 claim_a03 ( Signer , Secret , h1 ) ;
30 claim_a04 ( Signer , Secret , hash (mh1 ) ) ;
31
32 // t e l l Scyther to v e r i f y that a l l p a r t i e s where r e a l l y invo lved
33 claim_a10 ( Signer , Alive , V e r i f i e r ) ;
34 claim_a11 ( Signer , Niagree ) ;
35 claim_a15 ( Signer , Nisynch ) ;
36
37 // t e l l Scyther to v e r i f y that a l l messages were sent and r e c e i v ed
38 // by authent i c p a r t i e s
39 claim_a20 ( Signer , Commit , V e r i f i e r , hash (message , h1 ) , hash (message , K) ) ;
40
41 // t e l l Scyther to v e r i f y that r e a l S igner was r e a l l y invo lved during
42 // the p ro to co l
43 claim_a31 ( Signer , Reachable ) ;
44
45 }
46
47 r o l e V e r i f i e r
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48 {
49 var message ;
50
51 var mh1 ;
52 var mK;
53
54 recv_0 ( Signer , V e r i f i e r , {message , h2 , mh1 , mK}k( Signer , V e r i f i e r ) ) ;
55 c la im ( Ve r i f i e r , Running , HP, h2 ) ;
56 send_1 ( Ve r i f i e r , HP, {h2}k ( Ve r i f i e r , HP) ) ;
57
58 recv_2 (HP, Ve r i f i e r , {h1 , time}k (HP, V e r i f i e r ) ) ;
59
60 match (mh1 , hash (message , hash (mh1 ) ) ) ;
61
62 c la im ( Ve r i f i e r , Running , HP, hash (mh1 ) ) ;
63 send_3 ( Ve r i f i e r , S igner , {hash (mh1)}k ( Ve r i f i e r , S igner ) ) ;
64
65 c la im ( Ve r i f i e r , Running , HP, hash (h1 , time ) ) ;
66 send_4 ( Ve r i f i e r , HP, {hash (h1 , time )}k ( Ve r i f i e r , S igner ) ) ;
67
68
69 // t e l l Scyther to v e r i f y c la ims that a l l s e c r e t s are t r u e l y s e c r e t
70 claim_v00 ( Ve r i f i e r , Secret , mh1 ) ;
71 claim_v01 ( Ve r i f i e r , Secret , mK) ;
72 claim_v02 ( Ve r i f i e r , Secret , h1 ) ;
73
74 // t e l l Scyther to v e r i f y c la im that keys are s e c r e t
75 claim_v04 ( Ve r i f i e r , Secret , k ( Signer , V e r i f i e r ) ) ;
76 claim_v04 ( Ve r i f i e r , Secret , k ( Ve r i f i e r , HP) ) ;
77
78 // t e l l Scyther to v e r i f y that a l l p a r t i e s where r e a l l y invo lved
79 claim_v10 ( Ve r i f i e r , Al ive , S igner ) ;
80 claim_v11 ( Ve r i f i e r , Al ive , HP) ;
81
82 claim_v12 ( Ve r i f i e r , Weakagree , S igner ) ;
83 claim_v13 ( Ve r i f i e r , Weakagree , HP) ;
84
85 claim_v14 ( Ve r i f i e r , Niagree ) ;
86 claim_v15 ( Ve r i f i e r , Nisynch ) ;
87
88 // t e l l Scyther to v e r i f y that a l l messages were sent and r e c e i v ed
89 // by authent i c p a r t i e s
90 claim_v22 ( Ve r i f i e r , Commit , Signer , hash (mh1 ) ) ;
91 claim_v23 ( Ve r i f i e r , Commit , HP, hash (h1 , time ) ) ;
92
93 // t e l l Scyther to v e r i f y that r e a l V e r i f i e r was r e a l l y invo lved during
94 // invo lved during the p ro to co l
95 claim_v31 ( Ve r i f i e r , Reachable ) ;
96
97 }
98
99 r o l e HP
100 {
101
102 recv_1 ( Ve r i f i e r , HP, {h2}k ( Ve r i f i e r , HP) ) ;
103
104 match (h2 , hash ( hash (k ( Signer , HP) ) ) ) ;
105
106 f r e s h time : Nonce ;
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107
108 c la im (HP, Running , V e r i f i e r , h1 ) ;
109 send_2 (HP, Ve r i f i e r , {h1 , time}k (HP, V e r i f i e r ) ) ;
110
111 var resp ;
112 recv_4 ( Ve r i f i e r , HP, { resp }k ( Ve r i f i e r , S igner ) ) ;
113 match ( hash (h1 , time ) , r e sp ) ;
114
115 // t e l l Scyther to v e r i f y c la im that keys are s e c r e t
116 claim_h00 (HP, Secret , k ( Ve r i f i e r , S igner ) ) ;
117 claim_h03 (HP, Secret , k (HP, V e r i f i e r ) ) ;
118 claim_h04 (HP, Secret , k ( Signer , HP) ) ;
119
120 // t e l l Scyther to v e r i f y c la ims that a l l s e c r e t s are t r u e l y s e c r e t
121 claim_h01 (HP, Secret , hash (k ( Signer , HP) ) ) ;
122 claim_h02 (HP, Secret , h1 ) ;
123
124
125 // t e l l Scyther to v e r i f y that a l l p a r t i e s where r e a l l y invo lved
126 claim_h11 (HP, Alive , HP) ;
127
128 claim_h13 (HP, Weakagree , HP) ;
129
130 claim_h14 (HP, Niagree ) ;
131 claim_h15 (HP, Nisynch ) ;
132
133
134 // t e l l Scyther to v e r i f y that a l l messages were sent and r e c e i v ed
135 // by authent i c p a r t i e s
136 claim_h23 (HP, Commit , V e r i f i e r , h1 ) ;
137
138 // t e l l Scyther to v e r i f y that r e a l HP was r e a l l y invo lved during
139 // the p ro to co l
140 claim_h31 (HP, Reachable ) ;
141 }
142 }
The Scyther output can be seen in B.5.
Following claims have been defined (for specifics, please refer to the protocol
description):
• Claim that all keys are secret.
• Claim that all secrets are secret.
• Claim that all parties where really involved.
• Claim that all messages were sent and received by authentic parties.
• Claim that all roles were really and adequately involved during the protocol
until the end.
Scyther did not found any attacks, i.e. deviations from the aforementioned
claims, on the protocol under the assumptions that the protocol verification is
decidable within 5 rounds and 10 patters per claim.
Data Protection for the Internet of Things Santiago Reinhard Suppan, 2017
B. PROTOCOL DESIGN AND VERIFICATION 241
Figure B.5: Verification of the GroupMACs protocol
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